On Systematically Misleading Expressions
Far from duly rejecting the discipline of philosophy as unnecessary, overly complicated, and endarkening, however, we may instead use Ryle’s argument as a stepping stone towards understanding not only the form of logic, but also the incredible flexibility of the human mind.
Gilbert Ryle’s Systematically Misleading Expressions deals with expressions that pose trouble for the philosopher concerned with analysing language, but generate no such problems for the “plain man,” who understands them effortlessly. Before philosophers tackle these expressions, in fact, “there is no darkness present and no illumination required.” Far from duly rejecting the discipline of philosophy as unnecessary, overly complicated, and endarkening, however, we may instead use Ryle’s argument as a stepping stone towards understanding not only the form of logic, but also the incredible flexibility of the human mind.
Ryle’s systematically misleading expression is one which is true and has meaning, yet, due to its syntactical form, is bound to mislead anyone who relies on generalized rules based on logical form to establish the facts that the statement records. Though an expression of this type may be paraphrased in such as way as to satisfy this generalizing philosopher’s complaints, Ryle holds that, even in its misleading form, it is true and has meaning.
If such expressions retain their meaning except when subjected to philosophical analysis, it would not be absurd to suggest that, in the interest of clarity, they not be subjected to this analysis at all. Furthermore, if a philosophical theory maintains that they must be analysed, it might even be prudent to reject this theory outright.
However, arguments arise as reasons to study these expressions. Systematically misleading expressions act as superb indicators for where language and intention diverge; study of these expressions reveals entailments and commitments of formal logic, thus further illuminating this logic’s precise structure. This, in turn, may possibly uncover truths about the world, and at the very least will expose much of the structure of the rational part of the human mind.
Moreover, Ryle’s argument sheds light on the flexibility of the human mind as a whole (not merely its strictly rational side). Ryle points out that “the plain man who uses such [systematically misleading] expressions is not making a philosophical mistake [and] is not misled.” In this way, the layman has an advantage over the strictly analytical philosopher, in the same way that he has an advantage over even the most advanced computer today: he is able to do without strict logic in a way that strictly rational brains cannot. Further analysis of this human ability might clarify such puzzling yet nonetheless important concepts as George Orwell’s doublethink.
Thus, Ryle’s introduction of systematically misleading expressions serves not as ammunition for the attack on philosophical discourse, but as a springboard for further investigation into the human mind.
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