Isandlwana

Who should be credited with the battle of Isandlwana?

The battle of Isandlwana is historically regarded as one of the worst defeats suffered by the British army, and the worst defeat against an inferior native army. Although nobody will dispute the fact that the battle of Isandlwana was a serious defeat, and that there were probably several reasons, what is disputed is how the defeat came about. We know that the Zulu army was well led and surprisingly well trained, and we also know that their weaponry was much better suited for close combat than the British, but we also know that the British army, and it’s leaders, made several mistakes both in regards to the single battle, and also to the Zulu war as a whole. Commanding the majority of the British army in Zululand was Lord Chelmsford, who was also in personal command of all the soldiers involved in the main battle, as well as the large number of regular soldiers he had with him at the time.

Possibly the first error made by Lord Chelmsford was him wrongly predicting that the tactics of the Zulu’s would be to try and avoid a large battle, and to fight in smaller skirmishes or avoid any confrontation until the British had to retire. As a method to combat this, Chelmsford originally planned to send five separate columns into Zululand, and essentially prevent the Zulu’s from avoiding a major confrontation by surrounding them. This was changed into three columns, the 4th and 1st columns continued as originally planned, but the 3rd and 2nd merged into a larger central column. The fifth column, consisting of roughly 2,300 men did not enter Zululand at all. The obvious flaw in this tactic was that, having wrongly anticipated the Zulu tactics, any of his individual forces were open to attack and much smaller than the Zulu army, which consisted of around 20,000 men. The central column at its peak numbered around 8,500 men in total. As the intention had been to prevent the Zulu army escaping, upon entering Zululand all of the three columns were to far apart to help each other.

Lord Chelmsford’s second mistake was that his plans required haste in order to work properly, and as a result, he marched into Zululand in January, which was the rainy season. Therefore, in addition to the artillery and supplies the British army had to carry with them, the terrain and weather also hindered their progress. The British army couldn’t move a large body of troops quickly in any direction. If the invasion had been prolonged, or Chelmsford had accounted for the hindrance in his plans, then the British army would have either been more manoeuvrable or prepared for the consequences of this. This was not just a problem during the time in Zululand however; they also slowed before they had even left Natal. As a result, Chelmsford gave the Zulu’s more time to react and intercept the British troops, whilst also making any chance of the columns aiding each other almost impossible.