After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent radical changes in the political and economic landscape of the country. However, one thing held over from the Soviet Era was the security apparatus, comprised of the military and intelligence agencies such as the Federal Security Service (hereafter referred to as the FSB). Anna Politkovskaya shows this in her collection of dispatches covering the Second Chechen War A Small Corner of Hell. As she writes when discussing the FSB and other security services, “…taken root in all government nooks and crannies of the country, just like in the Soviet era.” (Politkovskaya, 119) Of course the security apparatus of Russia that is currently in place was also in existence during the First Chechen War under President Boris Yeltsin. These similarities at the time are well illustrated by both Anatol Lieven’s Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power and A History of Russia by Catherine Evtuhov and Richard Stites. The methods used by the security services in both Chechen wars help to illustrate what Politkovskaya termed as “a striking neo-Soviet renaissance.” (Politkovskaya, 154) As well as who profited from the wars and those who suffered from the brutal measures taken by both sides.

With the rise of Dzhokar Dudayev as President of Chechnya, Russia was faced with a prospect that it perceived to be in conflict with its national interests, as well as a threat to its national security. Dudayev was a proponent of Chechen Independence from Russia, and though Russia, and more specifically Yeltsin had allowed the union republics to fall away from the USSR, he feared allowing a precedent of succession to form after a possible succession of Chechnya (Stites, 495). So when Dudayev, summoning the images of Shamyl and the Chechen deportations during World War II, embarked on his separatist path, Yeltsin sent in the Russian military to quell the separatist movement. After several years of negotiation, tensioned reached a boiling point and escalated into a real war in 1994. With the beginning of the war, the Russian military and FSB began showing their ties to the Red Army and KGB of the Soviet era. At the time “Yleltsin turned to his inner circle of advisers and the “force’ ministers- security, police, and army…’ (Stites, 496). Like Stalin, who had used the Red Army when politically necessary, Yeltsin used the council of the force loyal to him the 1993 putsch. Yeltsin was especially influenced by his Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who felt quick victory in Chechnya would steal political thunder from the ultranationalist branches of Russian politics (Stites, 496).

Yeltsin’s political moves were once again reminiscent of the Stalinist period, specifically the utilization of propaganda to garner support after the stunning military victory at Kronstadt. Military strategies that highlight the similarities between the Stalinist Period and the First Chechen war also are important to note. Anatol Lieven illustrates this in the book Chechnya: the Tombstone of Russian Power. While discussing the “Clausewitzian” battle strategies (seeking decisive large scale battles, and then pursuing the enemy until its destruction) initially adopted and then cast off by Russian forces in the First War in favor of more indirect methods, Lieven makes special mention of the use of indirect tactics against the citizenry of Chechnya. The Russian forces decided to focus their efforts against the Chechen population instead of directly against the rebels. The reasoning behind this was to drive the separatists out from hiding in the general populace by inflicting heavy tolls on the citizenry (Lieven, 127). This strategy is very reminiscent of the tactics used by Stalin against his own populace in order to discover actual saboteurs and traitors.

With the missile strike that killed Dudayev during peace talks, the overthrow of his government, and the seeming pacification of Chechen separatism, the First Chechen War ended. However, it would not be long until tensions between Russia and Chechnya flared once again. Before discussing the similarities between the Red Army/KGB and the Russian Military/FSB it is important to note the rise of Yeltsin’s protégé and his similarities to the Communist Regime of old.

Vladimir Putin, an ex KGB agent as well as the civilian head of the FSB (Stites, 501) was Yeltsin’s chosen successor and would inherit the Second Chechen War after Yeltsin left office. President Putin’s history as a KGB and FSB man is a vitally important part of the Second Chechen War. As Politkovskaya says when speaking of betrayal “It fully corresponds with the type of politics that is being established in Russian Society in connection with the current president”s previous profession.’ (Politkovskaya, 145). Even though the FSB was already handily slipping into all aspects of Russian politics, Putin’s drastic ascension to power completed the cycle and cemented the FSB into a position as strong as the KGB had held in the Soviet Union. Though Putin’s economic policy concerning state ownership of the means of the production were hardly Communist in nature, his iron fist policies towards Chechnya and his much lauded/protested tendencies towards authoritarianism fit perfectly into the nature of near-dictatorship that Stalin and his protégé’s used to run their country.

Putin’s presidency was also a determining factor in the beginning, escalation, and the sheer brutality of the Second Chechen War. The main factor behind Putin’s policies is undoubtedly his perception of Chechen independence as a mortal danger to the security of the Russian Federation (Stites, 503). This viewpoint was only reinforced in Putin’s mind as well as the minds of his constituents after the bombing of a Moscow apartment building, and the terror attacks by Chechen terrorist at Nord-Ost and Beslan (Basaev being the mastermind between the latter). Though public of opinion and support of the war dropped sharply after the first two years of the war, Putin continued on his path of destruction directed against the separatists and also the Chechen people.

