Profits: Continuities and Changes in American Foreign Policy

The economic thrust driving American foreign policy is perhaps most evident in Vietnam. As with the Second World War, the economic motive is often absent from the popular historical memory. Given the conflict’s context in the Cold War, it is easy to interpret America’s involvement in Vietnam as a result of Cold War ideology, as part of a struggle for democracy and freedom against communism and oppression. The first half of this argument is easily refuted by a brief examination of U.S. policy. As early as 1945, America displayed undeniableambivalence concerning the sovereignty, self-determination, or independence of Vietnam.34 Though the popular leader Ho Chi Minh borrowed entire phrases from America’s Declaration of Independence when he issued a Vietnamese declaration of sovereignty, and though he sent eight pleas to the American president stating that “[u]nless great world powers and international relief organizations bring us immediate assistance we face imminent catastrophe,” Truman did nothing.35 A Viet Cong officer recalled this period when talking to an American soldier he had captured: “You were our heroes after the [Second World] war. We read American books and saw American films, and a common phrase in those days was “to be as rich and as wise as an American”. What happened?”36 Instead of supporting freedom and democracy in Vietnam, America allowed France to reoccupy the colony, securing French participation in America’s postwar policies in Europe. This decision led to a decade of struggle and resulted in the French withdrawal in 1954.

America’s actions once France withdrew were equally lacking in respect for democracy or freedom. The Eisenhower administration encouraged Ngo Dinh Diem, head of the South Vietnamese government, not to hold the elections scheduled under the 1954 Geneva Accords.37 Indeed, Eisenhower writes in his memoirs that he and every “knowledgeable” person he talked to unanimously agreed that “possibly 80 percent of the population” would have voted against Diem had free elections been held.38 Exceedingly unpopular with his people, Diem’s government was called “fascistic” by CIA officer Edward Lansdale, the director of America’s paramilitary team in South Vietnam.39 According to the Pentagon Papers, the Vietnamese resistance was, in stark contrast to the Diem regime, the only movement with any “real support and influence on a broad base.”40 Under the watch of three consecutive presidents, America labelled these groups “Viet Cong” and conducted a war against them and the surrounding population for more than a decade that involved American participation in torture, the massacre of civilians, the bombing of neighbouring Laos and Cambodia, the destabilization of the region, the devastation of the Vietnamese economy, and the deaths of millions of people.41

Of course, a loyal student of the Cold War would point out that, however dubious America’s position may have been with respect to independence, democracy, or human rights, sacrifices were necessary to resist communist domination. This approach bears a striking resemblance to the ideological argument for America’s involvement in the Second World War: the importance of fighting fascism necessitated an alliance with communism. However, for Vietnam, the argument is completely inverted: the importance of fighting communism necessitated an alliance with a “fascistic” regime. Such a total ideological reversal in a mere two decades, a paradigm shift of near-Orwellian proportions, may be explained by recognizing that ideology was simply not the primary factor in America’s involvement. As before, economic interests were crucial. Powerful evidence exists to support this thesis. In 1963, while President John F. Kennedy spoke to his fellow-Americans about communism and freedom, his Undersecretary of State Alexis Johnson made a different case for America’s involvement in Indochina: “Why is it desirable, and why is it important? It provides … room to expand [and] rich exportable surpluses.”42 This was no new argument. Ten years earlier, a congressional study mission reported that Indochina was “immensely wealthy in rice, rubber, coal, and iron ore. Its position makes it a strategic key.”43 In 1966 and 1967, while President Lyndon Johnson told Americans the familiar story about resisting communism at every opportunity, America purchased more than $2 million in magnesium from the Soviet Union in order to maintain its aircraft industry.44 America’s actions in the 1960s – including its involvement in Vietnam – were not as anti-communist as its presidents’ speeches suggest. As in Cuba and Western Europe, the U.S. government’s primary concern in Vietnam was largely economic.

Thus, American foreign policy may consistently be understood by examining its economic interests.1 Other explanations – those invoking democracy, human rights, regional stability, or ideology – consistently fail to provide a reliable account of U.S. action. As a result, the effects of American foreign policy have been similarly inconsistent. American actions were largely detrimental to Cubans and Vietnamese, but have arguably benefited more Western Europeans than they have harmed. Notably, some observers today argue that current American foreign policy does not represent a significant departure from the historical trend.45 Indeed, in its ongoing War on Terror, the Bush administration has sacrificed ideological consistency in the pursuit of economic interests, channelling the bulk of its military resources into an oil-rich nation that neither harboured nor financed terrorism, blatantly violating human rights and international treaties, and contributing to instability in the Middle East. If historians can recognize the primacy of economic motivations for American action in the past, then perhaps the rest of us may realize the implications to the present.