Account for The Failure of The Weimar Republic and German Democracy

In order to account for the failure of German democracy in the interwar period, it is necessary, first, to examine the nature of the Versailles Treaty in relation to the period between 1924 and 1929; second, to recognize the flaws in the Weimar constitution (in particular article 48) and the nature of proportional representation; and third, to determine the effects of nationalism and the Great Depression on the vulnerable republic. This essay will seek to demonstrate that this unique combination of events and developments, allowed Hitler and the Nazi Party to come to power and, consequently, democracy to fail. Further, it will argue that democracy in Germany was flawed from the first use of Article 48, but ultimately failed with the Enabling Act (March 1933) which was, ironically, voted in by the democratically elected Weimar government. Ultimately it will be argued that the failure of democracy was not inevitable, as argued by historians such as A.J.P Taylor, because democracy thrived in Germany between 1924 and 1929. This suggests that a collection of significant developments and events leading up to the failure of democracy must be considered as potential factors in its demise.

The Versailles Treaty, a document of 440 Articles, outlined the ‘conditions of peace’ that Germany was to adhere to. The reduction in the size of the army (Article 159) and navy (Article 181); elimination of any air force (Article 198); infamous War Guilt Clause (Article 231); and reparations repayments (Article 232) [1] created a sense of humiliation and bitterness amongst the German people. Historians such as A.J.P Taylor argue that “Reparations counted as a symbol. They created resentment, suspicion and international hostility. More than anything else, they cleared the way for the Second World War.”[2] Arguably, the only idea in this statement that is viable is that Article 232 in the Versailles Treaty created “resentment, suspicion and international hostility.” To argue that the reparation repayments were cause for the failure of democracy is to omit consideration of the events that took place in Germany between 1924 and 1929.

Gustav Stresemann, the Foreign Secretary, remained in this position through six different cabinets between December 1923 and June 1928.[3] After hyperinflation in 1923, which saw one US dollar equal to 191.8 marks in January 1922, becoming 4.2 trillion marks by 15 November 1923, [4] the Dawes Plan was put in place (August 1924) under Stresemann, after being pushed through the Reichstag. Seeing 16 billion Reichsmarks to enter the German economy in the form of American loans; allowed the German government to repay 7 billion Reichsmarks in reparations.[5] German industry was therefore able to return to production levels similar to pre-WWI. In addition, factories were upgraded allowing large improvements in manufacturing processes.[6]