3rd Home Rule Bill

    In 1910 the main Home Rule party had 70Mp’s. since 1900 its leader had been John Redmond, while second in command was John Dillon. After 1906 Joseph Dillon also emerged as a leading member of the party. The opposition to this party was the Unionist Party, lead by Edward Carson, second in command being Sir James Craig. The parties continually struggled for the Irish vote, but it was the Unionist party that had the upper hand.
   
    Since 1886 the conservatives party, who dominated the House of Lords , maintained close links with the Irish unionists. The British vote was the only way to get Home Rule for Ireland, only by convincing a majority of them to agree, could get they win their own parliament. The reason for the British denial was simple, the security of Britain was the most important, also they wished to protect Irish Protestants from the Catholic majority, as well as many British believing the Irish inferior.

    However some Liberal leaders such as Herbert Asquith, Augustine Birrell, David Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill, favoured Home Rule. In April 1912, Asquith presented the third Home Rule Bill and in 1914 it was introduced. For unionists the Home Rule Bill threatened disaster. Carson and Craig knew that with the Lords veto gone as a result of the General Election, they would be unable to stop it in parliament. Ulster resistance to Home Rule began as soon as the Parliament Act removed the Lords Veto.

    At first unionists preformed massive demonstrations, their most impressive staged in September 1912. The document called the “Ulster Solemn League and Covenant”, was signed before this rally. On the 28th of September 1912, Craig organised rallies of the 470,000 men and 250,000 women who signed the covenant. The covenant expressed the Unionists opposition to the Home Rule because it would mean “disastrous to the material well being of Ulster and destructive of our citizenship.

    “Using all Means” was stated in the covenant. This statement brought the formation of the Ulster Volunteers a group of well drilled and armed unionists. Volunteers were able to put pressure on the government, but there was a danger that some might engage in violence and damage the cause. In response to this the Ulster Volunteer force (UVF) was formed by the Ulster unionist council in early 1913. Retired general, Sir George Richardson as commander. Wealthy sympathisers set up as secret arms fund which contained £1million by 1914. Carson hoped that the mass demonstrations and the UVF would convince the British people that the Irish Protestants were opposed to Home Rule, perhaps forcing the Liberals to drop it.

    British Conservatives enthusiastically supported the Unionists. in 1911 the conservatives got a new leader, Andrew Bonar Law. He was more committed to Unionists that previous conservative leaders. In 1912 at a rally of British Unionists he stated the two mains reasons why British Unionists opposed Home Rule. The first was the belief that the Home Rule Bill was part of a “corrupt bargain”, between Redmond and the Liberals. Secondly it was considered unjust to expel the unionists from the UK, depriving them of all British citizenship. All through 1912-1914, British and Irish unionists issued pamphlets and organised speeches and demonstrations throughout Britain.

    Partition were considered a solution. Ireland would be divided into two parts. Ulster would remain within the Unitied Kingdom, while the rest of Ireland would have Home Rule. Partition appealed more to Craig than Carson. A wealthy Belfast businessman, Craig believed that the 890,000 Ulster unionists would manage very well. Carson, however a Dublin man, didn’t want the 250,000 southern Unionists left at the mercy of the Catholic, Nationalist majority.

    Asquith a Birrell worried over the Unionist opposition. However Redmond advised them to leave them alone. There were various reasons for this. In 1912 they only held 19 seats, while Home Rulers held 84. Redmond underestimated the UVF and believed Carson and Craig to be bluffing violence. The RIC had little informers on the Unionist campaign and so no one in London realised its strength. Finally the chief secretary and Asquith did little to stop the crisis. All of these combined meant the Unionist opposition became a serious force.