Comparing Truman’s Policy Towards China with Johnson’s Policy in Relation to Vietnam

The American government had not intervened in the Chinese Civil War, despite favouring the Nationalists over the Communists. There had been United States aid to China during World War Two to prop up Chinese resistance to the Japanese, which was most effectively carried out by the Communists. Truman did not believe that his administration had to intervene in China after the defeat of Japan as he overestimated the strength of the Nationalist government. At the end of World War II the Cold War did not immediately start, so Truman was not avowedly anti-Communist enough to want to intervene in China. Perhaps if Truman had realised how readily Mao Zedong’s communist forces would gain full control of China he would have intervened sooner, though it is doubtful that he would have wanted to involve large numbers of American troops in an un-winnable war.

Stopping the communists gaining power in China fitted in with what became known as the Truman doctrine. Unfortunately, Truman’s decision to intervene in China came too late to safe the Nationalist regime, the remnants of which went into exile on the island of Taiwan. The failure to prevent the Communist takeover in China was a major blow to United States foreign policy, yet it made Truman determined to prevent Communism spreading to other vulnerable states in Asia, especially South Korea and South Vietnam. In both cases the other parts of the countries were under Communist control. Truman was able to prevent the North Koreans from successfully invading South Korea, yet the Korean War proved to be very costly.

Like Korea, Vietnam had been divided along the boundaries of where Soviet and American forces had been when the Japanese had surrendered. Vietnam had been part of French Indo-China, until Ho Chi Minh had defeated them leading to the formal partition of Vietnam upon independence from France. The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had certainly been concerned about the North Vietnamese threat to South Vietnam, and had sent military advisors there.

Kennedy’s assassination left the decision to increase or decrease American involvement in Vietnam to Johnson. Publicly it seemed that Johnson did not want to increase involvement in Vietnam. Johnson’s apparent unwillingness to escalate involvement in Vietnam had more to do with gaining Congressional approval and funding rather than doubts about full scale intervention being successful.

The tactics of North Vietnam and the Vietcong made it harder for Johnson to convince Congress that greater involvement was needed. Instead of a full- blown invasion the North Vietnamese and Vietcong resorted to guerrilla attacks on Couth Vietnam. Johnson was able to justify increased American involvement after the Bay of Tonkin incident in 1964 in which the North Vietnamese attacked American destroyers. After that incident Congress approved and funded a major escalation in American involvement.

The onset of the Cold War meant that the United States could not return to isolationism again. Truman feared the Communists taking power in China, as that would alter the strategic balance in favor of the Soviet Union, yet intervention came too late to stop Mao Zedong. Johnson had seemed to want to concentrate on domestic issues yet the Bay of Tonkin made up his mind to stop South Vietnam falling under communist control.

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