Describe Russell’s Theory of Descriptions

  Initially, it may look like Russell’s theory has some adjusting to do. However, Russell does combat Strawson and ensures us that his theory still holds water. Russell claims that Strawson’s intuitions about being unable to assign a truth value to a non-referent definite description are misguided. He said the following, “Suppose, for example, that in some country there was a law that no person could hold public office if he considered it false that the Ruler of the Universe is wise. I think an avowed atheist who took advantage of Mr. Strawson’s doctrine to say that he did not hold this proposition false, would be regarded as a somewhat shifty character.”2

  Here, Russell is saying that our intuitions about formal logic (and the logic which underpins language) may not actually be reliable. The problem is that our intuitions can be very subjective and there are no hard and fast rules about the usage of English concerning the truth and falsity of sentences which involve non-referring definite descriptions. It was pointed out by Neale [1990] that there are some very clear cases where intuitions about truth conditions do not support Strawson’s view. If I were to say to you ‘My son just became the tenth winner of American Idol’ you would immediately intuit that this is completely false.

 Where Russell’s theory emerges from the fog of Strawson’s challenges is when Russell admits that his theory is a matter of logic and semantics. Russell’s theory is simply a process of revealing the logical foundations of a definite description and what it means in and of itself. How we assert these propositions, what they mean for everyday life and whether they suit our intuitions are not problems for Russell’s theory, but for our language practices. Russell simply highlights the semantic and logical elements of the language and didn’t purport to anything remotely pragmatic or intuitionistic about language, hence, his theory remains intact after Strawson’s obstacles.

 In conclusion, I have outlined Russell’s theory of definite descriptions and what it means for language. I addressed the problem offered by Strawson claiming that our intuitions regarding truth values of non-referent definite descriptions were a problem for Russell. As it is, this problem is not so much a problem for Russell as for language users in general. Russell’s theory does what it set out to do and doesn’t seem to falter when provoked by our intuitions. His theory doesn’t, however, address the whole scope of language as a practice. He simply focuses on the logical landscape of definite descriptions.

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References:

1: (Russell, 1912, p. 52)

2: (Martin, 1987, p. 142)

Bibliography.

-Martin, R. M. (1987). The Meaning of Language. M.I.T Press.

-Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy . Indo-European Publishing.

-Fritz Jr, Charles A. (1952). Bertrand Russell’s Construction of the External World. Routledge and Kegan Paul

-  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/#ChaRusTruCon  (accessed 12/11/2010- 17/11/2010)

-  http://www.sveinbjorn.org/strawson-russell  (accessed 12/11/2010- 17/11/2010)

[1] Strawson uses the enormously famous example of ‘The present king of France is bald’, but, to keep things interesting and to avoid tedium I use a new example of a non-referring definite description. There have only been nine winners so far.