The German Army’s Black Day: August 8, 1918

The date, August 8, 1918, proved a most victorious day for the British forces in the World War. Although the victory did not serve to cut off the enemy’s communications, or stop the opposing troops, it did disarm the German High Command.

The Kaiser was reported as saying: “I see that we must strike a balance. We are at the end of our resources. The war must be ended.”

Ludendorff demonstrated a similar despondency. His view was stated as follows: “The war would have to be ended.”

In order to understand this loss of German morale as of August 8, 1918, termed by Ludendorff, later, as “the black day of the German army,” it may be best to “reach back” in the archives and review the letter from Foch dated July 12, 1918 regarding his proposal to Haig as to “returning to the offensive.” The correspondence follows:

The first offensive to be launched on the British front should be one starting from the front Festubert-Rebecq, with a view to freeing the Bruay mines and forbidding the communication center of Estaires.

Five days later, Haig responded that he did not see the “advantage in advancing over the flat and marshy region located between Rebecq and Festubert,” and, thus, made the following suggestion (in his correspondence):

The operation in my opinion, which is of the highest importance and which I proposed to you as before, should be executed as soon as possible, is to push forward the Allied front to the east and southeast of Amiens so as to free that town and railway. The best way to carry out this object is to make a combined Franco-British operation, the French attacking south of Moreuil and the British north of the Luce.

To realize this project, I am preparing plans secretly for an offensive north of the Luce, direction east… In liaison with this project the French forces should, in my opinion, carry out an operation between Moreuil and Montdidier…

(As you can see), the letter brought forth from the archives provides insight on several areas of post-war controversy.

The first insight is that the origin of the offensive was conceptually British. Additionally, the focus was narrow; meaning the offensive “narrowly” entailed securing for Amiens and the railway a higher margin of safety.

Historically, it is debated whether the “true” idea originated with the Commander-in-Chief, Haig, or from Fourth Army Commander Rawlinson.