“The greatness of Napoleon, Caesar or Washington is only moonlight by the sun of Lincoln. His example is universal and will last thousands of years…. He was bigger than his country – bigger than all the Presidents together… and as a great character he will live as long as the world lives.”

- Leo Tolstoy 1

Introduction

Jacob Burckhardt has said that “great men are necessary for our life, in order that the movement of world history can free itself sporadically, by fits and starts, from obsolete ways of living and inconsequential talk”. 2 Abraham Lincoln was almost certainly one such man. He has been hailed as the pre-eminent politician of his period, the great emancipator, and the father of the American nation. There have been more works published concerning his character than that of any other man, bar Jesus Christ and William Shakespeare. 3 As Lincoln himself said, he could not escape history; 4 it has taken grip, recognising him as the personification of good leadership, the example to follow when it comes to overcoming even the greatest trials or tribulations.

Lincoln was, first and foremost, a war president. In fact, he was the only president whose entire administration was bound by the parameters of war. 5 Thus it should come as no surprise that “the most important single circumstance in shaping Lincoln’s genius was the war.” 6 Accordingly, the vast majority of this work has been devoted to Lincoln’s various roles in precipitating the Union’s victory; those same roles that have been employed as a structural apparatus, whereby Lincoln’s remarkable success in dealing with the problems of his day may be fully and conclusively communicated in this modest document.

Chapter 1: The Power of the President

Civil law systems are, by their very nature, reactionary. Rather than having their doctrines established and refined by specific cases, they begin from a basis of stringent abstractions that have only a unilateral effect where applied. Passing amendments in such circumstances is undoubtedly an uphill battle. Regardless of the advantages and disadvantages, an appreciation of this is of cardinal significance to any discussion of the development of Lincoln’s authority.

In 19th century America doctrinal reliance upon the constitution was so extensive that the first question with which Lincoln had to wrestle, having anticipated the coming Civil War, was whether the Constitution was not so outmoded as to prove a hindrance to the Union’s war effort. Lincoln’s own answer lay decidedly in the negative, with the only provision being a pragmatic interpretation. Lincoln himself said that he had “no purpose to construe the Constitution… by any hypercritical rules.” 7 This faith that “the Constitution, spaciously interpreted, could surmount crisis” 8 was to prove the basis behind almost all of Lincoln’s politically inclined deliberations. It has been hailed as the conviction responsible for not only Lincoln’s personal success but also the perpetuation of the Union itself.

Lincoln’s behaviour immediately after the Confederate attack upon Fort Sumter demonstrates this. Congress alone, according to Article I of the American constitution, can declare war and mobilise the armed forces. This was primarily so that the American nation would “not hurry into war… It will not be in the power of a single man… to involve us in such distress.” 9 Thus the Constitution envisaged a partnership of Congress and President with regards to matters of warfare. Lincoln, nevertheless, began his presidential career by choosing to act independently of Congress. Fort Sumter was attacked on April 12, 1861, while Lincoln did not have congress meet over the issue until July 4. This allowed him to prepare for war far better than he could have following regular procedure. On April 15 he called out state militia to the number of seventy-five thousand. On April 19 he imposed a blockade on rebel ports – an action that had always previously been preceded by a declaration of war. On May 3 he called for volunteers to supplement the army and navy, thereby further usurping power previously reserved for Congress alone. These and many further actions tilted the balance of Civil War decidedly in favour of the Union, even from its outset.

In justification of his “extra-legal” 10 activity Lincoln introduced the concept of “war power” as a peculiar function of the executive. This authority flowed into the presidency, as Lincoln saw it, through the presidential oath to “preserve, protect, and defend” the Constitution, through the constitutional commitment that the laws be faithfully executed, and through the constitutional designation of the President as commander-in-chief. While of questionable legitimacy this doctrine was not a mere fiction. It is an established fact that “no one expects government in wartime to be normal.” 11 The Constitution has always allowed for the suspension of habeas corpus in “cases of rebellion or invasion”. Thomas Jefferson himself conceded that Presidents may be justified in going beyond the Constitution only in circumstances where following it would mean “absurdly sacrificing the end to the means”. 12

