“It is difficult, if not impossible” to answer the question of why the First World War broke out argues Robert Pearce in a 1997 article. Similarly, to point out the exact reason why Britain joined the war in August 1914 is a difficult task. In The Realities behind Diplomacy, Paul Kennedy comments “there was no inevitable path to war”. There are long term reasons British could have entered such as the 1839 Treaty of London where Belgium was guaranteed neutrality; seventy-five years before the war broke out and some thirty-two years before Germany even existed. Likewise there are short term causes in the preceding months before the war; the July crisis being the most obvious of these. However, both these long and short term events could be argued to come down to one idea; Britain’s strive for a ‘balance of power’.  Germany was a rising power; in 1870 Britain had led the world in steel production with 0.7 million tonnes produced, Germany with only 0.3. By 1910 Germany’s production rate had risen to 13.8 million tonnes with Britain way behind on 5.9 million. Britain saw her as the biggest threat to the balance that had been established, and had to stop the country becoming too powerful and ruining the balance.

Britain’s relationship with Germany was fickle in the years prior to the war; in 1900 the majority of the Cabinet were seeking an Anglo-German accord however this began to deteriorate and by 1907 the likelihood of Britain siding with France in the event of war was more likely. One of the finest examples of this increasing rivalry is the naval race that took place. Germany adopted what Christopher Ray calls a ‘risk-fleet theory’; the country aimed to have a navy large enough to pose a threat to Britain was it involved in a third party conflict. This destroyed Britain’s ‘two power standard’; the idea that Britain’s navy should be bigger than the next two largest navies combined. While in 1898, the German navy was the seventh largest in the world, its growing size suggested that Britain’s previously held naval superiority would be destroyed and the balance of power shifted. The race reached its peak with the invention of the HMS Dreadnought. The Dreadnought effectively made all other battleships obsolete (including Britain’s older Battleships) and when Germany responded with her own version of the ship, a new stage was reached in the race.  Frank McDonough argues that by having a strong Navy, Germany hoped Britain would adopt neutrality in the case of war; however Britain saw the growing navy as a threat. Geographically, Germany was the biggest threat; neither American nor Japanese fleet expansion threatened Britain and it made sense for the British to become allies with America in the Western hemisphere and Japan in the East. However, as Robert Pearce argues the naval race was over by 1912, Germany concentrated on creating a large army. Therefore the naval race cannot be seen as a direct reason for Britain’s entry to the Great War. It did, however, begin to show Germany as a rising power and thus a threat.  

These relations had already been somewhat damaged in previous years, firstly with the Entente Cordiale of 1904 between France and England followed by the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. Many historians argue that despite it appearing an attack on Germany with hindsight, it was not done against Germany and was “more the settlement of past disputes” over the countries’ colonial enterprises. The fact of no formal alliance shows this; “British Diplomats wanted a freer hand in European affairs not a commitment to back up the French”.  Certainly when Britain signed the Ententes, their concerns were with the Empire which was beginning to fall, not Germany. The agreement of land was an attempt to gain some control and balance in the French and Russian expansion. However, while this action was not directly against Germany, it did leave her feeling encircled. The Schlieffen plan, a direct plan for war, was thus fine tuned and as Germany’s only war strategy, once implemented, a major European war could not be avoided. Though Britain was only looking for a balance in Europe, the action led to Germany’s preparation for war.

Another early example of a strain on Anglo-German relations is the first Moroccan crisis. The crisis took place in 1905 when Morocco, which was implementing a series of reforms overseen by the French, was visited by Kaiser Wilhelm. The Kaiser declared that the country was an independent state and the German government would be prepared to preserve that independence. This deliberately provocative attack against the French, who in the Entente Cordiale had control of Morocco, was designed to disintegrate relations between France and Britain. However, the British who “could not allow France to be dominated by a greater power in Europe” stood firmly by France hoping to keep the balance of power and stop Germany gaining political superiority.  Furthermore, when an International conference was held in Algeciras on the crisis, Italy (who was a member of the Italy/Germany/Austria-Hungary Triple Alliance) voted against Germany. British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey had rallied support from Italy as well was Russia and Spain in an attempt to keep the balance, however Italy’s ‘betrayal’ against Germany drew the nation and Austria-Hungary closer together; “The Moroccan crisis and the conference of Algeciras had shown the Germans that their alliance with Austria was all that stood between them and complete diplomatic isolation”.

Germany’s now stronger bond with Austria-Hungary meant the Germans gave full support to their ally during the Bosnian Crisis from 1908-9. When Austro-Hungarian troops invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina, land under control of the Turks, Russia was angered; the country had previously been promised greater influence in Constantinople and the free passage of Russian ships through the Straights, the Russians argued Austria-Hungary had so broken the agreement. Britain did not want Russia to become too powerful and thus opposed the proposition for the Russians and while Austria-Hungary was able to increase her territories, Russia gained nothing.  Britain’s lack of support for Russia in attempting to keep a balance has been argued as a direct link to the second Moroccan Crisis in 1911 and perhaps bringing Europe ever closer to the war as Germany saw this as a weakness in the agreement between the nations.

The second Moroccan Crisis broke out after the French military were actively involved in a revolt in Morocco. Germany argued this broke the agreement of 1906 (which indeed technically it did) and on top of demanding compensation for this, the country sent out a battleship to the Moroccan Port of Agadir in July, 1911. David Lloyd George (at the time Chancellor of the Exchequer) originally wrote in April when the French were preparing to intervene in the riots “what the French contemplate doing is not wise, but we cannot under our agreement interfere”. The British Government later responded angrily to Germany’s action and Lloyd George declared:

“If a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great…position Britain has won by centuries of heroism…then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.”

