The Legitimacy of the Argument From Analogy

A central problem in philosophy is that of other minds. How can we know for certain that other minds exist, and that people are not merely automatons? And if other minds do exist, how can we know their exact nature? For it seems that, although we may surmise their nature by the accounts of others, there is no way that we can fully rely on the testimony of others, given that a lot is not only lost in translation, but inexpressible in words. The argument from analogy is one attempt to demonstrate that other minds do exist.

J. S. Mill formulated a version of the argument in An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. In it, Mill states that, by an examination of his own case, it is clear that feeling is created by an antecedent condition, and results in a subsequent action. For example, when I fall down and hurt my leg, the first thing that happens is that my leg is physically affected (the antecedent condition). A split-second later, I feel this in my mind. Subsequently I express this in my outward demeanour. Therefore, there are three steps involved wherever feeling is concerned.

Mill notes that only the first and last of these steps is observed in other people: you may see another person fall down and hurt his leg then express pain, but there is no empirical evidence to suggest an intermediate stage. In Mill’s own experience the antecedent condition could not produce the subsequent reaction without the transitional stage, therefore he is forced to conclude that there is one in others, and that it must be the mind. That the link happens to be the mind is not a necessary conclusion, but for all intents and purposes is the conclusion that Mill prefers.

It is clear that the argument from analogy largely arises from common-sense, and puts little effort into withstanding philosophic scrutiny. The most notable weakness, it seems, is the idea that there must be a mind in others, simply by virtue of there being antecedent conditions and subsequent reactions. Where common-sense tells us that this is most likely to be the case, logical enquiry begs the question: must there be an intermediate stage? And if so, is it necessarily the mind? If there were no intermediate link, then this would certainly make others automatons, and therefore we can put that possibility aside because it runs contrary to instinct. However, there is no evidence, empirically at least, that this link is the mind.