To Blame or Not to Blame

There is a cause and an effect in every process. In this discussion of free will, cause and effect translates to freedom of will and freedom of action, and the process has two possible values (praiseworthy and blameworthy) that are contained within one term that is moral responsibility. This essay is divided into three sections: 1) freedom of action, 2) freedom of will, and 3) moral responsibility. The first section contains explanations of compatibilist and incompatibilist accounts of freedom of action that involve the principle of alternate possibilities, the Frankfurt case, Peter van Inwagen’s principles of possible action and prevention; and Daniel Dennett’s supporting argument. The second section contains explanations of compatibilist and incompatibilist accounts of freedom of will that involve Frankfurt’s hierarchy order of the will and agent causal theory. The third section contains explanations of why Susan Wolf’s type of compatibilism is more evolved than classical compatibilism and Frankfurt’s compatibilism are; Clarence Darrow’s account of criminals and the role of environment is used to support Susan Wolf’s compatibilism.

Now the main question: is moral responsibility possible? What is the sufficient condition to hold someone morally responsible? Does it only require freedom of will or freedom of action? Or perhaps, it requires both. The two prominent views in the discussion of free will that try to answer the main question above are compatibilism and incompatibilism. Compatibilism is based on determinism, and incompatibilism is based on indeterminism. Both views agree that the necessary condition for moral responsibility is freedom of will/free will, but they do not have the same definition of free will. Compatibilism (in general and classical compatibilism) defines free will as one’s unencumbered ability to do what one desires. Incompatibilism defines free will as one’s ability to be the ultimate source of will that is undetermined by any causal order; this definition of is the common sense notion of free will, and it is also the reason why it is hard for some people to understand compatibilism. For human beings seem to be hardwired to recognize themselves as creatures in control of their own lives.

Freedom of Action

As the first step, let us perform a backward analysis in order to have an easier process of understanding and distinguishing free will according to compatibilism and incompatibilism. The reason for a backward analysis is because the difference of freedom of action according to compatibilism and incompatibilism is more apparent than the difference of freedom of will is. Eventually, a connection from freedom of action to freedom of will and vice versa is going to appear naturally.