Account for The Failure of The Weimar Republic and German Democracy

The growing fear of Communism also added to the NSPAD vote in 1932, as did the appeal of Nazi nationalism. Ruth Henig writes that, “Throughout the 1920s, the image of a united German people selflessly pursing a common destiny in war, on the battlefields and in the factories and workshops at home, was repeatedly contrasted with the allegedly shabby political compromises and self-seeking deals of Weimar politicians.”[25] Both the old Junker-based right and the new radical right (NSDAP) of the Weimar republic agreed on a few things: they were both anti-socialist, anti-democratic, anti-liberal, anti-Republic, anti-communist, authoritarian and militaristic. The ‘Old Right’ (Hindenburg and von Papen), believed they could manipulate the ‘New Right’ and use them as a vehicle in “abolishing parliamentary government, reinstalling the old elites in power, and removing the constitutional necessity for parliamentary elections.”[26] Franz von Papen, who became chancellor in May 1932, after Brüning was forced to resign, had strong influence on Hindenburg, though was forced to resign and the Reichswehr man, Kurt von Schleicher, became chancellor in December 1932. Historian Richard Evans argues that “Hindenburg and his entourage […] detested Schleicher [and…] recognised that co-opting Hitler and the Nazis was the only way to get rid of him.”[27] Given the presence of shared right-wing interests and collaboration, it becomes possible to argue, as Eric Weitz does, that “Only the total and complete defeat of the Right [new and old] could ensure the republic’s health and well-being.”[28]

Democracy failed with the passing of the ‘Act for the Removal of the Distress of the People and the Reich’ (Enabling Act). Just under a month prior to this act, the Reichstag Fire Decree, responding to the 27 February Reichstag fire, allowing for the “persecution and elimination of political opponents”,[29] principally communist politicians who were murdered, imprisoned or fled. To pass the Act, the NSPAD, needed support. After promising to “respect the rights of the churches” [30], the Zentrum (Catholic Centre Party) agreed to support the Enabling Act. The Nazis also had the support of the DNVP and the Act passed with 444 votes to 94 SPD votes against.  

To account for the failure of German democracy in the interwar period, the ‘Golden Age’ (1924-1929) must be surveyed in order to illustrate that the argument of inevitability, with its emphasis on Versailles, is invalid. The Versailles Treaty and the Weimar constitution were important factors in weakening the republic, but it was the effects of the Great Depression – provided impetus for the electoral success of radical nationalists and the renewed fear of communism – and the willingness of the traditional German right-wing elite to collaborate with Hitler and the NSDAP that ultimately created the conditions necessary for the failure of democracy.

[1] Primary Documents: Treaty of Versailles, April 1919 viewed at: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles159-213.htm

[2] A.J.P Taylor, The origins of the Second World War, Atheneum, 1983, p. 44

[3] Henig. R, The Weimar Republic 1919-1933, Routledge, 1998, p. 39

[4] Gordon Graig, Germany 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press), pg 450

[5] Henig. R, The Weimar Republic 1919-1933 p. 41

[6] ibid

[7] Fullbrook. M, A Concise History of Germany, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 168

[8] ibid . 170

[9] O’Loughlin. J, Flint. Colin, Anselin. Luc, “Geography of the Nazi Vote”, Taylor and Francis, 1994 p. 356

[10] Preuß, H, Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919, 1919 viewed at: http://www.southalabama.edu/history/faculty/rogers/348/article48.html

[11] Henig. R, The Weimar Republic 1919-1933 p. 14

[12] Evans. R, The Coming of the Third Reich, Penguin Group, 2003, p. 80

[13] ibid p.80

[14] ibid p. 14

[15] Fullbrook. M, A Concise History of Germany p. 173

[16] Henig. R, The Weimar Republic 1919-1933 p. 65

[17] Darby. G, “Hitler’s Rise and Weimar’s Demise”, History Review, 2004, p. 44

[18] This discounts the problematic election result of 1944

[19] Darby. G, “Hitler’s Rise and Weimar’s Demise” p. 43

[20] ibid p. 45

[21] ibid p. 44

[22] German National People’s Party

[23] Darby. G, “Hitler’s Rise and Weimar’s Demise” p. 44

[24] Rees. L, The Nazis: a warning from history, Part 2, BBC, 2006  p. 31

[25] Henig. R, The Weimar Republic 1919-1933, Routledge, 1998, p. 5

[26] Fullbrook. M, A Concise History of Germany, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 176

[27] Evans. R, “The Coming of the Third Reich”, History Review, 2004, p. 17

[28] Weitz. E, Weimar Germany: promise and tragedy, Princeton University Press, 2007 p. 111

[29] Deutscher Bundestag, “The Enabling Act of 23 March 1933”, 2006

[30] ibid