Henry Cabot Lodge and the 1963 Diem Coup
The 1963 Diem coup during the Vietnam War as well as the American ambassador’s role in it.
By the beginning of October 1963, American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge had long reached the point of no return in supporting a coup and where the U.S. administration in Washington could effectively restrain Lodges behavior. On October 3, Lodge authorized a meeting between his trusted CIA contact Lucien Conein and South Vietnamese Generals Don and Minh. The next day, the CIA chief in Saigon John Richardson was transferred out of the country and replaced. Some have subsequently made the claim that the Richardson re-assignment was done at Lodges request, while others have argued that it was unrelated to the Ambassador but rather was meant as a sign to the Vietnamese. Lodge did make a request for removing Richardson as CIA station chief in Saigon a month earlier, but that request had been refused. No conclusive answer can be given.
On October 5, President Kennedy issued a final policy directive that remained in effect until the Diem coup on November 1:
President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup. There should however be, urgent, covert effort to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership Essential that this effort be totally secure and fully deniable.
On October 24, Lodge sent CIA contact Conein to meet with General Don one more time to discuss progress of the coup, which now was planned for the week leading up to November 2. The coup had entered its final stage and Lodge had one more meeting to attend to: that with the President of the Republic. Lodge met Diem on October 28. He described him as very likeable. In an act of extreme duplicity Lodge responded to Diems accusations, that anti-GVN activity was being conducted by agencies of the American government, by coldly insisting that should he have any proof of improper action by any employee of the U.S. government I will see he leaves Vietnam. Presumably, he was not referring to himself.
On October 30, Lodge sent one more cable about an imminence of a coup, concluding once more that the U.S. was in no position to stop or delay a coup. While the Presidents security adviser William Bundy cabled a response denying that this was the case, the window for action had been closed and the coup was imminent. On November 1, General Harkins received the first report of the coup taking place, with with the central police station being seized. Diem, upon hearing of the coup, called the ambassador asking him what the opinion of the U.S. government was:
Liked it