Not all, however, viewed Lincoln’s actions as wholly justified. Lord Bryce wrote that Lincoln was “almost a dictator who wielded more authority than any single Englishman has done since Oliver Cromwell.” 13 Similarly, Henry Adams wrote that the Civil War “for the time obliterated the Constitution.” 14 While hyperbolic these assertions are supported by a substantial volume of evidence. Lincoln did indeed act, at times, like an autocrat. He imposed martial law, instigated military courts, often far from the frontlines, hired secret police or “detectives”, reportedly detained untold hundreds, and suppressed newspapers all in the belief that, when circumstances demanded, such actions were constitutional.
Lincoln, however, was not a dictator. He allowed the mechanisms of accountability – Congress, the courts, and free elections – to persist unchecked. What’s more, no dictator would have tolerated the fierce opposition that Lincoln did, both from Congress and newspapers. Nor would he have submitted to a presidential election in the midst of war. With regard to Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus – perhaps the most often cited manifestation of the allegedly despotic ideology that underpinned his presidency – it was fairly justified as a measure endorsed by the Constitution, and an attempt on his part to deal with “the enemy in the rear,” 15 “tempered by… restraint and humanity.” 16

It is then well established that a key facet of Lincoln’s attempts to deal with the problems of his day was his belief that “measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution.” 17 Undoubtedly, it was this unique approach to presidential leadership that allowed him to deal with the war and the challenges it presented in the efficient way it did. Had it not been for Lincoln’s “war powers” the Union war effort may well have been crippled irreparably. Lincoln, as Figure 1 (page 7) poignantly depicts, “remained faithful to the spirit, if not the letter of the Constitution: acting on the spirit to save the letter.” 18

Chapter 2: Lincoln the Politician

Lincoln was remarkably apt when it came to politics and diplomacy. Though often a reluctant contributor, his latent potential was brought to maturity through his combined experience as a lawyer, politician, legislator and debater. In seeking to demonstrate this, and its role in ensuring the Union’s victory, Lincoln’s cabinet (2.1), his political opposition (2.2) and his role in forming the Union’s policy on foreign affairs (2.3) will be examined in some detail.

2.1 Lincoln and his Cabinet

Lincoln’s cabinet stands alone in American history as a composite of political rivalries and conflicting ambitions. In fact, Lincoln was the only president ever to appoint his main presidential competitors to his cabinet. 19 Jefferson Davis, upon his election to the Confederate presidency artlessly chose one cabinet member from each of the seven states that had seceded at that point in time. They all shared his own sentiments concerning the Union, the arriving war, and slavery. 20 Lincoln’s choice was far more sophisticated, demonstrating a profound competency that was to become a trademark of his administration. In selecting his cabinet members Lincoln took great care, approaching the issue from every possible angle with a shrewd political mind. It is said that Lincoln paid particular attention to three significant attributes in his potential cabinet members: political stature, previous party affiliations and geographical representation. 21 In Lincoln’s mind all other factors were subordinated by these three. Thus he chose with startling objectivity, willing even to form a coalition cabinet, comprised of his main competitors from the 1860 election. In doing this, he “forged a team that preserved a nation” 22 at the cost only of his personal happiness. Demonstrated in this remarkable act is Lincoln’s ability to value quality
and put aside petty differences. Furthermore, we see a lucid indication as to Lincoln’s superlative powers of judgement that were to be so crucial in deciding the fate of the American nation.

2.2 Lincoln and his Opposition

During the war there existed a great deal of opposition to the Lincoln administration in the north. In particular, the Democrats proved a significant problem for Lincoln. They were divided over the war; some supporting the war, others taking the view that the conflict was a purely Republican affair. This political dichotomy eventually resulted in a party split, with one side opting for compliance and the other for opposition. This latter body termed themselves “Peace Democrats”, but were more often than not referred to as “copper heads”. Take, as an example of active opposition, the words of Clement Vallandigham of Ohio: “You have not conquered the South, you never will. Money you have expended without limit. Blood poured out like water…. Defeat, death, taxation and sepulchres…. These are your only trophies.” 23 Such rhetoric was neither uncommon, nor without its influence. “The leaders of the Democratic Party are fast swinging that powerful organisation into an attitude of serious hostility towards the government.” 24 Indeed, the extremist Peace Democrats did more than just speak out – they formed secret societies, attacked conscription laws, discouraged enlistments, and tried to ship supplies to the Confederacy. However, their greatest detriment to the Northern war effort lay not in their actions, but rather in the measures Lincoln was forced to take to counter them. Lincoln chose to mitigate their influence, primarily by suspending the writ of habeas corpus. This of course provided dissenters with further ammunition for their anti-war, anti-Lincoln polemics. In fact, such was their influence that in the 1862 congressional elections six
Republican states went Democrat. However, it may fairly be said that, had the peace democrats been allowed to persist unopposed their influence would have spread considerably farther. Resultantly, Lincoln’s actions have come to be seen by most as correct.

