The German Army’s Black Day: August 8, 1918

Conferences were held in absolute secrecy at various locations. Divisional commanders were unaware an offensive was planned until July 31, 1918, and the troops to be deployed not until thirty-six (36) hours before the start of the attack. The War Cabinet in London was even “kept in the dark.” In example, on that same morning, a general from a neighboring army made a call to Rawlinson’s headquarters, as he was heading home “on leave,” and casually inquired as to why he heard so much gunfire coming from the front.

The deception was accomplished by making all movements during the night: airplanes patrolled the area checking for any exposure; and work continued on the British rear defenses until the very last evening. Normal artillery fire was regulated on a daily basis as not to make it appear that more and more guns were being slipped into concealed positions.

By employing such means, the strength of the Fourth Army was almost “doubled.” Between the dates of August 1, 1918 and August 8, 1918, six new divisions, two cavalry divisions, nine tank battalions, and one thousand guns were slipped into the area without any “notice” or suspicion from the enemy.

The operation involved using two hundred ninety special trains: sixty for ammunition and the remainder for troops.

Consequently, by 0 hour (or 4:20 a.m.) on August 8, 1918, the Fourth Army’s strength had been increased to thirteen (13) divisions, three (3) cavalry divisions, seventeen (17) air squadrons, ten (10) heavy and two (2) whippet tank battalions (totaling 360 heavy and 96 whippet tanks) and over 2,000 guns and howitzers, including 672 heavies. Two-thirds of the artillery was allocated for counter-battery work, thus, effectively “paralyzing” the enemy’s artillery.

In this strategy, the “enemy” was also distracted with the appearance of Canadian troops. The Germans regarded them as storm troopers and considered them an indication of a coming attack. At the time, the Canadian Corp. was near Arras. A good portion of the Canadians-two (2) battalions were dispatched north to Kemmel in Flanders. The bulk of the Canadians were filtered down to the Somme while inventive rumors were engineered by the British to account for their presence.

The Canadians and the Australians appeared to be spreading themselves out in a defensive position. The Canadian Corp (Currie) was just south of the Somme on the right with the Australian Corp (Monash) positioned on the left and next to the river. The III Corps (R.H. K. Butler) advanced north of the river protecting the flank of the main punch being the Canadian Corp (Currie) on the right; and the Australian Corps (Monash) on the left.

In actuality, the Canadians did not move into the front line until a few hours before the assault. In the interim, the Australians were extending their front south to Amiens-Roye Road, thus, relieving the French and at the same time giving the Germans a “false sense of security.” The force did not appear to be a “threat” as they were spreading themselves out in a defensive posture.

The entire front (of attack) was approximately fourteen miles in length.

The German side consisted of six (6) divisions (averaging 3,000 each) of the Second Army. Their weakness in numbers was weakened further by their lack of defense. There was none of the usual deep dugouts to keep the morale safe until the start of the fighting.

Five days prior to the offensive, a German raid captured an Australian post; and, three days afterward, a local attack took two hundred prisoners from the III Corps front. However, such information received by the Germans only tended to further delude them.

Conclusively, victory, as demonstrated in the August 8th 1918 offensive was accomplished by subtle components as well as the most important element–that of surprise.