Immanuel Kant: The Role of Emotions in Morality

    So can it be true that such a thing as false moral knowledge exists? If it is true, then it is possible to act morally without acting from duty, thus eliminating respect from the incentives of the action. In eliminating respect, emotions are also eliminated (in the form of the affective aspect of respect). So it would appear that Kant’s system does, in fact,  downgrade emotions as unimportant.

    But fortunately for Kant’s sake, a response on his behalf arises at this seemingly unavoidable problem with his system. First, it needs be explained that, in order for moral law to be obligatory two conditions must be met: universality and autonomy. That is, moral law must apply to all rational beings (universality), and, in order for moral law to obligate me, it must be my own principle (autonomy). Thus, if I have false moral knowledge (about a principle), I in fact have no moral obligations at all. This follows from the fact that moral obligation is contingent on the fulfillment of (necessarily) two conditions. Universality is not here met because a false idea of duty cannot be universally applicable, because it is false. Therefore it is in Kant’s best interest to claim that there is no such thing as an action not done in accordance with duty but not done from duty; thereby securing respect, thereby securing emotion. His ethical system depends on this claim.

    It is apparent, however, that these types of actions do actually obtain in the world. This would mean one of two things: either Kant’s whole system is wrong, and emotion is in no way connected with duty, or his idea of the correlation between universality and autonomy is not quite right. As it were, it seems there must be a discrepancy between the autonomy and universality, thereby calling for some alternate explanation of duty, respect, and ultimately, emotions. It is clear, however, that Kant has done a large part of the work already.