Describe Russell’s Theory of Descriptions

  The philosophy of language is a vast and fascinating area of philosophy. There have been many theories about all aspects of language and many people have their own views. One of the major questions involved appeals to meaning and where language gets it from. One of the popular theories is the Referential Theory which states that all our language gets its meaning by referring to some worldly item or set of items. This theory, it was realised, comes up against some major obstacles and in his quest to tackle these problems, Bertrand Russell devised his own theory. He developed his Theory of Descriptions and in this essay I will explain what this theory says about definite descriptions in everyday language and what it entails. Furthermore, I will explore one of the most important problems which the theory encounters and will determine whether Russell has formulated a thorough enough theory to overcome its hurdles.

 Russell’s Theory of Descriptions was brought forth in his essay ‘On Denoting’ in 1905. Russell hoped that it would help to clarify the linguistic and logical properties of definite descriptions which were, and still are, prominent features in many philosophical debates concerning semantics and metaphysics. One of Russell’s main aims was to highlight the underlying logic of language and he hoped his theory would sufficiently illuminate the structure of language from which meaning is derived.

 When Russell saw the problems which the Referential Theory could not cope with he attempted to show that we can understand definite descriptions and that they can have meaning by looking at the logic involved in language and not by appealing to the actual world for referents. In doing so, Russell used what has now become an iconic example in philosophy of language; the author of Waverley was Scotch. For the purposes of variation and keeping things fresh, I will use another example; ‘the fourth winner of American Idol is Oklahoman’.

 At first glance we might think of this definite description as being fairly straightforward; we attribute the property of being Oklahoman to the fourth American Idol winner in a subject-predicate manner. Russell tells us, however, that we are mistaken if we do so. ‘The fourth winner of American Idol’ is not a simple constant as we might anticipate. Instead, Russell says, ‘the fourth winner of American Idol’ is converted into formal logic as a variable which is quantified over existentially, making being the fourth winner a property in itself.