World dominsation seeking radical Muslims of the mid-Asian highlands have little meaningful cultural tradition perhaps apart from Islamic law. Toynbee believed people would fight to defend their relegion more so than any other element. If a secular-and theocratic state are synonymous in tribal areas with Islamic religionous majorities how could the consolidation of their power not seem logical to simple tribesmen with donated high-tech weapons? When they seek to destroy distant U.S. targets of global power such as the World Trade Center and Pentagon with terror attacks how can the U.S.A. or others curb their aggression and restore security at home and in Afghanistan after their terror coordinating government was taken out of power?

What about Afghanistan–should Americans stay, go or do something else? U.S. Policy in Afghanistan has been said by the administration to concern itself primarily with keeping security for the people of the United States and Europe from terror attacks organized in Afghanistan by a Taliban or other terrorist friendly government. The administration has provided the opinion that building a permanent stable Afghan government isn’t the primary mission of the United States. With these two points in mind, the third salient opinion concerning the cost to the people of the United States in the ongoing Afghanistan mission is General McCrystal’s opinion that the United States may lose the war in Afghanistan if he is not given more troops and war material. The administration has further said that it will study U.S. long term strategy before deciding about sending more troops and materials to Afghanistan.

U.S. civilians are of course caught in the middle of this foreign policy cycle of intervention funded by the U.S. Congress that has seemed to completely spineless and uncreative since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in New York and Washington D.C. Many taxpayers also wonder if the prior Bush administration did not unnecessarily extend the Iraq nation rebuilding administration in order to benefit its Republican favorite Iraq reconstruction contractors. Regardless the Iraq rebuilding fiasco ongoing cost more than a trillion dollars. The U.S. military and private sector contractor reconstruction costs were as effective at harming the U.S. economy as either Al Qa’eda or the corruption of the financial services, banking and mortgage sector. Civilizations have collapsed because of the costs of protracted and incessant foreign wars, and it is certain that Select Muslim oil rich powers sympathetic to a change in balance of western-Muslim political relations will continue to fund the terrorist and insurgent efforts in Afghanistan that mire the U.S. in a near decade long cycle of military caused debt. Is it possible to win in Afghanistan militarily?

A military victory in Afghanistan that General McCrystal believes may be reached with more reinforcements is worth considering; what is a military victory in Afghanistan? Would a decisive final battle occur after which the insurgents would throw in the towel and join the Karzai government?

The military philosophy of protracted wars has been addressed before by Chairman Mao in his little book ‘On Protracted War’. The aims an objectives for the forces on the exterior lines and on the interior lines inherently differ. Those on the interior defending a government for example may wither in time, and are invariably always on the defensive, while those on the exterior may actually be on vacation and attack occasionally as they can afford. They may have tremendous volunteer funding and reinforcements extending generations. They may also have the objective of simply creating ongoing vast expenses for a foreign ‘away’ team defending interior lines temporally as in Afghanistan. The terrorists on the exterior lines can simply renew attack whenever the interior forces reduce their troop and expense levels to accomplish the larger strategic purpose of in this case ruining the United States financially with the help of the banking, energy and auto sectors.

American government policy tends to reflect its European political heritage in many respects. U.S. State and Defense planning tend to view second world nations without adequate social institutions and governments as nations in need of reforming toward a western style government, and our policy objectives tend to pursue illusory goals with inaccurate objectives that cannot lead to real conclusions or victories.

Would a realistic political and economic policy in Afghanistan envision a condition in which a continuum of military violence is successful at permanently repressing anti-west political sentiments? When tribal memory is so long and Hatfield and McCoy’s style feuding longer lasting than U.S. antipathies to Iran, Cuba, North Korea or the Soviet Union, is it reasonable to suppose that U.S. military activity in Afghanistan will form a permanent social pacification in which the political dynamics are amenable to administration by a western friendly Afghan Government able to defeat all western infidel hating jihadists visiting Afghanistan or home-grown financed by wealth Muslim oil interests? Would it be at least equally as reasonable to formulate defense policies in Iraq that have a reasonably realistic chance to succeed without achieving a western vision influenced perhaps hallucinatory objective that isn’t feasible?

