Afghanistan War and Corruption: Karzai Needs The Boot
by President Karzai reminds me of that kid in eleventh grade physics who sets the grading curve with a lucky B+ and afterwards considers himself as qualified as Stephen Hawking. As if the 76 Points of Resolution passed during the Loya Jirga was enough of a Christmas list from a regime that deserves freight trains full of coal, the Mayor of Kabul has the nerve to continue harping against the international entities whose biggest mistake (outside of failing to back a Mussad Clean-House tactic in 2001 instead of an occupation) was giving Karzai the false impression that he is actually a legitimate leader.
Here are five reasons why Karzai should go:
1. He’s like the oldest brother who feels entitled to his parent’s inheritance despite his failure at life. The moment NATO delivers an overture to the Taliban who more effectively run checkpoints then Karzai’s forces, Karzai pouts and demands that the US handover the detention center at Bagram Air Base along with all local national detainees. Afghanistan is not a hopeless case, in twenty plus years, if we stayed, a transformation would occur (just like it took South Korea 25+ years to go from the Flintstones to today with continued in-country American support); however, right now Afghanistan can barely wips its own ass- and that’s not a criticism- that’s actuality. So who, what, where, why, when, and how does Karzai even begin to imagine Afghans effectively running detention centers?
2. The much dreaded APPF transition is an unknown whisper among the American public. In March, Karzai’s regime expects to takeover local national private security contracting despite the lack of personnel, training, equipment, financing, and general mental and technical capabilities of the regime and Afghan forces. The recent arrest of British contractors allegedly gun-running in Kabul is a prelude to the disastrous transition solely defined by Karzai and his cronies desire to monopolize security for self-gain and American politicians who simply want to see a bar graph and numbers to back a 2014 withdrawal. There are a whole slew of issues with the transition. USAID contractors are likely to leave if Expat private security consultants aren’t able to hold authority over contracted APPF local national personnel, which means no development, no stability. Good pay is what curbs the issue of bribery as well among local nationals working for private security companies whose workforce- contrary to Karzai- is on average 95% Afghan. Karzai clearly lives in a dreamscape. Even in America, where a pool of resources and expertise already exist, it would be extremely difficult to set-up a security company in less than a year. Besides, goats with laser-guns at this rate would be more effective than the APPF.
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