Who should be credited with the battle of Isandlwana?

The battle of Isandlwana is historically regarded as one of the worst defeats suffered by the British army, and the worst defeat against an inferior native army. Although nobody will dispute the fact that the battle of Isandlwana was a serious defeat, and that there were probably several reasons, what is disputed is how the defeat came about. We know that the Zulu army was well led and surprisingly well trained, and we also know that their weaponry was much better suited for close combat than the British, but we also know that the British army, and it’s leaders, made several mistakes both in regards to the single battle, and also to the Zulu war as a whole. Commanding the majority of the British army in Zululand was Lord Chelmsford, who was also in personal command of all the soldiers involved in the main battle, as well as the large number of regular soldiers he had with him at the time.

Possibly the first error made by Lord Chelmsford was him wrongly predicting that the tactics of the Zulu’s would be to try and avoid a large battle, and to fight in smaller skirmishes or avoid any confrontation until the British had to retire. As a method to combat this, Chelmsford originally planned to send five separate columns into Zululand, and essentially prevent the Zulu’s from avoiding a major confrontation by surrounding them. This was changed into three columns, the 4th and 1st columns continued as originally planned, but the 3rd and 2nd merged into a larger central column. The fifth column, consisting of roughly 2,300 men did not enter Zululand at all. The obvious flaw in this tactic was that, having wrongly anticipated the Zulu tactics, any of his individual forces were open to attack and much smaller than the Zulu army, which consisted of around 20,000 men. The central column at its peak numbered around 8,500 men in total. As the intention had been to prevent the Zulu army escaping, upon entering Zululand all of the three columns were to far apart to help each other.

Lord Chelmsford’s second mistake was that his plans required haste in order to work properly, and as a result, he marched into Zululand in January, which was the rainy season. Therefore, in addition to the artillery and supplies the British army had to carry with them, the terrain and weather also hindered their progress. The British army couldn’t move a large body of troops quickly in any direction. If the invasion had been prolonged, or Chelmsford had accounted for the hindrance in his plans, then the British army would have either been more manoeuvrable or prepared for the consequences of this. This was not just a problem during the time in Zululand however; they also slowed before they had even left Natal. As a result, Chelmsford gave the Zulu’s more time to react and intercept the British troops, whilst also making any chance of the columns aiding each other almost impossible.

Another major error caused by Lord Chelmsford was that the British army, as well as originally splitting into several columns, then went on to once again split his main column at Rorke’s drift, albeit for a hospital camp. Despite this resulting in a second battle which was successful for the British, through doing so he lost a few hundred of the natal native contingency, which did not contribute to the battle of Rorke’s drift, but would have been an important part of the battle at Isandlwana, due to the fairly small number of soldiers in the actual battle itself. So Lord Chelmsford split his forces to many times in the build up to the battle, and shortly before the battle itself split his forces again.

Apparently, Lord Chelmsford should have expected these things to cause him problems, according to Lieutenant Colonel Edward Durnford, brother of Colonel Anthony Durnford, a casualty and highest ranking officer present during the main battle. Edward Durnford claimed in 1882, three years after the battle took place, that a veteran of fighting Zulu’s said “Be on your guard and careful. Place your spies far out, and form your wagons into a circle for defence. The Zulu’s are more dangerous than you think.” Apparently Chelmsford ignored this advice, believing that the Zulu’s were inferior. This coincides with several other similar reports, and apparently other, smaller groups of Europeans had in the past been attacked by Zulu’s in Zululand, and had been defeated fairly easily, even those who took precautions. This has lead many people to believe Chelmsford was overconfident and did not respect the ability of the Zulu fighters; this could have caused a lapse in the planning or preparations made, and then resulted in the British defeat as a consequence. Perhaps this can be forgiven, almost all conflicts with African cultures resulted in easy victories for the British solely because of the superior weaponry, and in Chelmsford’s case, large numbers. So, one of Chelmsford’s serious mistakes was overconfidence and this could easily have caused the defeat regardless of whether this mistake is understandable.