Paul Kennedy argues that at this time, “British fears that Germany might browbeat France in to political submission were such that even Lloyd George and Churchill shared the alarm”. Britain could not allow Germany the Foreign affairs success they wanted at the cost of France as the political balance would therefore be destroyed with power shifting in favour of Germany. Allowing Germany to become too powerful and France to therefore be submissive meant danger for Britain’s position and the overall balance in Europe.

These clashes with the ever growing Germany created a sense of ‘Germanophobia’ in the British public. The country was seen as a threat to the British security and a threat to the pride of the country, its empire. The 1896 Kruger Telegram incident had caused dislike in the British public of Kaiser Wilhelm II which was only reinstated with the events over the next eighteen years. The incident began with The Jameson raid, an armed attack to incite an uprising in Johannesburg against the Boers, which was illegal. It was an act against the state of Transvaal and the British government had not approved it. The Kaiser sent a congratulatory telegram to the Boer president, Kruger on the defence of the independence of Transvaal. This caused anger in Britain who saw the Transvaal as their land and Germany had been seen to challenge Britain’s position in the balance of power. While this was perhaps forgotten, in 1908 comments made by the Kaiser about the British in an interview with the Daily Telegraph angered the nation. He commented the British, “mad as March hares” and this is probably one of the events that led to the shouts of “we want war” at protests in Trafalgar Square in August, 1914. When the prospect of war arose, the anti-German, pro-war sentiments came to the surface; some therefore arguing the government could have been pressured by public opinion. If the public lost faith in the government, it surely lost some of its power in Europe. While the rest of Europe were engaged in war, were Britain to stay neutral with such strong public opinion, a deterioration in the country’s position was sure to follow.

These protests and the prospect of war were of course spawned on to the level they were by the so called ‘July Crisis’, however in the close years before the war Anglo-German relations had been improved slightly. In 1912, Lord Haldane, British Secretary for the State of War, visited Germany to try and reach an agreement. However, Germany would only offer to scale down their naval programme if England promised neutrality in a Russo/Franco-German war. Haldane “could not accept an unqualified neutrality that would compromise Britain’s freedom of action and, in effect, amount her to abdication from European affairs”. In short, Britain could not compromise the balance of power for their naval superiority, granting Germany her neutrality in the case of a war would mean a huge shift in the balance of power. If Germany won, she would be the most powerful nation having defeated the powerful Russia and France. Had France and Russia won and Britain not assisted, though there was no military agreement in case of war between England and the countries, the relationship between the two would not be amiable. Furthermore a Europe with Russia and France with the greatest strength would break the balance of power and leave Britain weak. Even without a naval agreement, Britain led the naval race by the time war came about with twenty-nine Dreadnoughts and nine Dreadnought battle-cruisers to Germany’s seventeen and seven respectively. In the years 1912-1913 further attempts between the countries were made to improve relations, probably to prevent a shift in the power. Britain and Germany came to an agreement that “granted the Germans a much larger share of Angola than in the earlier arrangement and were given only slight compensation in this for this alteration in Mozambique”. As well as this Britain and Germany cooperated in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and as late as June 1914 the English and Germans made an agreement on the building of the Baghdad railway. These signs of cooperation and improved relations suggest that Britain wasn’t simply obsessed with crushing the growing Germany; they were interested in keeping the balance of power between all nations. The attempts to reach agreements further support this as they were started by Britain.

However, when the events of July, 1914 unfolded it was difficult for Britain to avoid a war. As mentioned previously, in order to keep the balance of power they could not stay neutral as whichever duo of nations won would have the greatest power. Though they were in this situation, Britain was still reluctant of war; it was Foreign Minister Edward Grey who, on 27th July 1914, first raised the possibility of Britain entering a war. Though five members of the Cabinet threatened to resign, when Germany broke the terms of the 1839 London treaty of Belgium neutrality by invading the country, Grey and the Cabinet had a reason to enter war. Many argue against this being the real reason and see it as simply an excuse as Germany did not foresee Britain acting in aid of Belgium; Britain did not make it clear. On the 2nd August, Grey threatened to resign unless the Cabinet agreed to the war. This would have meant disaster for the Liberal Government as Prime minister Asquith too would have resigned making way for a new coalition Conservative government who had made it known they fully supported the necessity for war. The Cabinet saw that for the Liberals and thus their current balance of power policy to remain in control, unity had to prevail.

Some historians argue Britain’s entry being based solely on defence of Belgium, S.J. Lee for example arguing “The defence of a small and helpless state had an irresistible appeal”. However, it seems more likely looking at the threatened balance of the previous European set up that Britain was simply interested in keeping equality in power. The Germans were rising economically as well as in confidence; their two attempts at making France politically submissive in the Moroccan crises an example. Furthermore, despite amiable attempts by Britain to build bridges in Anglo-German relations and thus keep a balance, Germany would not accept her terms. It seems war was an inevitable occurrence as the growing tension between Germany and France took place. When Franz Ferdinand was shot on 28 June, 1914, war was sparked however this appears to be simply an excuse, not the reason. Similarly, Britain had various run-ins with Germany in the years preceding the war; however these are not alone responsible for her intervention beginning in August, 1914. Economic interests as well as domestic issues could too be included in the equation, however filled with the idea that “it would all be over by Christmas”, Britain’s strongest argument was to retain the balance between the different states.