The Morality of War

In the second chapter of The Morality of War, Brian Orend argues that a state forfeits its rights if it has committed an act of aggression against another state. This stipulation is necessary to satisfy Orend’s Core Principle on Aggression, which allows a state to defend itself with lethal force only if such means do not violate human rights. However, Orend begs the question in the argument he uses to justify this stipulation. Fortunately for Orend’s theory, however, we can find sufficient justification for it elsewhere in the chapter.

Orend’s assertion that an aggressor state, A, must forfeit its rights when it attacks a victim state, V, is necessary for the logical integrity of Just War Theory as a whole. Were this not the case, it follows logically from Orend’s acknowledgement of state rights that V would be committing a moral wrong – violating another state’s rights – in going to war even to defend itself. This prospect, a central part many interpretations of pacifism, is completely opposed to the concept of just war theory, which explicitly allows wars of self-defence. Furthermore, V’s choice to make war against A, resulting in a violation of A’s rights, would evidently justify A in going to war as well to defend against this violation. Though Vitoria indeed accepted this “comparative justice” as feasible, Orend does not allow for such an eventuality to occur in his theory. Clearly, the stipulation that an aggressor forfeits its rights is vital to Orend’s case.

The reasons Orend gives to justify this stipulation are intrinsically based in V’s right to defend itself. Orend writes that “the weight of reasons in this case must draw on those just offered in defence of V’s entitlement to resort to force in the first place.” Orend’s arguments earlier in the chapter for these reasons are compelling. Briefly summed up, it is “unreasonable, unfair, oblivious of responsibility, and at odds with implicit entitlement” to declare that V cannot resist A’s aggression with lethal force. Based on these reasons, Orend thus feels able to argue further that, since V has the right to defend itself, A must therefore not have the right for this not to be done. Thus, Orend declares, A must have forfeited its rights. Despite his compelling reasons, however, Orend does not employ any independent justification for this declaration. In fact, he appears to beg the question: he argues that V may defend itself because A gave up its rights, and that A must have given up its rights because V has the right to defend itself. This form of argument is not ideal at best and completely baseless at worst.