Time and Space: Empirically Real, Transcendently Ideal
A paper discussing the philosophy of Time and Space.
Human knowledge comes in two distinct forms. The first form is called a posteriori that is knowledge gained through experience. And the other form is called a priori which is knowledge gained without the help of experience. In between these knowledges, there is another rather complicated subtype of knowledge called a priori synthetic. Space and time are a priori synthetic. That is to say that although space and time are independent concepts in terms of the knowledge of their existence, they still inhabit a quality that enables us to observe them. A good example of a priori synthetic is the science of geometry that determines the dimensions of space synthetically but the knowledge of those dimensions is completely a priori. It is in that sense that Kant understands Space and Time as both empirically real and transcendently ideal.
To begin, Kant amplifies on the limits of experience. Knowledge gained empirically cannot nullify the fact that experience based knowledge is limited in its ability to explain all possible outcomes of an outer object. In Kantian words, “experience tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise.” (P 42, Smith) Therefore, it is crucial to have knowledge that is concrete and unchangeable by human experience. Space and Time are the only inhibitors of a priori knowledge and that quality is what makes them more reliable.
In defending Space, Kant claims that space is empirically real because of its relationship with the objects of our perception. In the section named “Conclusions from the above Concept” he makes clear the point that Space is empirically real because it contains as a container the objects of our perception. In other words, it would be impossible to imagine objects without the presupposed phenomenon of space. Kant also believes that Space is Transcendentally ideal. The first and foremost important reason is the fact that Space is underlying all of our “outer experiences.” Our intuitions drawn from our sensibilities are invisible without Space. In Roman numeral I of the “Space” section, he draws a distinction between things that exist through human perception and things that are presupposed by the human mind. Space is a presupposed phenomenon because the understanding or the “sensation” of Space is completely independent of our mind. In other words, unlike objects, Space does not require a process through which an object becomes a permanent part of our understanding. In essence, it is a presupposed and essential condition that must be present in order for any outer appearance to take place.
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