In addition, it is significant that Lincoln did willingly suffer these criticisms and, further, allowed the usual mechanisms of American politics to accommodate them. He provided a legitimate outlet for criticism that meant that while there were radical dissenters, they were still firmly in the system even as they voiced their repugnance for it. In doing this, Lincoln kept the north united against the Confederacy. It seems that, paradoxically, accommodating his enemies was the best thing Lincoln could possibly have done with them. 25

With regards to the 1864 election, it should suffice to say that most of the credit for Lincoln’s success may be placed in the hands of his generals, and their accomplishments on the field of battle (specifically Sherman’s inexorable march to Atlanta and Grant’s assault upon Richmond outer defences). The only notable political measure taken by Lincoln that bore much direct influence upon the election was his endorsement of soldiers’ votes, which were taken from the field for the first time in American history. Of these votes, Lincoln took a substantial 70%. 26

2.3 Lincoln and Foreign Affairs

“The president had little to do with foreign affairs…. He willingly entrusted foreign policy to his secretary of state,” 27 says David Donald, championing the sentiments of a legion of other Lincoln biographers. Similarly, another has asserted
that “Lincoln had little interest in foreign affairs…. He usually left foreign affairs in Seward’s hands.” 28 However, such opinions are reflections on Lincoln as a man with limited familiarity with diplomatic practices, rather than a fair representation of the actual role that he played in shaping America’s foreign relations during the second half of the 19th century. Indeed, it has been well established that Lincoln did play a significant role both in forming the Union foreign policy and ensuring that it was followed consistently.

The foreign policy of the United States has, almost without exception, followed two basic principles – non-intervention by the United States in the affairs of other countries and resistance to foreign intervention in the affairs of the United States. These goals set the basis for Lincoln’s essentially isolationist foreign policy and birthed his famous axiom “one war at a time”. This was a necessary tenet of the Union policy: its absence may well have spelled the end for the North and her struggle to reunite the Union. Norman Graebner has persuasively argued that even a limited amount of foreign intervention on the side of the Confederacy may have meant the end of the Union’s chance for victory. 29 Thus Lincoln’s contribution was invaluable in establishing this as the Union’s foreign policy. He was of further significance in helping ensure that his policy’s goals were met. Consider first his role in placating Seward on a number of occasions where his incendiary speeches and fierce threats may well have led Britain onto the war path. Indeed, at the outset of the war Seward toyed with the notion of a foreign war against all of America. This “foreign war panacea” 30 was intended to unite America against another country, thus going some way in bridging the gap between North and South. Such was the extent of Seward’s war-mongering – a facet of his character that Lincoln was largely responsible for stamping out. Another area where Lincoln was of significant value was in “determining responses to a series of diplomatic developments and crises.” 31 The Trent affair is one famous example of this. In the autumn of 1861 two Southern emissaries were detained en route to Britain and France. Upon hearing of their incarceration Britain issued an ultimatum, saying that if the prisoners were not released immediately, she would have to consider military action. In fact, it was at this point that the two Confederate emissaries came closest to realising their goals. 32 Instead of responding in kind, with threats and insults, Lincoln chose to pacify Britain, and maintain that the captors had acted without authority and that he was sincerely apologetic for the unfortunate turn of events. Thus the crisis was abated, not by the Secretary of State, nor any other established diplomat, but by Lincoln, whose limited experience and jovial simplicity of character had led many to dismiss him as a poor-minded incompetent.

