Why Did the Franco Regime in Spain Last So Long?

Another factor that contributed to the length of the Franco regime’s survival was that for much of the period there seemed to be no serious alternative. The regime played on the fears that a return to democracy would bring Communists and Socialists back to power. In other words the alternative to Franco was another Republic or another Civil War. Franco played on the fears of further conflicts should his regime fall as an excuse for repression and to ensure the population accepted the continuance if the regime (Roberts, 1996, 492). Franco himself wanted to remain in power for life and then have the Spanish monarchy restored with a military led government retaining power. He achieved that goal when his made caudillo or head of state for life in 1947. In essence the regime length was directly linked to the life span of Franco himself. Franco plans for the continuance of the military led government were not to be fulfilled due to the murder of Admiral Blanco and the support of King Juan Carlos for democracy. With the exception of ETA, much of the opposition to the Franco regime was biding its time as the aging dictator survived into his eighties. It made little sense to risk life and liberty in openly opposing a regime built around a man who was increasingly frail, they need do nothing but wait for his death.

The Franco regime was partly able to last so long as it delivered economic growth. The Franco regime started a process of economic reforms and modernization in order to end Spain’s economic backwardness. At first economic progress and reforms were directed and promoted by the group Accion Espanola. The policies of Accion Espanola were intended to instill Spain with a vigorous form of capitalism. The only influence that the fascist Falangists would have during the Franco regime was control of the trade union movement. That control was used to make sure that all workers and unions co-operated with regime’s economic policy and were not involved in supporting opposition movements. The corporatist structures helped enforce the regime’s economic measures that started to increase Spain’s productivity and wealth.

The ideological nature of the Franco regime itself contributed to the length of its survival. The regime was not dominated consistently by any group or deep-rooted ideology. Franco was keen to play the different factions within the regime off against each other to maintain his personal control. Although the regime contained the small group of fascists the Falange it represented the entire nationalist and conservative groups in Spain. When Franco had wished to maintain strong links with Hitler and Mussolini the Falange’s role within the regime was highlighted. However when the regime needed to re-establish better relationships with the rest of Western Europe and the USA the Falange were played down in importance.

General Franco was astute enough to consolidate the regime after winning the Spanish Civil War. It was a bonus for the regime that many of its most dangerous opponents had been killed, jailed or gone into exile as a result of the Civil War. Staying neutral during the Second World War was a sensible decision given Spain’s lack of resources and because it started so close to the end of the Spanish Civil War. If Spain had joined the war on the Axis side defeat would have followed and the Franco regime would have collapsed. Aside from its anti-communism the Franco regime had no constant ideological agenda thus allowing it to be highly pragmatic in foreign and domestic policy- making decisions. The onset of the Cold War was a bonus for the regime as it ended its international isolation after the defeat of the Axis powers. The regime’s anti-Communist credentials were more important that it’s obvious lack of democratic freedoms. Franco himself was astute at playing the fractions of the regime off against each other and would often change the government around to keep his authority absolute. The regime maintained in its propaganda that it was Spain’s only hope for political stability and economic progress.

Bibliography

Carr R (1986) The Spanish Tragedy – The Spanish Civil War in Perspective, Phoenix Press, London

Eatwell, R (2003) A History of Fascism, Pimlico, London

Hobsbawm, E (1994) Age of Extremes- the short Twentieth century 1914-1991, Michael Joseph, London

Roberts J M (1996) A History of Europe, Penguin, London

Watson, J (1997) Success in World History since 1945, John Murray, London