A Look Into Aristotle’s Four Causes

Aristotle provides us with a very concise definition of nature: that which has essence and form. He saw natural things as those things that have the cause of change in themselves (self-causing). In a very systematic, and logical, way (since he is the first philosopher to write in detail about logic), he derives at four causes that occur in the world: the potential cause, or what a thing is made of; the Formal cause, or what the thing’s shape, form, and Idea, is; the efficient cause, or what agent is responsible for the thing in form and essence; and the teleological cause, or the ending purpose for the thing. Essentially, the first two causes are most seen in nature. For example, a tree is made up of wood, and leaves, and branches, and other materials (potential cause), but this definition would be incomplete because unless the tree has a form (i.e. of its shape and pattern of being a tree). We would not call wood, leaves, and branches a tree unless it took the form of a tree.

However, the last two causes pre-suppose two things that need more analysis: one, that there is a specific agent that is working in order to produce this thing; and two, that there was an ending reason that this agent had in mind when it (or he or she) produced the thing. The four causes are easy to picture when we are talking about unnatural things. For example, we have a house-builder. The potential cause is what the house is made up of: wood, stone, brick, etc. The formal cause is the blue-print or Idea of the house that the house-builder wishes to build. The efficient cause is the house-builder himself – the one responsible for why the house is built. And the teleological cause is the reason or purpose for the house – in order to house people, store objects, etc.

We cannot, though, classify unnatural things as natural things. So what is the primary difference? Aristotle says that natural things are those things which are the source of change in themselves. This implies that the efficient cause is the natural thing itself. This also implies that the ending aim of the natural thing is already determined by the efficient cause. So if we take a tree, for example, we could describe its potential and Formal cause. But what is the efficient cause? Why, the tree, of course! This is an extremely difficult concept to comprehend, in my opinion. There can be raised a series of questions that I’m not sure about: if the tree is the cause of the tree, would that mean that the tree, in its full completion, is the cause of the tree in its incompletion? How does the tree “know” that it is a tree? In other words, when is the tree aware that it is fully a tree or that it has reached its ending purpose? Is there a set rule that the tree must follow so as to keep being a tree?

In the case of the house-builder, it is easier to understand because we can understand that he has in mind an idea, the materials, and the purpose, for why we can build a house. The essential problem that I have in trying to understand Aristotle is that if we apply the four causes to natural things, it almost supposes there is a sort of God or Creator that was the first cause of the change. In fact, in Aristotle’s Metaphysics he reasons to the ability for there to be a God, or Prime Mover, in the universe. The fundamental puzzling question that I have is: is it possible for there to be no Prime Mover, and yet have nature be the efficient and teleological cause?