Chapter 3: Lincoln the Commander-in-Chief

It is said that “Abraham Lincoln had… no military education and no military experience, except for a brief and inconsequential interlude as a militia captain in a small Indian war.” 33 In later years Lincoln himself joked of how he’d survived a good many “bloody struggles with mosquitoes” and led a number of “valiant assaults on wild onion patches” during this time. 34 Nevertheless, as President, Lincoln threw himself into military affairs, playing a significant role both in forming the Union’s national strategy (3.1), and in the everyday conduct of his armies (3.2).

3.1 Lincoln’s Strategy

The works of Carl von Clausewitz, the famed military strategist proffer a basic distinction that is crucial in understanding Lincoln’s contribution to Union strategy. Clausewitz believed that there are two types of strategy that exist in any successful war effort. The first is National Strategy, which details the shaping of a nation’s political goals in time of war. The second is Military Strategy, which concerns the military means by which these goals are realised. 35 A fundamental tenet of modern military theory is that if success is to be had National and Military strategies must be inherently compatible with each other. Establishing such a complementary strategic construct was Lincoln’s primary contribution to the North’s military victory. 36

Clausewitz further contends that there are two types of National Strategy. The first concerns the conquest of a certain amount of the enemy’s territory with the modest aim of the suppression of a rebellion. The second strives for the overthrow of the enemy’s entire political system. Wars of this second type usually end with the unconditional surrender of the enemy. 37

The Civil War started out as one of the first of these types, in which Lincoln hoped to “avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or interference with, [enemy] property.” 38 This approach gained the Union a limited degree of success – most notably, the capture of West Virginia and New Orleans. However, it also allowed the Confederacy to counterpunch more than its weight in the brief period of the policy’s employment. Guerrilla attacks and cavalry raids in Tennessee and Mississippi struck Union supply bases and transport networks as Union forces were driven back from the Shenandoah Valley, Richmond and Vicksburg, and counterattacks were launched in both Kentucky and Maryland. It soon became apparent that “The limited-war strategy of conquering Southern territory… would not do the job so long as Confederate armies remained intact and strong.” 39

One of the first to take note of the apparent inadequacy of the policy of limited warfare was General Grant – only a minor figure at this time – who was fast in giving up “all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest.” 40 Not far behind Grant was Lincoln himself. “Destroy the rebel army,” 41 he instructed McClellan before the battle of Antietam. When McClellan proved unable to do so, Lincoln removed him from command.

In enacting this aggressive policy Lincoln condoned government seizure of civilian property and suppression of civil liberties. Essentially, all captured property belonged to the state, to do with as they saw fit. Significantly, this exchange concerned slaves as well as other kinds of property. It was an appreciation of this that provided Lincoln his first military motive for issuing the Emancipation Proclamation.

If Lincoln took time to see the advantages of confiscating Southern property he already knew that the slaves were the South’s most valuable commodity. He saw the contribution they made to both the Southern economy and diet and may even have conjectured that, in their absence, the Southern war effort would be irreparably crippled. Equally, he was also convinced of the devastating psychological power that an army of Negro’s might well harness, saying, “the bare sight of fifty thousand armed… black soldiers… would end the rebellion at once.” 42 Thus Lincoln saw fit to issue the Emancipation Proclamation as part of a policy of total war, and a means to Union victory.

Following this, it remained for him to make emancipation an end as well. Previously it was said that a war effort would prove successful only if its national and military strategies complemented each other synergistically. The most apparent manifestation of Lincoln’s strategic prowess came in realising this. He had created a total war, with limited war aims (the suppression of an internal rebellion). This proved a detriment to the Union. However, Lincoln had his solution at hand. He was to add emancipation to the war aims and, in doing so, adopt a policy of unconditional surrender. He was, essentially, revoking his previous assertion that he “had no intention to interfere with slavery where it exists” 43 and saying instead that he “no longer [wanted] the Union as it was, but the Union as it should be.” 44 This decision strengthened the Northern war effort no end. Many took to the war’s new moral dimension, born of Lincoln’s addition of emancipation to the Union’s war aims. The coveted strategic congruity had finally been achieved, and with it Lincoln’s reputation as a brilliant strategist.