 An essential policy for war and peace planners, like planning in virtually any other field of policy or practice is to assure that the premises equal the conclusion. The end must be achievable with affordable means. If steps a through z are taken they must add up to 28 steps that spell victory.

 Afghan policy should temporally adjust to the requirements the United States has for war costs and security. It should recognize the cultural differences and challenges that are encountered in Afghanistan. U.S. foreign policy must be cognizant of the post-cold war transformations abroad and the ineffective national economic and political adjustments to both the rise of the Chinese economy, our national habit of not living within our means and becoming greatly indebted to nearly eleven trillion dollars so far, as well as failing to comprehend the rise of Muslim power associated with the reliance upon oil products that are sure to rise in price again. The United States leadership has failed to recognize and to respond to long term economic and political challenges in such a way that the nation’s security including economic security is increased. Important diversions from economic, health and space investments are being made with a morass of military spending in Iraq and Afghanistan. Temporal military spending is like an hallucination of destruction leaving wreckage strewn in its wake. It general isn’t very constructive, though it is occasionally required for defense. What then can the United States do about creating a more pragmatic strategy for Afghanistan that would prevent it’s being used as a training base for terror attacks upon the United States and Europe?

It is supposed that in war as in writing novels the basic plots never change, or change little while it is the characters, language and scene settings that change most. One such plot is the setting of defense fortresses in hostile countries to keep the barbarians at bay.

The Romans established military garrisons abroad, Hadrian’s wall kept the savage Scots on their side of the border, and frontier forts across the U.S west were a lifeline for the passage of travellers west and for interdiction of hostile concentrations. A similar policy can be one lower cost element of U.S. policy in Afghanistan.

Taking pages out of the terrorist playbook the United States can form a temporal external line of Old Sarum’s castle concentric defense fortifications high in tactically efficient locations in Afghanistan set for defense for the next half century against a takeover of the Afghan Government by hostile terrorist forces. U.S. military engineers haven’t ever been very good at designing fortresses against conventional terrorist non-nuclear forces perhaps because they have been part of a fire and maneuver with heavy and fast weapons team policy with speed of assault being a virtue. In Afghanistan speed is not a virtue, for the mirage of present engagements is always followed by a continuing low-intensity fighting that is improbable of ever being conclusively defeated. Perhaps fifty highly fortified mountain fortresses should be built in Afghanistan and operated by a large company each for the next half century.

Each post would have clear fields of fire, napalm filled moats, strong positions uphill, a variety of killing zones to beyond any attack by ground forces and so forth. In case the Taliban ever took over in Afghanistan these fortresses would draw enemy attacks providing many targets for deletion. The fortresses would support special forces missions during war, as well as prevent areas of organization to retreating Taliban the next few decades. U.S. air power would be able to destroy Taliban concentrations including in government, except where they hide behind women and children. Special measures would need to be designed to address the issue of Taliban moral corruption in that regard. Less than twenty-thousand U.S. forces should be needed for the half century security constellation of forces in the high country of Afghanistan.

 On the ground at lower altitudes U.S. policy should be to construct a variety of practical culturally improving macro projects such as monolithic domes and water conservation canals in addition to synthesis of new annual interior forms of agriculture. Support for the present Afghan Government should continue, yet the cultural improvement should continue with or without its cooperation. U.S. goals would be to withdraw except for its force de frappe in Afghanistan except for a limited number of military and civil advisers. U.S. policy should be to establish a permanent presence in Afghanistan an let the Taliban know that it is really their to stay simply in order to defend U.S. national and European interests and that attack upon it is counter-productive to Afghan goals of self reliance.

