Aristotle on Substance in The Categories

A Less Ultimate Vantage Point

However, I will argue that it is possible to consider Aristotle’s primary substance in a way that does not cause this conflict. I will argue that this problem only exists when Aristotle’s Categories is interpreted under the notion of speculative metaphysics. I will then describe an alternative way of viewing primary substance that alleviates the problem of primary substance’s fundamentality.

            When interpreted under the veil of speculative metaphysics, Categories describes primary substance’s that are fundamental for any other type of being to exist (In Class).  Certainly, Aristotle claims this is argument is accurate. He believes that if “primary substance did not exist, neither could any of the other things exist” (Page 181). He also clearly states his belief that the categories he has created describe the nature of all types of being (Page 180).[7] Thus, Aristotle himself seems to believe his categories are all inclusive and give a description of the ultimate nature of reality.

            However, I believe that, much like the way all-inclusive resort in Cuba are not a true representative of the country, Aristotle’s categories are not a complete and ultimate description of all types of being. I believe that Categories should be interpreted through the notion of descriptive metaphysics instead. Descriptive metaphysics makes no ultimate claims about reality (In Class). Instead, it is a way of logically studying the structure of how we think about the world. In essence, descriptive metaphysics describes the structure of the world we are familiar with (In Class).

If Categories is viewed through this understanding, rather than that of speculative metaphysics, primary substance is not necessarily fundamental, or even necessarily independent. Explicitly, though primary substance may seem fundamental in the way we view the world, under the idea of descriptive metaphysics it is not necessarily so. Thus, I believe that by simply accepting that Aristotle’s Categories cannot be viewed as an ultimate description of reality, the fact that secondary substance reveals what primary substance is does not pose a problem, since primary substance is not to be considered fundamental for all possible types of being.

 I have shown this by first describing the general ideas in Categories, and following with Aristotle’s seemingly ultimate distinction between primary and secondary substance. I then described the problem this distinction creates, and suggested an alternative viewpoint that alleviates the conflict. Therefore, I believe the only reason Aristotle appears to argue that primary substance is more fundamental that secondary substance is because he believes Categories must describe the ultimate nature of reality, rather than being content to describe reality as we, as humans, see it.

[1] By without combination, Aristotle is referring to words or phrases that are not sentences by themselves. For instance, the word ‘human’ versus the sentence ‘the human is tall’.

[2] By real thing I mean words that are logical subjects, rather than only grammatical subjects.

[3] This can be seen in the 4 to 1 test, where predicates that describe what a thing is can be transformed into subjects. Conversely, predicates that describe what a thing is like cannot be transformed into subjects.

[4] ““Further, the primary substances are subjects for all the other things, and all the other things are predicated of them or in them.”

[5] “Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are said to be substances most fully.”

[6] “species and genera are said to be secondary substances, for they are the only things predicated that reveal primary substance.”

[7] “Each signifies either substance….or being affected.”