Why Study Constitutional Law?

“By Constitution We mean, whenever We speak with Propriety and Exactness, that Assemblage of Laws, Institutions and Customs, derived from certain fix’d Principles of Reason…that compose the general System, according to which  the Community hath agreed to be govern’d.”[1]

Constitutional law should be studied to determine firstly, whether electoral apathy bears any relationship to constitutional reform and increased ‘power sharing;’ requiring the electorate to take a proactive role in decision-making.  Perhaps leaving the electorate feeling that the agreed ‘social contract’ has been a breached.  Secondly, whether the newly increased number of responsible bodies, has rendered the constitutional fundamental of ‘accountability’ less viable; threatening ‘political sovereignty’ by disenchanting further the endangered species of interested voters.  The very essence of the constitutional relationship is the renewal of the ‘social contract,’ the electorate demonstrating its will and surrendering some individual rights in exchange for state protection.[2]  This provides the elusive ‘political sovereignty’ transforming ‘legal power’ into ‘legal authority,’ creating a supreme parliament.[3]

“.. a paradox of participation’……The more people are invited to participate, the less inclined they are to do so.”[4]

Studying constitutional law may highlight an electorate preference for the opportunity to simply signal their disapproval at General Elections; suggesting that inclusive and decentralized power is a deviation from the original ‘social contract’ and causing large numbers to disenfranchise themselves.  Previously the constitution allowed the governors to govern and the governed to accept governance in exchange for a right to vote at least every five years.[5]  Today’s governors have lost some of their mystic[6] and confidence in their ‘moral right to govern.’[7]  They now seek democratic confirmation and validation with further referendums and elections; suggesting a  “…representative democracy which seeks to turn individual preferences into policy through the expedient of merely counting votes.”[8] The traditional constitution operated a “power hording regime…..[with] few or no autonomous centres of political power, apart from… the voters themselves and possibly the mass media.”[9]  The 1997 General Election, however, signalled reforms affecting the traditional balance between the governed and the governors; change designed to bring about “reconnection and revitalisation”[10] but which has actually enhanced apathy indicating that the original constitution which, although it is submitted was potentially undemocratic, adversarial and rigid, was the system that successfully allowed voters to pass responsibility to the elected representatives