Pausing parenthetically, we may do well to note that, while the above account does constitute a fair exposition of the present historical orthodoxy, a number of dissenting historians have proposed an alternative thesis on the motives behind Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. These historians contend that Lincoln was coerced into emancipating the slaves, not for strategic or moral reasons, but simply because people and circumstances demanded. Such figures as the famed Frederick Douglass and William Lloyd Garrison castigated him for not emancipating immediately at the outbreak of the war. More significantly, as further Confederate territory was subjugated more and more slaves streamed into the North, inexorably bringing the question of their civil status under the piercing light of urgency. This has led one historian 45 to argue that Negro’s were agents of their own freedom, and that Lincoln was merely swept along by the anguished cries and societal ambivalence of the North’s ever increasing black population. While a subject that demands more discussion than can be sustained here, it should suffice to say that the choice was ultimately Lincoln’s and by no means did he have to do what he did. In fact, it may be said that emancipation effectively solved all of Lincoln’s greatest challenges aside from the war itself, in a single blow. He placated the nation, silenced his opposition within Republican ranks, heavily damaged southern attempts to gain aid from foreign nations who shared the north’s new anti-slavery sentiments, and freed the northern war machine from the crippling uncertainty that surrounded its directionless policy towards seized Confederate property. In addition, and more pertinently, there exists no alternative to the proposal that Lincoln was the father of the Union’s brilliant national strategy.

3.2 Lincoln’s General Military Involvement

Aside from Lincoln’s cardinal contribution to the Union’s national strategy he was also hugely significant in co-ordinating many of the North’s key victories. Lincoln reportedly spent more time in the War Department telegraph office than anywhere else except the White House itself. 46 Lincoln frequently stayed at the telegraph office all night reading dispatches from the front, sending dispatches of his own, holding emergency conferences with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and other military officials. He even wrote the first draft of the emancipation proclamation in his office while awaiting news from the army. 47 Further, James McPherson has argued convincingly that the three key military campaigns that brought the Union her victory were more the product of Lincoln’s mind than any other. Grant’s assault on Lee’s army at Petersburg, born of Lincoln’s instruction to “hold on with a bull-dog gripe, and chew & choke, as much as possible” 48; Sheridan’s following of Confederate General Jubal Early to eventual victory at Lincoln’s orders; and Sherman’s march through Georgia and the Carolinas, as enthusiastically endorsed by Lincoln – combined they were enough to destroy the Confederacy’s hopes for military success. 49

Conclusion

The reaction of Lincoln’s closest colleagues to his assassination stands as an irrefutable testament to the greatness of his character. Bates, who had originally thought Lincoln a “well meaning but incompetent administrator” 50 concluded instead that he was “very near being a perfect man.” 51 Similarly Stanton declared upon Lincoln’s demise that he had been “the most perfect ruler of men the world has ever seen.” 52 Years later, an awe-struck novelist would write, with perhaps the most memorable pathos of all, “The greatness of Napoleon, Caesar or Washington is only moonlight by the sun of Lincoln.” 53

Aside from these, a million other voices cry witness both to Lincoln’s remarkable strength of character and his ineffable tenacity in pursuit of true liberty, the quintessential motif of America’s long and arduous history. Lincoln threw everything he had into the War, declaring upon his election “I am now public property” 54. He was willing to tackle the greatest of problems with no prior experience or support from those around him. He proved more than capable in dealing with the seemingly insurmountable challenges of his day, and yet he was just as willing to involve himself in the minutiae of any and every affair. No challenge was too great or too small. Nothing was beyond the parameters of his duty. Thus may we say without any reservation that Lincoln dealt with every significant challenge of his day with superlative ability and attentiveness in equal measure.

Citations

1. Leo Tolstoy, The World (New York , 1909),quoted in Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln by Doris Kearns Goodwin (Simon &Schuster, 2006) pp. ix

Introduction

2. Judgements on History and Historians by Jacob Burckhardt (Routledge Classics, 2007) pp. 214

3. Battle Cry of Freedom by James McPherson (Penguin Books LTD, 1990) pp. 865

4. Abraham Lincoln: Selected Speeches, Messages, and Letters, compiled by T. Harry Williams (Rinehart Editions, 1957) pp. 207

5. James McPherson Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 32

6. Ibid. pp. 31

Chapter 1

7. Collected Works of Lincoln, 9 volumes, by Abraham Lincoln, edited by Roy Prentice Basler et al. (Rutgers University Press, 1990) volume 4 pp. 264

8. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. in Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 149

9. To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law by F.D. Wormuth and E.B. Firmage, quoted in Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 30

