Subjective Objectivity

I have a worry. My worry lies in that what is commonly held as the essence of contemporary philosophical discourse may be nothing other than a deceptive mask. Philosophy in the Contemporary Era, at least as self-described, has largely been about the business of pluralism and relativism. The Modern Era, the era which preceded the Contemporary Era, was the age of reason, all things centered on the rational quest for truth. During this age, the skeptics, those Like David Hume, Berkeley, and Locke ruled the day. Through their philosophies, a new notion entered the intellectual climate of that day, and that was the notion that we may not have as good a handle on Truth as was traditionally believed (I think it was more likely that people had blinded themselves, but that is not the focus of this paper). What followed in thought was a sequence of events that would radically shift the nature of thought in the Contemporary Period. Probably most notable of these effects was the work of Hegel.

Hegel occupied the thought space between the Modern and Contemporary Eras of philosophy, and many believe that it was his work that provided the impetus for the new focus of philosophy in the Contemporary Era. Hegel’s work birthed the system of thesis and antithesis, which together create a synthesis. This synthesis then became a new thesis, which was met by another antithesis, and so on. This was a radical shift from the one-side absolutism of philosophical ages past. From here, the beginnings were in order for the shift to the Contemporary era. What followed in the Contemporary Era was in many ways, according to the philosophers of this age, the death of foundation or absolutism, and what followed, subsequently, was the instatement of relativism, pluralism, and perspectivalism. However, as I stated earlier, I worry that this new movement toward pluralism or perspectivalism is nothing more than an appearance. It is my contention that philosophers of the Contemporary Era are equally grounded in foundationalism or absolutism as the philosophers of ages previous, and that they base their systems on foundations, which are themselves fixed and absolute, often suggesting truth which lay beyond.

It is this occurrence that I wish to demonstrate, then, in the words to follow. I believe that the purported dissolution of absolutism in the Contemporary Era is an unnecessary and, indeed, unfounded claim. In the words to follow, then, it is precisely this that I wish to demonstrate.