On the twentieth of January, Chelmsford and his men arrived at Isandlwana hill. Immediately, Chelmsford began to make mistakes that either resulted in the British defeat, or would have made a British victory much harder. At this time he did not know the location of the Zulu’s or their plans, and being overconfident he ignored the standing order throughout the British army to entrench. He also did not form the wagons into a circle, as the veteran had suggested, taking a logistical view, believing it unnecessary, and would take to long under the circumstances. His objection was “It would take a week!” and as he believed there was no threat from the Zulu’s, that sort of delay was unacceptable. As a result, the only real defence the British had was the soldiers themselves, having set up no form of defensive position. In reality, the camp at Isandlwana was just that, a camp. So Chelmsford clearly did not anticipate, or take precautions against an attack. This may have been one of the most serious mistakes, as Rorke’s Drift was undoubtedly a British victory against the same army, yet there the defensive positions proved crucial in combating the Zulu’s.

Perhaps ironically, one thing that Chelmsford did do right resulted in a much larger problem for the British, essentially falling into a Zulu trap. He sent out a large number of scouts from the Natal Native Contingency, who came upon a force of Zulu’s. These, it was believed, were the vanguard of the main Zulu force, and therefore Chelmsford took 2,500 men, leaving around 1,400 at the camp, to find and destroy the main Zulu force before it could attack. Little did he know, this first force was a decoy, and he had himself moved more than half of his soldiers away from what was to be the genuine battleground. In addition, the soldiers Chelmsford took with him comprised of more than half the British regular infantry. The native soldiers fighting under the British were good soldiers, but they were poorly equipped, and compared to the British, were probably the equivalent of what Chelmsford believed the Zulu’s to be, perhaps another reason for his underestimating the Zulu’s. If the Zulu’s were the same as the other native soldiers, whilst being equipped with a spear and shield and few firearms, surely British regulars, each with a modern rifle, could easily have won the battle. Clearly, this would have been the basis for Chelmsford’s beliefs. So, as a result of him sending out scouts, which cannot really be called a mistake, he ended up splitting his force, taking more than half away from the future battleground, and causing probably the worst blunder of the entire campaign.

However, when Chelmsford left the camp, he appointed Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine.  This either proved the improbability of an attack, though the orders were to defend the camp only, so there was clearly a chance. Pulleine himself though had no previous experience as a field commander, which was an obvious error. Either through the belief the camp was secure or through sheer blunder, Chelmsford appointed an officer who had never been in command on the front line. Admittedly, during the battle he may have tried his best to command efficiently, but as a result of this appointment, Chelmsford should be partially credited with all major tactical errors during the battle itself. Pulleine’s scouts observed some Zulu’s, and several reports were received during the early morning on the 22nd of January about Zulu soldiers. Pulleine and his remaining officers were uncertain about the intentions of the Zulu’s, and as such they believed themselves not to be the target of any Zulu’s in the area, and that these were most likely moving to attack Chelmsford, which turned out to be incorrect, and had the scouts investigated further, they may have discovered the main Zulu force. However, the action taken by the Zulu’s upon their later discovery makes that possibility ultimately pointless anyway.

Colonel Anthony Durnford arrived at the camp in the morning of the 22nd, and outranking Pulleine, he would usually have taken command. He did not, though his arrival alone raised the moral of the British soldiers, as he arrived with several cavalry companies. A while after, due to the lack of intelligence, the British officers wrongly believed the Zulu’s were moving to attack Chelmsford’s rear. Therefore Colonel Durnford moved to engage the Zulu’s with his personal troops, however instead of finding the previously reported numbers, which were a fraction of the true force, he stumbled upon the main Zulu army. Although they had not intended to attack until later, upon discovery the Zulu’s charged towards the camp, moving into formation as they progressed. Colonel Durnford fought a retreat to the camp, and Pulleine himself got little warning about the Zulu attack. The British army were largely unprepared, and therefore had to move out to fight the Zulu’s in an open area, slightly away from the camp.

The British army were spread into a line that was to long and thin for the number of men. Especially considering the British were outnumbered by an incredible number anyway, the result of having the small force of soldiers spread over such a large expanse was eventually catastrophic. Meanwhile, word was sent to Chelmsford of the Zulu army. For whatever reason, he chose not to return to camp until it was too late. Upon his arrival the battle had already finished, and he undoubtedly made a mistake here, as an extra 2,500 soldiers coming in to attack the Zulu’s would have been largely beneficial. For a surprising time, with no orders being given to the British, the British line held. Eventually, having been fighting the longest and hardest, as well as losing their artillery at the start of the fight, Durnford’s men began to retreat to camp. This began to expose the flank of the remainder of the line, and the whole British force retreated to the camp. Fighting was much fiercer at this stage, but almost every man was by now fighting with bayonets, their ammunition being used up. One thing that is uncertain is whether the ammunition became a problem before or after the British line began to crumble anyway. If the ammunition was merely low at that point, and there was not a large need for more ammunition, then the inaccessibility of the supplies was not a genuine problem until after the battle was certainly lost anyway.

