Gulf War Mining Case Study

The Tripartites initially tackled MF II in MDA 6, because QCS 307 cut through the area.  They later moved to MF I and III.  The Tripartite Class performed well, and on one notable day the French MCMV SAGITTAIRE destroyed 33 mines by following the minelines.  Although the French gloated over the international scoreboard for mine destruction, (much to the annoyance of the British and Americans who swept and hunted up and down the routes where there weren’t any planned mines) this particular feat was a credit to the operational efficiency of the crew and the effectiveness of the platform.

Four Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force Hatsushim Class MCMVs and a support vessel arrived and started work in MF V under USS TACON.

By mid July, the designated clearance work was complete and the vessels of the WEU started to independently return to their own countries.  USN pledged to continue the problem area of MDA 10, with Japan’s support.  By 1 September 1286 mines were countered, 975 moored and 311 ground, by the combined allied MCM Force.

Lessons Learned – General Warfare

Mine Watch Organisation and Intelligence

Effective surveillance of Minelaying activity should have led to the establishing of MDAs, very early in the conflict.  The worst case must be assumed when assessing potential minefields.  The MCM Command must not rely on scanty intelligence and shouldn’t discard information because it doesn’t agree with predictions.

USN MCM Capability

From their experience in the Gulf, the USN acknowledged that their MCM capability had considerable shortcomings.  Key areas were as follows:

AMCM

•  55 hours maintenance to 1 hour in the air.

•  No mines swept by AMCM influence wire sweeps.

•  Restricted to daylight hours operations only and overnight hours spent deploying and recovering equipment.

MCMVs

MSO were old, unreliable, acoustically and magnetically unclean.  USS AVENGER (MCM Class) had problems associated with any prototype.  The lack of suitable afloat support contributed to low efficiency.  Their combined (AMCM and Surface) efficiency was very low <12% coverage of MF 5 in one month was an indication.

EOSS

EOSS, a thermal imaging device, proved very useful.  In sea states up to 3/4, the device could be mounted on the masthead or deployed from a helicopter.  Additionally Nightsun, an infra red searchlight again mounted on the ship or deployed from a helicopter, could be useful with further development.

Mine Avoidance Sonar

COMUSMCMGRU staff regarded the Kingfisher MAS enhancement to the SQQ 56 Sonar as unreliable in Sea States above 1 and 2, with numerous false alarms.

Conclusions

From a mining perspective, the Iraqis were mostly successful in achieving sea denial.  They were unlucky not to damage more ships.  They prevented the Allied forces from conducting an amphibious landing in Kuwait.   This had all sorts of implications.  They could have done better.

From an MCM perspective – what stands out in the Gulf War is the sheer luck that remained with the coalition in avoiding significant damage and death from mines.  Much of the minefield was ineffective, but the fact that intelligence support failed to provide any significant details of the Iraqi Minelaying effort placed many units in extreme danger.

Overall, the aims of the coalition were accomplished and the land forces were given the support required to prosecute the land offensive albeit by a different route then intended.  Additionally, what seemed a hap-hazard command and control organisation for the subsequent clearance operation fraught with political manoeuvring, at the operational end worked well with a high level of effectiveness demonstrated by most countries with MCM units.

Had the allies been forced to make a full scale assault on the Kuwait beaches the resultant losses amongst the amphibious units would have been significant. The alternative would have been a long mine clearance operation, in a hostile environment, causing a delayed offensive.