The Legitimacy of the Argument From Analogy

If actions are just the result of dispositions to act, there is no need to suggest that others have minds at all; they need only have a primitive brain which feels physical pain and desires things. However, this theory seems woefully inadequate as an account of mind. How, for instance, do we account for those beliefs and desires which are not expressed physically or verbally? A belief in God need not be expressed by prayer or by confession, and yet palpably it exists in many people.

On the other hand, Mill’s argument from analogy, as we have seen, does little to explain the nature of other minds. A central premise of the argument is Mill’s observation that others have bodies. While doing away with Cartesian mind-body dualism in one fell swoop, this seems nevertheless to belittle the idea of the mind, limiting it only to the physical sphere. While it is true that in our experience the mind is inseparable from the body, there is no absolute rule that states that minds generally must have a body. It can be said, for instance, that senses such as sight and hearing are illusions, since they operate solely on signals sent from the eyes and ears. If a scientist managed to take someone’s brain from their body and, by replicating the signals from the eyes and ears gave the brain the illusion it was seeing and hearing, then it seems that brain would contain no less of a mind than any other.

Instinct and common-sense tell us that others do have minds. However, philosophy seeks not to make any assumptions, and we cannot assume that common-sense is correct and certainly not that it tells us enough. The argument from analogy is a common-sense approach that seems rather out of place in philosophy, mainly because it is not rigorous or detailed enough to stand up. I don’t doubt that other minds exist, but Mill’s argument cannot be regarded in any way as proof. Further, since it is does not give a satisfactory definition of mind, there is no way I can be certain that others possess minds as I know them, and therefore I cannot even venture to give them the title of minds.