From the Zulu perspective, the battle was not won so much through error, as through superior ability and tactics in general. The Zulu king Cetshwayo knew that the British would invade, and gathered a Zulu army of 24,000 soldiers in preparation. Using his knowledge of the terrain, he planned an effective set of tactics, largely based upon knowing the relative numbers and positions of the British columns for the entire build up to the battle. Whereas the British army could only move slowly, particularly at the time of year the campaign took place in, the Zulu’s could easily outmanoeuvre the British, and did so several times in their defensive attempts. Firstly, the Zulu soldiers themselves, were in a way superior. The British had modern weaponry, but up close the Zulu weaponry was more effective, and naturally this battle ended up close like most eventually did at this period in time. The Zulu soldiers were better motivated, much better trained and overall they were more efficient than the British soldiers, in particular more efficient than the Natal Native Contingency and the irregulars that were the bulk of the British force.

The Zulu’s successfully lured the majority of Chelmsford’s forces away from the camp, whilst they were camped, over 20,000 of them in total, surprisingly close without being detected by scouts. This was partly due to them choosing an unlikely route, the British officers were used to dealing with armies similar to their own, with wagons and large supplies, having to take the easiest route whereas Zulus lived off the land and could take almost any route they chose. This was also due to the Zulu’s maintaining, apparently, and incredible level of silence and discipline making themselves almost undetectable, until eventually they were stumbled upon. Having already out planned, outnumbered and generally outmanoeuvred the British forces before the battle began, they were in an incredible position, as well as having evaded detection unless they wanted detection as a decoy. Eventually they were found, but their intense and superior training meant that they could immediately attack, charging the whole way to the British camp whilst forming up. The element of surprise was still there, and at the same time no Zulu organisation was lost. Despite being held back for a period by the British firepower, the “Bull’s horns” formation resulted in the British being flanked, and being forced to withdraw with the main body of Zulu’s still directly in front of the British line, able to capitalise and overrun the British as soon as the order to retreat was given.

This largely proves the superior discipline of the Zulu’s, as when they had the advantage the British line crumbled and the retreat quickly lost its discipline, but the Zulu’s persisted earlier in the fight under a supreme disadvantage against the British guns without any loss of moral or order. After the British broke the fighting was hand to hand, and in close quarters fighting the Zulu’s easily outclassed the British. Despite even several groups of British troops forming together to fight the Zulu’s to the death, Zulu losses were considerably less than that of the British. Overall, the British lost almost all of their forces, whilst the Zulu’s lost around a thousand of their twenty thousand strong force involved in the attack. The Zulu’s had completely outclassed the British, despite being a supposedly inferior force, and because of their leaders being superior, as well as their troops.

Perhaps ironically, the same night four thousand Zulu soldiers were defeated by 139 British soldiers, several of whom were hospitalised at the time. Even more so, the victory at Isandlwana led to a second, more efficient campaign that utterly defeated the Zulu’s, which only came about because of the Zulu victory.

In conclusion, did Lord Chelmsford’s mistakes really defeat the British? Admittedly, he did cause some serious errors, and a better commander may have defeated the Zulu’s in his place, but was that the sole reason, or even the main one? I largely agree with Ian Knight about the outcome of this battle though “Like most historical calamities, the British defeat came about not through any single great error of judgement, but rather through a combination of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and sheer bad luck. The Zulu victory, on the other hand, was won by sound tactical judgement, by aggressive spirit, and by raw courage and endurance in the face of an awesome and destructive enemy weapon technology…”

This shows the key point that proves there was no main reason. Whereas in most battles you have one general who is simply better, or two very strong generals, or two appalling generals, in this case you have a general who completely outclassed his opponent on one side. On the other, you have someone who blundered several times, in addition to being outclassed, and as they are separate reasons they should be kept separate.

So, Chelmsford’s mistakes were not the main reason, because there were only two, equal reasons. Firstly, Zulu superiority, and secondly the British forces being poor and badly led.