Reversing Demands by The World Bank

Today functional imperatives and changing norms are keys to drive demands for democratizing the Bank’s governance.  The rampant existence of capital flows has decreased demands for IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) loans from middle-income nations that historically represent the core of the Bank’s business.

More institutional proposals such as a move towards majority (double) voting may also recapture the bank’s legitimacy by granting more say to the poorest nations.  They are obviously the primary benefactors of the Bank’s services although currently have little incentive to actively participate in board discussions.  This act (interaction) would regain within the bank a significant level of legitimacy if the gentlemen’s agreement dictating the non-transparent (hidden) and highly politicized selection of the Bank Presidency was shaken aboard (overturned).

Two (2) sides of the coin could describe the Banks dilemma of reform goal dissonance.  Firstly,  the bank opted to reverse stagnant demand for Bank loans by becoming more abreast (focused) to borrowing government interests.  Lastly, the bank had sought (decided) to appear more taken (responsive) to demands for increased accountability from vigilant (attentive) and vocal (attuned) NGOs, civil society organizations and their attendant national parliaments in donor states.  This required enhancing the time-consuming and costly accountability measures and safeguard policies, which were conflicting (alluring contrast) with the interests of the borrowing governments that the bank was inadvertently eyeing (wooing) upon.

Accordingly, the result was that overal weak progress in improving compliance with safeguard measures (the reform goal of NGOs and donor states) was due to resistance from borrowing nation (government) and the exclusive desire to further orient operational staff towards client responsiveness (sort of a reversal of progress due to sustainable development goals).