One of the more tragic similarities between the Second Chechen War and the Stalinist Era is the complete destruction of Chechens as people as well as the reinstitution of the “Purges”. As Politkovskaya writes when talking about torture, purges, and other atrocities “Human substance disappears overnight, without a trace, a la 1937.” (Politkovskaya 27) Her biting reference to one of the worst periods of the Purges and Terror shows how the Russian security apparatus has only changed names, and not tactics. The tactics of the FSB do differ from those utilized by the KGB during the Purges of Soviet society, whereas the KGB purges where sweeping and grandiose in nature, the tactics of the FSB have been directed against an entire nation. Guilt by association was re-instated by the FSB and utilized against an entire nation. Politkovskaya illustrates this when an interview subject responds, “Of course. But when the Purge begins, I”m just a Chechen in their eyes, not a policeman.’ (Politkovskaya 104). It doesn’t matter to the Russian Forces that a person is a supporter of the puppet regime, if they have the correct papers, or if they are a simple policeman, all that matters is that the “guilty” person is a Chechen, and must therefore be a bandit. Also, according to Politkovskaya, the Russian Forces have switched from carpet bombing citizens to a strategy of destroying people through a “conveyor belt” (Politkovskaya 112). The change in tactics of dehumanization have been changed for several reasons. Firstly, the carpet bombing is too inefficient a method of human destruction, while buildings may fall, people can escape. Secondly, the more people caught in purges, the more rebels that are likely to be caught. This is tragically similar to Stalin’s policy of killing five innocent to capture five guilty.

Another factor that has arisen throughout Russian history and in the Chechen Wars is that of the Foreign and Domestic Agenda. Once again, Russia is stepping onto the world’s stage and pushing its interests onto others. However, the problem of legitimate power has also been resurrected. How can the Russian Federation re-achieve Velikaia Derzhavnost or Great Power status if it cannot achieve victory in its sphere of influence? This fear of illegitimacy is evocative of the Crimean and Caucasus Wars of the Tsarist period. However, unlike the defeat by foreign powers on Russian soil in the Crimean War, and the victory of Russian forces in a contested region, the current Wars have been victories by Russian forces on ethnically foreign soil. This fight for political and military legitimacy after the collapse of the Soviet Union is another of the most important reasons in explaining why the Russian Federation fought so fiercely and brutally in the First and Second Chechen War.

Whereas the Chechen people were undoubtedly the victims of the two Chechen Wars, the Russian military and political elite were undoubtedly the benefactors. The Second Chechen War especially offered an opportunity for the military hierarchy to gain benefits, both career wise and for personal economic benefits. As Politkovskaya states, “And as a team (soldiers and some of the militants), they take part in illegal oil and weapon trade. And there are also ranks, awards, and careers…” (Politkovskaya 161). Without a doubt, the Chechen War has offered an opportunity for the members of the Russian Armed Forces to gain awards and accolades for their bravery when fighting (but more importantly killing) the Chechen separatists. Politkovskaya also insinuates that officers in the Russian military as well as military contractors have been skimming money out of the defense budget for their own personal wealth. They have done this by slightly tweaking the reports on their expenditures. In one case, it was reported that Italian toilets were being installed in the Chechen village of Kalinovskaya (Politkovskaya 164). However, she states that the toilets are of local origin, and only the prices are Italian. The difference in prices is insinuated to go to military contracting firms and the military elite. Also, the army has gained a very powerful position in Russia through the Chechen war. The army has clearly turned into a “politically repressive institution in Chechnya” (Politkovskaya 160), another parallel to the Red Army’s position in Russian politics during the Soviet years. This position of power has also translated from Chechnya back to homeland Russia. ‘It’s the military that tells Russia what to do today’ (Politkovskaya 205). According to Politkovskaya, Putin may be popular but he has limited actual power. The real power is seated in the upper echelons of the military. This power can help to explain the length of the Second Chechen War, if the power does truly rest with the Russian High Command, then the military would undoubtedly continue the war (no matter the human costs) until it is no longer in their interests.

While the Second Chechen War has come to an uneasy standstill, with most of the country pacified, a final, tragic aspect of the Chechen Wars with similarity to Stalinist Russia shines through, it is the stance of the Russian people in regards to the conflict. A Small Corner of Hell serves as a chilling reminder to the Russian people of the atrocities that their military has committed and that their government has ignored or endorsed. The Russian people have decided to turn a blind eye to the horror that is taking place in Chechnya. Much like the times of Stalin, silence is a virtue and those that protest it are silenced. Anna Politkovskaya’s brutal murder provides evidence enough to this. And since her murder, serious, journalistic opposition to the war has dropped off, and with it the citizenry has resigned themselves to go with the political flow of the Putin Administration. However, the Russian people have been left with a quote that can perhaps help to guide them in their future political endeavors. Anna Politkovskaya quoted Akhmed Zakayev as saying “Real heroes don”t let this happen to their country.’ If the Russian people take this quote to heart, it is possible that they can break from the cycle of murder, rape, and injustice that has carried over from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation.