The Revitalization of Stalinism in the Chechen War

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent radical changes in the political and economic landscape of the country. However, one thing held over from the Soviet Era was the security apparatus, comprised of the military and intelligence agencies such as the Federal Security Service (hereafter referred to as the FSB). Anna Politkovskaya shows this in her collection of dispatches covering the Second Chechen War A Small Corner of Hell. As she writes when discussing the FSB and other security services, “…taken root in all government nooks and crannies of the country, just like in the Soviet era.” (Politkovskaya, 119) Of course the security apparatus of Russia that is currently in place was also in existence during the First Chechen War under President Boris Yeltsin. These similarities at the time are well illustrated by both Anatol Lieven’s Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power and A History of Russia by Catherine Evtuhov and Richard Stites. The methods used by the security services in both Chechen wars help to illustrate what Politkovskaya termed as “a striking neo-Soviet renaissance.” (Politkovskaya, 154) As well as who profited from the wars and those who suffered from the brutal measures taken by both sides.

With the rise of Dzhokar Dudayev as President of Chechnya, Russia was faced with a prospect that it perceived to be in conflict with its national interests, as well as a threat to its national security. Dudayev was a proponent of Chechen Independence from Russia, and though Russia, and more specifically Yeltsin had allowed the union republics to fall away from the USSR, he feared allowing a precedent of succession to form after a possible succession of Chechnya (Stites, 495). So when Dudayev, summoning the images of Shamyl and the Chechen deportations during World War II, embarked on his separatist path, Yeltsin sent in the Russian military to quell the separatist movement. After several years of negotiation, tensioned reached a boiling point and escalated into a real war in 1994. With the beginning of the war, the Russian military and FSB began showing their ties to the Red Army and KGB of the Soviet era. At the time “Yleltsin turned to his inner circle of advisers and the “force’ ministers- security, police, and army…’ (Stites, 496). Like Stalin, who had used the Red Army when politically necessary, Yeltsin used the council of the force loyal to him the 1993 putsch. Yeltsin was especially influenced by his Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who felt quick victory in Chechnya would steal political thunder from the ultranationalist branches of Russian politics (Stites, 496).