Does Islam and Start and Continue Wars?

Does the role of Islam in the Iran-Iraq war (80-88) suggest that the nature of Political Islam provokes and expands conflicts?

This essay will look to examine the role of Islam in motivation and instruction of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. By doing so it will aim to assess the validity of academic literature that sees religion in general as inflexible, fanatical, and by this merit conflictual. More pertinently to Iran, it will also examine the hypothesis that Islam is an expansionist religion, which by its very nature is incompatible with modern stable, secular, nations states and systems. To do this essay will draw upon the ideas of orientalist theorist like Samuel Huntington and Roger Scruton to better understand the concerns over the nature of Islam and the Clash of Civilizations rhetoric. By doing this the essay will develop a hypothesis, which will predict the actions of an Islamic state as described by the aforementioned theorists. The essay will then examine the evidence of from the Iran-Iraq war, to test the hypothesis and conclude on its validity.

Firstly therefore let us consider how theorists like Huntington view Islam. The nature of any religion is in itself a complex thing, and clearly it varies depending on individual practice. Islam also has various sects (Sunni and Shi’a being the key ones) and variance in the way in which they Islam is practiced. However, some theorists do believe that Islam has some key traits that define its nature, to a point whereas it is incompatible with modern nation states. Firstly they see is as a religion of personal and clan allegiance, which runs against the impersonal nature of secular states. They also see it as an all encompassing religion, with its own religious law, and where God is sovereign, not the state, or the people. Importantly to later discussions it is argued that Islam does not recognize the legitimacy of the nation state system, in stead looking to unify the Islamic world into a community or ‘Ummah’. Given then the ideas about the nature of Islam within the state system, it might be asked how an Islamic state might act. Essentially it is argued that, whilst Christianity has a basis for peace in the forgiving nature of Christ, Islamic society aspires to that lead by Muhammad, which look to expand via conquest.

It is now possible to combine these ideas about Islam with a general thesis on the nature of religion to consider what role we might expect religion to play within a conflict. Like most religion, Islam offers an after-life. It also offers eternal pleasure for martyrs in the cause of Islam. Given the difficulty of deterring an individual who wishes to die for a cause, we might expect this to add a degree of fanaticism to fighters, which might simple not exist in secular soldiers. As Lewis points out, Islam is: ‘Not merely a system of belief and worship……It is rather the whole of life’. Thus it might be predicted that conflicts with a religions element may be more intractable, as the fighting is over fundamental elements of the beliefs and lifestyle of the combatants. Given the religious nature of the Iranian state, it may also be expected that the state would not follow pragmatic, reasonable goals, but to aim instead towards uncompromising religious aim, the cost in human suffering which is, to them, simply irreverent. 
Now that we have briefly examined the ideas of Huntington, Scruton and Lewis, it is possible to derive some form of hypothesis, which can later be tested. The expectations are therefore that an Islamic state would seek to expand, in order both to unite the ‘Ummah’, and because the ideal state for Muslims is an expansionist one. Because of the promise of afterlife we might expect to see tactics that show little concern for the loss of human life, it is after all not so much lost, as progressed to a ‘better place’. As Huntington has argued that religion forms something fundamental to people’s identity, it may be expected that wars over such fundamentals would be intractable, as compromise would be practically impossible. 
It is now possible to examine the Iran-Iraq war, and consider the balance of evidence for or against the hypothesis. Firstly it is worth saying that in 1979 Iran went through a revolution that resulted in it becoming the Islamic republic of Iran.
It had a commitment to Islamic principles, and the spreading of the revolution to unite the Islamic Ummah. Because of this it is argued that Iran lacked respect for the state system in the Middle East, and set about the subversion of sounding states, supporting Shi’te revolts in Iraq, Saudi and Kuiwait. This involved the attempted assassination of the Deputy prime minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz and information minister Latif Nusseif al-jasmin. Given this subversion, and Iran’s commitment to spreading the revolution, Iraq chose to strike whilst Iran was still vulnerable after its military purges. As pre-revolutionary Iran had a vastly greater military power than Iran, and that even the Islamic Republic of Iran had significant, territorial and population advantages over Iraq, it is easy to see why Iraq might wish to take the transitory strategic advantage. Therefore on the 17th September 1980 Saddam Hussein, declared the treaty that had temporarily resolved the border dispute between the two states null and void. The war was swift in coming after that, with Iraq launching a lightning strike with limited territorial aims.

