Nice and Healthcare Rationing in The Uk
As an organisation NICE was established in order to improve the cost effectiveness of the National Health Service (NHS) besides helping to reduce the waiting lists and times for medical treatment, and also allowing all patients to receive the treatment most appropriate for their actual health needs.
The tightened regulations and also procedures put in place for the NHS, whether extended from previous guidance or introduced from scratch by the New Labour government from 1997 were not publicly at least depicted as a means of rationing public health care in Britain.41 However in many ways the role of NICE in deciding directly or indirectly, which drugs, equipment, medical services, and health care treatments should be freely available to NHS patients or in fact rationed cannot be denied or played down.42 The roles given to NICE by the government go further than just deciding whom benefits from drugs, equipment, medical services, and health care treatments, and who does not. NICE is now the main body for deciding after appropriate tests and trials, which new drugs, equipment, medical services, and health care treatments will be used by the NHS or rejected due to unclear health benefits, or simply because they are too expensive.43 Any of the new drugs, medical equipment, services, or health care treatments considered to be surplus to requirements will not then be available upon the NHS. NICE however will face lobbying to change decisions from the public, medical groups, and the media when potentially life saving treatments are not approved simply because they cost too much.44
Therefore in conclusion the requirement for the NICE to regulate and indeed ration the publicly funded NHS is perhaps more pronounced than ever before. The demands placed upon the British NHS as one of the worlds most used publicly funded health care service providers. Thus the NHS has to use great quantities of drugs, as well as expensive equipment that to allows it to provide medical services alongside health care treatments of the highest standards. If the supply of public money was not tightly restricted then perhaps NICE would not have to find ways of tightly regulating the health care services in Britain as well as the medical treatments delivered by the NHS itself. Minus the perceived requirement for the NHS to perform its tasks within the confines of the budget put forward by the British government there is uncertainty as to whether or not NICE or any other organisation would have to have been set up in the first place.
After all the New Labour government set up NICE to act as a body inside the NHS to give the latter the specialists it requires in order to effectively and tightly regulate as well as ration such a complex state funded organisation. There are literary many thousands of different cures, drugs, alongside alternative forms of medical treatment that should be and are tightly regulated by NICE. Tight regulation by NICE combined with rationing arguably has the benefit that NHS patients get the best treatment available to them. The problem that justifies the existence of NICE is related to the fact that the NHS with all of its various health trusts plus specialist care units only have a finite budget available to them. They have to take that into account when they have to determine all the cures, drugs, medical services, as well as treatments should be provided to the British general public.
However not everybody is overly impressed by the functions or indeed the performance of NICE. For example British people on the political left and also health care professionals suspected that the tight regulations and rationing linked with NICE had a more sinister purpose than increasing efficiency, they feared it was a method of getting parts of the NHS ready for privatisation. Indeed since New Labour reached political power during 1997 the private sector has provided facilities and services in partnership with the NHS to treat patients more efficiently and as part of the efforts to reduce hospital waiting queues. Besides the decisions reached by NICE about whether or not to approve treatments can and do cause political controversy.
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1 Coxall, Robbins, & Leach, 2003 p. 10
2 Young, 2003 p. 20
3 Jones et al, 2004 p. 45
4 Kingdom, 2003 p. 101
5 Judt, 2007 p. 131
6 James, 2003 p. 280
7 Ham, 2004 p. 51
8 Jones et al, 2004 p. 624
9 Watson, 1997 p. 123
10 Kingdom, 2003 p. 53
11 Palmowski, 2008 p. 480
12 Coxall, Robbins, & Leach, 2003 p. 371
13 Seldon & Kavanagh, 2005 p. 402
14 Palmowski, 2008 p. 480
15 Childs, 2006, p. 16
16 Jones et al, 2004 p. 624
17 Childs, 2006 p. 326
18 Young, 2003 p. 15
19 Palmowski, 2008 p. 479
20 Judt, 2007 p. 721
21 Childs, 2006 p. 351
22 Kingdom, 2003 p. 55
23 Seldon & Kavanagh, 2005 p. 402
24 Childs, 2005 p. 327
25 Jones et al, 2004 p. 625
26 Young, 2003 p. 302
27 Coxall, Robins, & Leach, 2003 p. 377
28 Ham, 2004 p. 51
29 Seldon & Kavanagh, 2005 p. 403
30 Childs, 2006 p. 366
31 Seldon & Kavanagh, 2005 p. 404
32 Childs, 2006 p. 392
33 Kingdom, 2003 p. 54
34 Childs, 2006 p. 393
35 Young, 2003 p. 307
36 Ham, 2004 p. 52
37 Childs, 2006 p. 392
38 Childs, 2006 p. 367
39 Wanless, 2002 p. 5
40 Seldon & Kavanagh, 2005 p. 408
41 Ham, 2004 p. 53
42 Childs, 2006 p. 393
43 Ham, 2004 p. 213
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