The Seeds of Conflict: Reasons Behind Russia’s Entry Into the World War and Germany’s Response

A second conflict lost by Russia in the years leading up to World War I was the Russo-Japanese war. This was was fought in 1904 and 1905, and concerned control over Korea. Again, the Russians were soundly defeated. This time, the loss was even more humiliating-never had an Eastern power so decisively defeated a European power (which Russia was contemporarily considered) (Martel 271). This defeat brought shame to the people of Russia, along with Czar Nicholas II. The need for a Russian victory grew.

Yet another diplomatic failure for Russia occurred only a few years after the Russo-Japanese War when Austria-Hungary annexed the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After Emperor Franz Josef I of Austria-Hungary announced the annexation, Europe was thrown into tumult. Some nations supported the annexation, while others, Russia included, felt it to be in violation of the Treaty of Berlin (Gatrell 49). Russia also felt that this annexation would make Austria-Hungary too strong, thus threatening the security of their Serbian allies. After many months of negotiations and intricate diplomatic maneuvering, it was decided that the Treaty of Berlin would be amended, and the Austro-Hungarian annexation Bosnia-Herzegovina would be recognized by the European powers (Lieven 40).

These three losses were all major blows to Russia’s pride in the decades leading into the Great War. They set the stage even further for a public demand of a Russian victory. As Orestes Ferrara wrote after the conclusion of the war, “The great losses suffered by the Russian state created a desire for victory with a strong sense of urgency; the national pride was replaced by shame” (Ferrara 190). Combined with the influence of Russian alliances, these losses composed the majority of Czar Nicholas II’s rationale behind his nation’s entrance into the First World War (Martel 214).

Influenced by its own political and diplomatic alignments, Germany interpreted Russia’s alliance-driven acts as aggressive gestures against German allies (Lieven 105). Since the formation of the unified German state, an alliance had existed with Austria-Hungary. Due to this alliance, Germany gave Russia twelve hours to demobilize its troops or else face consequences. Russia declined, and Germany declared war on Russia. Due to its actions, it is clear that Germany felt that Russia should not have intervened in a dispute it viewed to be between Austria-Hungary and Serbia (Sheffield). It was only after Russia entered the picture to defend its ally that Germany entered to defend that of its own.

While the consideration of the commitments to other nations made by both itself and Russia played an important role in Germany’s entry, the latter country was struck by its own wave of nationalism in the years leading up to the war (Martel 157). As Ferrara wrote of German leaders, “All were swept away by an avalanche of resurging patriotism, more sanguinary today than ever in past centuries,” (Ferrara 62). This increased national pride and elitism amongst both the German leadership and populace was certainly a major factor in Germany’s entry into the First World War.

In summary, Russia entered the Great War with the dual rationale of an alliance with Serbia and a great craving for victory. Germany did not accept this reasons as sufficient, and declared war on Russia after they refused to demobilize (Kelly). All things considered, the first part of Russia’s reasoning seems sufficient for a declaration of war; the second seems irresponsible. In its own interest, a nation should always protect its allies. When a country severs an alliance, they are liable to be dooming themselves. This scenario played out during the aforementioned Crimean War, when Austria broke its alliance with Russia to align itself with Britain and France. In consequence, the state that was then Austria was essentially liquidated. It was merged into the Austria-Hungary empire, and was became aligned with countries such as Germany with which they historically had been at odds. While the alliance was an adequate reason to enter the war, the nationalism that was obviously also very much behind the decision was not. When a country’s leader cannot successfully harness the nationalistic feelings in his or her nation, chaos and downfall can easily follow. In fact, these emotions got far out of hand in the midst of the war they possibly helped cause when the Russian Revolution took place in 1917.

Had Czar Nicholas II found a way to adequately appease his subjects, his government may not have been overthrown. In conclusion, Russia’s involvement in World War I was correctly justified; however, some of the reasoning used to provide a rationale was not. Serbia deserved to be protected, but the people of Russia deserved to not be put in harm’s way due to emotion taking hold of the general’s reins.