10. Constitutional Problems under Lincoln by James G. Randall (University of Illinois Press, 1964) pp. 513

11. Ibid. pp. 511

12. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 20 volumes, quoted in Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp.153

13. The American Commonwealth by James Bryce, quoted in Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 160

14. The Great Secession Winter of 1860-61 and Other Essays by Henry Adams, quoted in Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 160

15. Abraham Lincoln by Benjamin Thomas (London Press, 1953) pp. 246

16. Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 159

17. Collected Works of Lincoln, 9 volumes, by Abraham Lincoln, edited by Roy Prentice Basler et al. (Rutgers University Press, 1990) Volume 7 pp. 281

18. Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 178

Chapter 2

19. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln by Doris Kearns Goodwin (Simon & Schuster, 2006) pp. xvi

20. Battle Cry of Freedom by James McPherson (Penguin Books LTD, 1990) pp. 259

21. Abraham Lincoln and a Nation worth Fighting for by James A. Rawley (University of Nebraska Press, 2003) pp. 35

22. James McPherson, writing for The New York Times Book Review, quoted in Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln by Doris Kearns Goodwin (Simon & Schuster, 2006)

23. A History of the English Speaking Peoples volume 4 by Winston Churchill (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002) pp. 178

24. Thomas, Op. cit. pp. 247

25. Abraham Lincoln by Benjamin Thomas (London Press, 1953) pp. 240

26. David Donald in Abraham Lincoln: Interpretations on the One Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of his Birth (London, 1959) pp. 27

27. Lincoln by David Donald (London, 1995) pp. 320

28. The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln by Philip S. Paludan (Kansas, 1994) pp.88

29. An American Iliad by C.P. Rolland (The University Press of Kentucky, 2004) pp. 171

30. Mahin, Op. cit. pp. 7

31. Ibid. pp. 3

32. Rolland, Op. cit., pp. 164

Chapter 3

33. T. Harry Williams in Abraham Lincoln: Interpretations on the One Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of his Birth (London, 1959) pp. 31

34. With Malice Toward None: A Life of Abraham Lincoln by Stephen B. Oates (Harper Perennial, 1994) pp. 23

35. On War by Carl von Clausewitz (Penguin Classics, 1982) pp. 74

36. James McPherson in Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 58

37. Clausewitz, Op. cit., pp. 140

38. James McPherson in Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 46

39. Ibid., pp. 44

40. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant quoted by James McPherson in Lincoln, the War President edited by Gabor Boritt (Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 45

41. Collected Works of Lincoln, 9 volumes, by Abraham Lincoln, edited by Roy Prentice Basler et al. (Rutgers University Press, 1990) volume 5 pp. 426

42. Ibid. volume 7 pp. 499

43. Abraham Lincoln: Selected Speeches, Messages, and Letters, compiled by T. Harry Williams (Rinehart Editions, 1957) pp. 139

44. Collected Works of Lincoln, 9 volumes, by Abraham Lincoln, edited by Roy Prentice Basler et al. (Rutgers University Press, 1990) volume 6 pp. 534

45. Barbara J. Fields, historian and co-author of Free at Last: Documentary History of Slavery, Freedom and the Civil War

46. T. Harry Williams in Abraham Lincoln: Interpretations on the One Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of his Birth (London, 1962) pp. 32

47. Ibid. pp. 33

48. Collected Works of Lincoln, 9 volumes, by Abraham Lincoln, edited by Roy Prentice Basler et al. (Rutgers University Press, 1990) volume 7 pp. 499

49. T. Harry Williams in Abraham Lincoln: Interpretations on the One Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of his Birth (London, 1959) pp. 36

Conclusion

50. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln by Doris Kearns Goodwin (Simon and Schuster, 2006) pp. xvi

51. Edwin Bates, quoted in Six Months at the White House with Abraham Lincoln by F.B. Carpenter (New York, 1866) pp. 68

52. Doris Kearns Goodwin, Op. Cit. pp. 743

53. Leo Tolstoy, The World (New York, 1909), quoted in Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln by Doris Kearns Goodwin (Simon & Schuster, 2006) pp. ix

54. Recollections of Abraham Lincoln by Lamon, quoted in Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln by Doris Kearns Goodwin (Simon & Schuster, 2006) pp. 312