World War Two: Battle of Stalingrad

“As a city, Stalingrad was of no strategic importance” (Beevor 1998, p. 22). To what extent does this statement hold true for Germany?

Beevor’s statement “as a city, Stalingrad was of no strategic importance” for Germany only holds true to a certain extent. Opinions of historians on this matter are divided with some believing that Stalingrad was of no strategic importance in early 1942 and others arguing that Stalingrad’s industrial and propaganda value were of strategic worth. Despite the different arguments, both sides do share one common idea – if there was any strategic value in the city, whether it be industrial, geographical or for propaganda purposes, it was undermined by Hitler’s determination to capture the entire city and turn it into a “symbolic victory” (Beevor 1998, p. 124). This obsession eventually led to the complete destruction of the “flower of the German Wehrmacht” (Cawthorne 2003, p. 103), the elite German 6th Army, and also proved to be a turning point in the Second World War  where “the hinge of fate had turned”(Churchill 1953, p. 831).

There is a perception that, during the planning stages of Operation Blau, Stalingrad was considered to be of little tactical significance. Stalingrad was deemed by the Oberkommando der Werhmacht (OKW), to a degree, to be a “by product, a steppingstone” in the planning phases, with “the Caucasus [being] the gold” (Baldwin 1966, p. 69). Evidence of this can be inferred from the views shared by Hitler and his generals in 1942. At that time, Hitler prioritised the economic conquests in Russia over military conquests. Therefore, instead of targeting Moscow, which was the “rail and communications centre and political capital of ‘Mother Russia’” (Baldwin 1966, p. 158), for its military benefits, Hitler opted to “very cleverly shift the whole strategic focus of the campaign onto the war of the South” (The World at War Stalingrad, 1974) where the oil fields of the Caucasus were located. This allowed the German war machine to replenish its vast gasoline shortages due to three years of continuous expansion. The fact that the initial view of Stalingrad was “as far as his [Hitler’s] generals were concerned…little more than a name on the map” (Beevor, 1998 p. 69) conveys the view of the OKW – in the context of Operation Blau – pertaining to the irrelevance and worthlessness of Stalingrad and triviality and insignificance. Such a view is reinforced by Beevor (1998, p. 70), “at that stage, the only interest in Stalingrad was to eliminate armament factories…and secure a position in the Volga”, and by Craig (1973, p. 28), “[Stalingrad] the city that Hitler never planned to invade”. Accordingly, it can be inferred that in early 1942, Stalingrad was considered by many to be a city of minimal strategic value. It is important to note though, that Hitler’s shift to the south would “play a major part in his new obsession with Stalingrad” (Beevor 1998, p. 123).