The war started on the 22nd September 1980, with Iraq attacking with ten divisions and attempting to hold limited Iranian territory alone the line of Khorramshahr-Ahvaz-Susangerd-Musian. The resulting war would last eight years and itself had many battles and involve complex variance in tactics and strategic position, however, the complex strategic details are not of pivotal importance to this essay. One must remember that evidence is being sought for Iran’s actions in war to verify the hypothesis. Primarily, therefore, the focus will be on Iranian military tactics that show a disregard for human life, and a high degree of fanaticism. In the ‘human wave’ strategy it would seem that such evidence can be found. In this tactic the ‘Basij-i-musta’afin’ (mobilization of the oppressed) were encouraged to become martyrs in defense of Iran. This tactic aimed to use wave after wave of devout perspective martyrs in an attempt to exhaust the Iraqi’s stores of ammunition and overwhelmed them. This tactic was even extend to Iran’s boy soldiers who were used in ‘human wave’ tactics, on bicycles, but also to clear land mines by running over them. This certainly seems to show the fanaticism and lack of concern for the welfare of Iranian citizens that our hypothesis predicts. 
It might be argued that, in an attempt to repulse the Iraqi military, and in a state of weakness, Iran was justified in utilizing such ‘human wave’ tactic, in some wars, mirroring Russian tactics in world war two to repulse NAZI Germany(although the motivation in that case was national defense not God). However by May 1982, Iran had changed the course of the war, and practically forced Iraqi forces out of Iran. Despite this Iran continued to use the ‘Human wave’ tactic with the lack of artillery or air cover used ensuring a large cost of life without any significant tactical gains . Furthermore Iraq offered repeated peace treaties, offering compete Iraqi withdrawal from Iran. The hypothesis suggests that Islamic leadership would be committed to the unity of the Ummah, and thus wish to pursue the overthrow of the secular regime in Iraq. It might then be expected that Iran would refuse peace, and instead aim towards the destruction of the Iraqi regime, irrespective of the human cost.
This is very much what is observed; Iran declined offers of peace, and took the war into Iraq. Iran looked to take Iraqi territory and de-stabilize the regime, even costly and repetitive defeats failed to deter them. The Iranian leadership saw the war as one where: “we are fighting for religion not our territory” and one in which there was: “no question of peace or compromise”. Thus the war was seen as one against Islam itself. Given that peace may have been advantageous this seems further to indicate that pragmatic politics are not such a concern for a religiously motivated state. Iran eventually managed to secure small amounts of Iraqi territory, but the use of chemical weapons Iraq lead to another stalemate. 
In the long period between 1984, and 1988 in which Iran saw no significant advance into Iraqi territory, and in fact was driven back into Iran, we find some considerable evidence for the Islamic nature of Iran exacerbating and prolonging the conflict.
Primarily it must be noted that the religious justification for the continued conflict left the Iranian leadership in a very difficult position. They had claimed that God was on their side, and that God would gain victory for them. The Symbolic significance of victory was heightened by actions such as naming the conflicts after the campaigns of Muhammad leading to an even greater reluctance to sue for peace. The theocratical belief in spreading of the Islamic also led to reluctance towards a peace that allowed the secular regime of Iraq to prosper. The result of this religious zeal was that Iran declined the offer of a peace treaty with Iraq on no less than nine occasions during the eight year war. Not only that, but they were happy to let their citizens suffer five ‘wars of the cities’, and their economy stifle. 
Through all this Khonomeini and the Clerical leadership were giving Islamic justification for the conflict, encouraging martyrs, and issuing a Fatwa demanding the destruction of destruction of Iraq. It was only the hopelessness of the conflict brought about by Iraqi advances and US involvement that eventually forced Iran into accepting a cease fire in July 1988, and even then Khonomeini was reluctant comparing accepting peace as being like drinking a cup of poison
Our hypothesis predicted that the Islamic nature of the Iranian state would result in expansionist tenancies, and a lack of regard for the state system, which would lend itself to Iran looking to undermine local regimes, to spread the revolution.
In Iran’s support for Shi’ia groups in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi, there would appear to be some evidence for this. It was also expected that Iran’s religious justification for the conflict and religious motivation for its soldiers would lend itself to tactics that showed little regards for the cost of human life. In the ‘human wave’ strategy, and the continuation of the conflict even when the military thought it was a lost cause and city strikes seemed to make the war pointless and costly, seems to offer more evidence for the hypothesis. It was also predicted that the religious motivates for the continuation of the conflict, combined with a belief that God supported their cause would result in Iran being reluctance to sue for peace.
Given the nine refusals Iran offered in response to Iraqi offers of peace, there would appear to be some evidence for this element of the hypothesis also. However, all the evidence has not been considered. This essay will now examine the evidence against Islam as major causal factor in the Iran-Iraq war.
Primarily it must be noted that the Iran-Iraq war was a territorial and resource one. Iraq wanted greater access to the sea, Iranian oil reserves, and to settle the territorial dispute resolved out of its favor in the 1975 Algeria agreement. Given this it is clear that Iraq saw the opportunity presented by temporary Iranian weakness, and took it. Iraq had aspirations toward regional hegemony, and thought that it could win a shift victory towards by using strategic surprise. Given then that the expansion of the Islamic empire was not in fact the direct cause of the conflict religion is instantly relegated to a possible agitating, or exacerbating force acting on a problem that would surely have still existed even had religion not.

