The event of 1942 in the Far East, namely ‘the fall of Singapore’ could be seen as a point where urgent haste was required in order to quash the Axis powers dream of world domination . Such a key event in history undoubtedly deserves recognition, evidentially why the Times decided to write this editorial. One would have to consider the paper’s ambitions (as it is an editorial) in writing this article. One such ambition, I feel, was to tell the country (Britain) of its valiant men, whom fought far from home. I believe that it is a fair assumption to make that the general public would have thought more about the European war than the war in the Far East, simply as it was closer to home. Another such ambition, I feel, was to possibly highlight and even criticize a possible negligence to the Far East, which was felt by The Times.

Reasons for this document’s existence are fairly palpable, however, what lies within the contextual elements warrant’s further explanation. The factual accounts found in this document offer a lot of background information, with relative sizes of the islands portrayed, ‘Java is 100 miles longer than Great Britain’ allowing public perception to the scale of fighting, and highlighting the tremendous difficulty in securing these areas of the Empire. We are also made aware of the amount allied troops are stretched; forcing readers to feel sympathetic to our heroes misfortune, ‘the fierce and unequal battle for the Island of Singapore has now ended in just a week’ categorizes this.

It is interesting how The Times make comparisons to other parts of the Far East, ‘Singapore provided no such possibilities of resistance as Tobruk’. This approach would suggest that The Time’s feels that the Allies possibly could have fortified the area better, like Tobruk, for example. I also find this extract interesting, ‘But what can be accomplished by the air arm in conjunction with light naval forces against heavily protected hostile convoys has been shown in the Macassar Strait’. It portrays a positive, but slightly pessimistic viewpoint by The Times. It is understood that the allies have the strategic capability to defeat the Axis Power, however, is followed up by the notion of ‘if the reinforcements which are arriving contain a sufficient proportion of fighters and light and medium bombers there still exist a hope’.

It is clear from Churchill’s paraphrases, that he is trying to lead his country and, it could be said, the rest of the allied nations, through these difficult times. He really empowers his people with his iron fist approach, ‘once again he recalled perils already faced and overcome’. He also states that ‘the United States with its vast resources is now in this struggle and in it to last’, and also gives great praise to ‘the heroic and unbroken resistance of the Russian armies’. However, I do find it strange that there is no direct mention of McArthur’s gallantry in the Far East from Churchill, which The Time’s have touched upon, ‘Where General McArthur’s heroic troops are still maintaining an unbroken front against Japanese resistance’. I believe, in regards to national moral, it would be a good notion to highlight British achievements in particular, however, felt more obliged to praise Russian efforts (which are no less of a feat, of course).

There is unquestionable passion, fuelled with slight negativity, within the document, particularly in response to Churchill, ‘some petulance, some more carping comment may have been heard, here and overseas, in moments of stress’. This feeling of war weariness, on behalf of the Times, more than likely embodies the feelings of the British population, whom have endeavoured rations, the blitz and other war implications by 1942 (It is important to realise that this negativity is an aid of constructive criticism, and doesn’t imply a lack of unity). There is even a plea of some sort from the document, ‘and it may well include that of taking risks elsewhere’ , which implies that the Allies should have a further interest in fighting the war in the Far East. Although, how conceivable is this notion, with the Allied armies fully stretched, and already protecting and attempting to liberate areas throughout the world.

The importance of defending the Far East is explained in this document. The first importance is explained as, ‘from the extension of the enemy’s command of the Sunda Sea and his approach towards Batavia’. The consequence of losing entire control of a whole sea would be absolutely devastating, allowing the Axis power to develop and precede its naval control. Batavia (which was part of the Dutch East Indies) is particularly important because of its raw materials, in particular its oil production , which is the indication made by the second important, ‘because of the immense oil production of the area’.

The consequences which this article could incur in relation to the war were probably next to none; however, regarding national understanding of the Far East warfront and discussions orbiting this, it more than likely had interesting implications. I believe that an article of such an opinionated format is undoubtedly a catalyst towards major debate, not only by the academics and politicians of the time, but also the masses, who were very much a part of this total war.

This document definitely embodies a degree of negativity, and understandably so, regarding the era. However, positive notions do arise from this, which would have delivered hope to its readers, encompassing the unity all shared between the Allied nations.