M4 Sherman: Firepower
by An analysis of the Sherman tank and its firepower through out the Second World War.
105-mm M4
A realistic drawing of the M4A3 (105). Because of its comparatively supportive combat role it’s generally not subject to as much attention as other tanks.
The need for firepower in the headquarters companies of both Infantry and Armored battalions was initially fulfilled with the M8 Howitzer Motor Carriage based on the M5 “Stuart” light tank chassis. It was armed with a 75-mm M2/M3 Howitzer (not to be confused with the 75-mm guns that armed the Lee and Sherman medium tanks) which were developed from the M1A1 Pack Howitzer.
This vehicle was well and good for its size, but the 75-mm howitzer wasn’t giving the kind of firepower needed. Especially when the Germans started introducing assault guns carrying 105-mm armaments, individual battalions were finding themselves lacking in firepower against soft targets. They needed a vehicle capable of carrying a larger gun, and a convenient solution was found in the Sherman.
The famous 105-mm M2A1 Howitzer was shortened and placed in a vehicular mounting to create the 105-mm M4. This was fitted in the Sherman turret, deleting the powered turret traverse and forcing the crews to rely on hand cranking to train the gun on target. It was found to be satisfactory for what it was designed to do, with the only real complaint being the lack of power traverse though it didn’t impact performance in its designated role that much. Tanks armed in this way were, as you could probably guess by now, tagged with a ‘(105)’ designation at the end of their name.
The high explosive charge was hefty and could easily obliterate soft targets. The HE M1 Shell alone carried 4.8 pounds of TNT. Although the vehicle was not designed for combating enemy vehicles, there are accounts of high explosive shells causing damage to German heavy tanks and even outright destroying them. The HEAT (High Explosive Anti Tank) M67 shell channels the explosion through a narrow stream rather than in all directions, affording it great armor penetration in its own right.
Conclusion
After having taken all this in I think it’s reasonable to conclude that the Sherman was not in any way under gunned for a vehicle in its weight class. The problem ultimately seems to be that it was missing a valuable team mate: A heavy tank to cover for it against threats where a heavy tank would be appropriate. The Soviet Union made good use of the M4A2s armed with the 76-mm M1 that they received via Lend Lease, and I don’t think it’s any coincidence that Dmitri Loza views the tank as confidently as he does because the Soviet Union had access to this vital component which the Western Allies lacked. At several points in his book heavier, more appropriate tanks such as the IS-2 are deployed against dug in German tanks such as the Pz.kpfw V “Panther,” leaving the Shermans to do the kind of jobs they were intended to do.
The closest the Western Allies had to something like a heavy tank were the British Infantry Tanks such as the A22 “Churchill.” While these vehicles were well armored enough to slug it out at long range with heavy German armor, they always lacked the armament necessary to reliably engage targets at the required ranges. Even with this deficiency, though, it was proven in Tunisia that the Churchill-Sherman team was a powerful force to be reckoned with. Unfortunately this was never effectively repeated as Allied planners started stubbornly using the Sherman in the initial assault role; a role for which they were not designed.
Had the Western Allies learned from the lessons taught in Tunisia and Italy and continued to pair the Sherman and Churchill as a team – and preferably if the United States had deployed a heavy tank of their own such as the M6 – the Sherman would be remembered much more fondly in the annals of history.
Sources
American Armored Fighting Vehicle Database
Erwin Rommel. The Rommel Papers. Da Capo Press
Isaac D. White. United States vs. German Equipment. Merriam Press
R.P. Hunnicutt. Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank. Presidio Press
Dmitry Loza. Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks. University of Nebraska Press
Liked it
-
Post Commentrick van heerden
On May 21, 2010 at 2:07 am
Good article, well argued. Thank you! Rommel’s remarks on the advent of the Sherman are revealing. Zaloga’s statistical analysis of the Sherman’s performance against the Panther during the Battle of the Bulge also indicates that the Sherman did not fare badly. But there is something haunting about Belton Cooper’s heartfelt protest at the losses incurred from Normandy onwards.