 The Taliban and Muslim forces gathered to subvert the present government of Afghanistan are clever and determined fighters more adaptable to using time tensor military planning than those of the United States. U.S. forces still fight an expensive western style conclusive battle strategy at significant cost yet of course cannot afford that over time, while the financial forces of oil based Muslim contributors to anti-western forces are increasing yet wisely spend little of their money when not necessary. The function of spending seems to be a real component of the Afghanistan war. As temporary interior line forces the U.S. military and government are spending billions and billions of dollars and the U.S. Congress simply adds more U.S. public debt insensibly as if another half trillion will buy a permanent security status vis Afghanistan.

 The United States has two fundamental issues with Afghanistan. One is to deny it as a base for terrorist training, and the other is to accomplish the first without doing harm to the U.S. economy through adding vast new public debt.Seemingly high-country military garrisons in Afghanistan supplied by air and reinforced by Air Power could deny the U.S. of Afghanistan as a secure place for terrorist training the next half century for a modest annual cost.

 Another issue is the question of could Afghanistan become a nation with enough cash income to afford a western style central government and military, or would it always be just a prop financed by the west borrowing money from the east? What role can the U.S. play in converting Afghanistan to a western style democratic government and economy when corporatism has already corrupted the U.S. economy and too much sucks up to Muslim oil interests? Would the U.S. corporate elite and Harvard M.B.A.’s consider Afghanistan as a place for cheap labor to assemble widgets for Wal-Marts of Wyoming? Would they teach the Afghans how to be independent small businesspersons and give them small business loans?

 U.S. policy planners seem to have little ability and creating multi-disciplinary economic improvement teams capable of significantly reforming a second or third world economy on a sustainable ecological basis. While Afghanistan might be such a place to try such a venture, it would need to add the complicating factor into the equation of the requirement that ever project be hardened to withstand expected terrorist attack and strong-arm bullying by corrupt political and para-military elements. That sort of planning makes selection of physical civil engineering projects more important if cultural changes in the direction of renewable prosperity are to be attained. The U.S. Government shows very little competence at cost-effect social intervention not only in foreign nations but in the United States as well, perhaps because of unrealistic political philosophies based on incompetent micro-and macro-economic philosophy. The failure to construct a comprehensive public health service for the poor in the United States is most notable. A prosperous democracy should assure that the poor are healthy and able to compete in the economy in order to not be tramped down by the jack boots of the rich and strong.

 The Obama administration may choose to give General McCrystal the reinforcement he wants or not. The cost financially to the United States is quite high. We hope that the leadership exercises wit in reasoning about how to keep down costs and accomplish the important mission of safeguarding global corporate and Pentagon headquarters in the United States.

 If the people of Iraq can be given real shares in some publicly created oil corporation from which they directly receive royalties rather than through government hand outs by corrupt politicians then the people of Iraq will yet still better defend the security of that nation. If so more quickly the U.S. Government cold transfer 25,000 troops and combat engineers to Afghanistan from Iraq. Iraq is the place of the oldest civilization on Earth, they will definitely reform a stable government in time. We should build some good concrete monolithic does there to add to future archaeologists structures of interest to go along with those of ziggurats and so forth.

 It is plain that the United States is compelled to deny use of Afghanistan to terrorists seeking to make it a base for global attacks on western social and economic interests. It is also not plain that the corporatist and western military approach to problem solving in such places is effective. The time tensor of military and social culture support required to pacify Afghanistan until the issue rots way through time may require a redundant line of extremely secure physical fortresses as low key overlook points on Afghan while amidst the people cultural and military affairs also are time-structured for multi-dimensional initiatives. When the people of Afghanistan reach an age of moral accountability in regard to the right to life of the people and economic philosophy of democrats of the west, then the U.S. Afghan security earthworks hill castles and monitoring posts might be demolished with deep mountains of high explosives, finally converting to rubble the entire half century-expending enterprise that denied so many good times to oppressed people of the world that could have used the money better than the protracted Afghan conflict.