Jimenez vs. Quarterman (2008)

Jimenez was convicted of burglary in Texas in 1995. The case raised an issue over the meaning of a term in a statute, and the Court defined that term.

At issue was the term “final” in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A). That statute indicates that the one-year time period for determining when a judgment is “final” begins on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” After a decision is final, no review is allowed under the statute.

Jiminez filed an out-of-time petition and later filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus on July 19, 2005. He argued that the decision was “final” on January 6, 2004 when time expired for an out-time-appeal, and that the time during which his appeal was pending did not count for calculation of the time period. He argued that the court could hear the habeas petition because it was timely filed. The District Court ruled that Jimenez’ decision was final one year after October 11, 1996, when his conviction became final. The appellate court in Texas denied petitioner’s appeal.

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision by Justice Thomas, reversed the Texas court and ruled in favor of Jimenez.

The Court held that “where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal during state collateral review, but before the defendant has first sought federal habeas relief, his judgment is not yet ‘final’ for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A). In such a case, ‘the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review’ must reflect the conclusion of the out-of-time direct appeal, or the expiration of the time for seeking review of that appeal.”

The Court was probably influenced by the fact that the Defendant had already spent 13 years in prison for burglary, a stiff sentence to say the least.