Aristotle on Substance in The Categories

Aristotelian Reality

In order to understand why Aristotle argues that primary substance is more fundamental than secondary substance, it is necessary to start with an understanding of what substance is. From there, I will describe the discord between the fundamentality of primary substance and the seeming necessity of secondary substances existence for primary substances existence. I will conclude that this conflict does not actually have to be a conflict. In addition, I will reference an alternative way of understanding Categories that alleviates the issue.

An Understanding of Aristotle’s Categories

In Categories, Aristotle argues that there are ten categories each of which denotes a type of being (page 180). He claims that any words or phrases that exist without combination are either things or describe things (page 180). [1] Descriptors of things make up nine of the ten categories, ranging from descriptions of the quality of a thing, like its’ color or temperature, to the position a thing is in, like standing or hanging (page 180). The tenth category describes things, including anything from the human race to a grain of sand (page 181). This category is what Aristotle terms substance (page 181).

            Aristotle believes that since the other nine categories describe substances, the category of substance is required for the existence of the other types of being (page 181). He argues that all types of being apart from substance exist only in a subject, where a subject is defined as any real thing that can be predicated (page 181).[2] Therefore, subjects must necessarily be substances, since none of the other categories fit this definition of a logical subject. In fact, Aristotle claims that since substances describe the identity of things, they are characteristically not in a subject (Page 181). That is, substances have th e ability to stand alone without being predicated to another subject.[3] On the other hand, the other nine types of being act like parasites, since they are always attached as a predicate to a logical subject.

            Furthermore, Aristotle makes a distinction between universals and particulars for both substances and non-substances. I will first examine this distinction in non-substances. Aristotle uses the term “said of a subject” to describe universals and the term “not said of a subject” to describe particulars (page 180). Things said of a subject that are also in a subject are abstract nouns. For example, the words yellow, low, and hot are all non-substance universals. On the other hand, things that are not said of a subject but still in a subject are adjectives, referring to the condition or state of a subject. Examples of non-substance particulars include the exact white of my bedroom wall and the exact heat being emitted by the tea sitting on my desk. Evidently, no particular color, temperature, or other non-substance can exist without being in a logical subject. For instance, the exact white of my wall could not exist without my wall, and the exact weight of my housemate could not exist without my housemate.