Analysis of Michel Foucault

The existence of ethics, morality and values has long been a basis of contest among philosophical thinkers. On one pole stands the deterministic teleology of Aristotle, which distinguishes the good from the evil and the just from the unjust. On the other pole resides the de-centrism of Foucault, which denies a universal code of ethics or values altogether. The latter also denies a unifying human essence by a similar argument and has become prey to a host of contradictions. This essay will discuss the philosophy of Michael Foucault in relation to contrasting philosophies and expose the inconsistencies in his descriptions of human essence and values.

Foucault fundamentally denies the existence of a universal code of ethics or morality. His ideas are, in part, an adaptation of genealogy, the study of origins. Foucault argues that values do not have any origins and so cannot be predetermined universally by a metaphysical being. Rather, he proposes that values are the by-products of a non-progressive historical process. Values, he argues, do not evolve or progress over time; they are simply structures of knowledge established by power and violence at a time in history. Hence, the history of values is merely the history of dominance and power struggles between the ruling forces of a given time. Furthermore, the human has no power to create or direct the course of these values; the human is simply subjected to this history of violence and exclusion without choice. The human lacks both the creative ability and the freedom to create history or to shape values; rather, history creates and controls the human.

Foucault stands in stark contrast to Karl Marx, who states: “The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated.”1 Marx argues that humans are both the products of and creators of history. History shapes humans, but cannot consume us, for we in turn create and control history.

Foucault denies any human power to shape history, which in turn supports a non-active and quiet life. If action is maneuvered for change, the results of action are nullified if change is impossible. This, again, is strongly contested by Hanna Arendt and her notion of viva activa (the active life). For Arendt, it is action that creates history. Humans can condition and are conditioned by history.