Iran did of course use some fairly extreme tactics, the ‘human wave’ being the most notable. However this form of tactic is not completely different from that of tactics in World War One, even if the primary motivation for dying is one of national defense not defense of God. British tactics involved troupes walking towards German machine gunners, often simply to force Germany to defend, and ease pressure on other front. Its certainly true that Iran was quite happy to see a lot of its people die for its war efforts, and that its people lined up to die. However, again one wonders if this is really a unique attribute of Islamic or even religious motivation. There are many dictators who have used children soldiers, and have had little concern for their people. This seems more an attribute of ruthless dictators than of Islam or religion. Besides that, the war turned out to be an ideal way to unify the population, and the human wave tactic proved a great way to rid Iran’s clerics of the radical left-wingers who they feared might rise up against them.
The idea that Iran was intractable in regards to seeking a peace treaty owing to its religions justification and belief seems again to suffer from an alternative explanation. It would seem that geo-strategic concerns were more important that God in determining Iranian policy. Iran wanted to oust Saddam Hussein, the leader who had order the invasion of Iran. With its large population, and oil reserves, Iran had harbored regional power aspiration which would have been greatly assisted by the weakening of Iraq. It’s worth pointing out that if Islam was used to justify the war in Iran, then Islam was also used to justify its cessation. One presumed that the cost had become too high, and that the chance of victory had become too low, something that would hardly affect the true religious zealot. It is furthermore hard to ignore the role of the supreme leader in such a personality driven system, and Khomeini was particularly stubborn in his commitment to continue the conflict.
Again, perhaps we can see Iran’s reluctance as more a matter of a centralized system based on the stubborn personality of Khomeini, who considered the destruction of Iraq a personal commitment and was still sore after his exile from Iraq.
It is possible to exaggerate the intransigent ahistoric nature of religion. The same Islam that was used to justify the ruthless continuation of the war was in fact used to justify its cessation. Thus Islam can be a dynamic force, one that might be utilized to justify a variety of actions, as they become politically expedient. Gieling’s analysis on the nature of Jihad and religious ideas are of particular interest in this regard, they point out the pure diversity of justifications used. The concept of defensive Jihad was to mobilize the masses, and Jihad of the tongue to justify propaganda. To think of Islamic society as simply aspiring to be similar to the expansionist world of Muhammad is a rather simplistic static view of Islam. Given that the Korean forbids war against Muslims , the killing of innocents, and the forcible expansion of Islam, it could well be argued that Islam offers a stable basis for peace. It also seems to be a limited argument to claim that, even though Muslims have participated in a variety of political systems, from Milieu, to monarchy, from despot to democracy, that they somehow would be unable to accept the state system. Although Iran did indeed claim to wish to export the revolution the meaning of this is unclear. At times it would appear to mean the armed, forced export of the revolution, whereas at other times it would seem to mean simply proving a good example of how Muslims might live, so that they may choose to follow the example. In fact, given the flexibility of Islam, and verity of interpretations of Islam thought history and the Iran-Iraq war, one wonders if the exacerbating facts of Islam might be more to do with politics and power than the nature of Islam.
The insecurity caused by the international system of states in anarchy, combined with territorial and resource concerns seem to explain the Iran-Iraq war effectively. Therefore our hypothesis seems, in this example, to have little in the way of validity in regards the starting of the conflict. However, it must be noted that the religiously motivated fanaticism of the Iranian volunteer forces does seem to at least suggest that religion had an effect on the ferocity and longevity of the conflict.
The human wave tactics, and simple disregard of the cost of the conflict could also be seen as evidence for religion adding to length and destruction of the conflict. In the nine peace-treaty declines, we can also see that there is some evidence for Islamic justifications of the war adding to its length. It is also clear that Iran’s pragmatic state interests would have been better served by seeking an advantageous peace in 1982. However, if we view Islam as an ideology, one that is evolving over time, and can be adapted to different political and individual circumstances, it become more difficult to see religion as the causal factor. In fact it would seem that religion is more the justification for very practical pragmatic aims. It is also clear that the personal grievance and the personality of Khomeini was at least as instrumental in the intractability of the conflict as Islam. Given that very nonreligious regimes have employed a similar disregard for human life, and a similar tenancy to avoid peace, it is difficult to claim any serious evidence for for our hypothesis. As religion both motivates and is used as a justification for both acts of war and peace, acts of hate, violence, and love, is it abundantly clear that it does not have a consistent and negative effect. 

Bibliography

Benard, Cheryl, Zalmay Khalizad (1984) The Government of God Columbia University press, USA
Gielingm Saskia (1999) Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran I.B Tauris and Co LTD
Hubin, Shahram and Tripp Charles (1988) Iran and Iraq at War I.B Tauris and co LLT, London, UK
Karsh, Efraim(2002) The Iran Iraq War 1980-1988 Osprey Publishing UK
Kepel, Gilles(2006), Jihad :the trail of political Islam I.B. Tauris London
Lewis, Bernad (1993) Islam and the West Oxford University Press
Ramazani, R.K (1990) Iran’s Revolution Middle East institute, USA
Scruton, Roger ((2002) The West and the Rest continuum, UK
Wright, Martin (ETD) (1989) Iran:The Khomeini revolution Longman, LTD, Essex, UK

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