Origins of the Cold War

Schools of thought in Cold War history have developed immensely since the 1950s when the orthodox view espoused by western historians such as Feis and Schlesinger Jr was primarily a chronological narrative which saw the Soviet Union as responsible for hostilities. Revisionist historians, like W A Williams and G Kolko, questioned this view from the 1960s onwards, offering ideas such as United States expansionism and empire building as reasons for the Cold War. Whereas, post revisionists of the 1970s and 1980s, like Gaddis, were more non committal about responsibility for hostilities, seeing the Cold War as more of a misunderstanding, with both sides at fault. Since 1992, the New Cold War historians have benefited from witnessing the collapse of the Soviet Union and receiving greater access to both Allied and Eastern European archives, resulting in greater breakthroughs in understanding of the Cold War.

Certainly most historians are agreed that the issue of a divided Germany was a key factor in the commencement of cold war hostilities, however amongst the myriad of other reasons cited the following are also relevant:- American desire to retain the majority of world manufacturing output acquired during World War 2 and thus avoid the threat of a depression similar to the 1930s; issues of understanding and communication – American and Russian leaders did not meet face to face from the end of the war until 1955; the possession and threatened use of the atom bomb by America; Russian security fears leading to the annexation of so many eastern and central European countries; West European and American fears of a communist threat and the re-emergence of a united and re-armed Germany that would, perhaps, side with the USSR; and USSR economic disparity with America.

The term ‘Cold War’ used in this essay refers to the uneasy stalemate and political impasse that occurred between the American and Soviet superpowers after World War 2 policed by the massive arms build up and continual threat of nuclear war. Some historians (Gaddis for example) do feel the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, with its stated aim of world revolution, was the start of cold war hostility leading to Russian isolation, however this does not appear to be a widely held viewpoint.

Arguably, ‘We Now Know’ by J L Gaddis first published in 1997 is a definitive Cold War text, which builds upon the considerable body of post-revisionist text he has already published. This book displays more of an international perspective on key events, due to his sojourn in Oxford from 1992, which also gave him valuable European insights on the end of Cold War hostilities. The book is written in an accessible, easy to read format and over 25% consists of notes, annotations and bibliography, illustrating great depth of research. According to Gaddis by 1947 it was clear that agreement with the USSR was not possible, also by the time he writes this book he accepts the theory of American hegemony and empire building, Gaddis suggests here that the issue of the divided Germany was actually perpetuating the cold war by increasing the need to defend the West together with the nuclear issue and arms race “As weapons became more devastating they became less usable”. His ultimate conclusion is no different to that in previous publications, in that he sees Stalin as driving force behind the inception of Cold War.