The use of religion as a pretext to consolidate power is a common feature of political regimes that lack widespread support or find their popularity waning. This practice has been seen throughout modern history in both Western and Eastern societies. Some of these efforts have been made overtly, but many have been made stealthily by interweaving political ideals within religious doctrine and vice versa.

Perhaps one of the more overt attempts at political consolidation through religious means was seen in Pakistan in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The regimes of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq exemplify the use of this tactic greatly. Both leaders tried to use the Islamic religion as a way of legitimizing executions, imprisonment and violence which, in turn, strengthened their rule due to the appeasement of largely Muslim populations.

A less overt attempt at political consolidation through religious means was, is, and will continue to be seen in America and consequently, throughout the world. The United States of America approaches both domestic and foreign policy with an inherent evangelical protestant slant and is further bolstered by the hijacking of “human rights,” which has essentially, become a pseudo religion in itself. My contention is that the American manipulation of religion is actually more dangerous to its people and the world because the exploitation is now two-fold. In this fashion, the Bush administration can satisfy and appeal to both the left and the right simultaneously while achieving the same goal – colonialism.

This paper will evidence these claims by in-depth exploration of the politics of Pakistan in the 70s and 80s and establishing parallels to modern American politics, in particular, the Administration of George W. Bush. Such parallels will include the Bush Administration’s use of religious symbols and rhetoric, particularly regarding the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Through examination of both Pakistani leaders’ reign, the decay of democracy due to persecution and violence will be revealed, as will the tightening of political power by means of corruption. Conversely, it will be shown how America has chipped away democratic values by the introduction of the Patriot Act and the use of such rhetoric as the “Axis of Evil” so as to create a global atmosphere of “either you”re with us or against us’. This notion will be furthered with the use of Costas Douzinas’ concepts that western perceptions of human rights have morphed into a form of quasi-religion, which has successfully resulted in a merging of counterterrorism and humanitarian intervention agendas.

Pakistan

Since the start of his rule, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto attempted to cultivate his image as a pious and Islamic leader under the banner of “Islamic Socialism. Bhutto understood the importance of appealing to the religious sentiments of the population for political legitimacy. He emphasized the notion of Islamic unity with other Muslims leaders, such as Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Sadat of Egypt, during the Lahore Islamic Summit. He also tried to connect his policies with that of the Prophet”s teachings. However, the pragmatic purpose behind his use of Islam in government policy can be seen in the Constitution of April 1973. The constitution declared Islam as the state religion, noted all laws must confirm with injunctions of Islam and that laws repugnant to Islam would not be permitted.1 However, the constitution didn’t limit his powers as the PPP chairman.2 This shows that Bhutto would use Islam for political purposes, but not let it interfere with his power.

In order to understand the context behind Bhutto’s actions, it’s important to examine the Islamists’ power in society at the time. The Islamists parties were always opponents of Bhutto and PPP. They formed a significant role in the opposition coalition to Bhutto, the PNA, and their mosques became centers of demonstrations against Bhutto. Leaders of religious organizations mobilized participation from the lower middle class as evident in their mass demonstrations after the 1977 rigged elections. The Islamists had even managed to penetrate the armed forces. Commanding troops began to believe that opposition to Bhutto was equivalent to affirming one’s belief in Islam.3 Bhutto realized that he could both buy himself more time in power and possibly sway the Islamists to his side if he was able to appease them through concessions. As Stephen Cohen states, “aware of the growing Islamist movement, which had gathered steam by opposing both Ayub and the blatantly irreligious Yahya Khan, Bhutto advanced the idea of Islamic socialism.”4 Understanding the strength of the fundamentalist movement makes it much clearer to see why Bhutto would implement certain policies.

The religious policies Bhutto made were desperate concessions to appease and buy support from the Islamists. The fundamentalist nature of the policies clearly conflicted strongly with the Bhutto’s original platform of liberal and moderate Islam. Such a blatant contradiction in the ideological nature of the policies shows they were done out of political pragmatism. An example of this was his policies towards the Ahmediyya community whom are seen as heretics by the Islamists. Out of political weakness, Bhutto supported the Islamists calls for oppressing this community. He helped enact the legislation of the Ahmediyya community that designated them as non-Muslims. This prohibited them from attending Islamic rituals and removed them from all positions of public service or office in the armed forces.5 This religious apartheid completely contradicts with Bhutto’s original liberal platform. Perhaps the most blatant example of Bhutto’s use of religion to get mass appeal was his actions right before his overthrow. These included banning alcohol, gambling, bars, nightclubs, and movie theatres. He publicly stated that he would move Pakistan to an Islamic state.6 As Omar Noman observes, “It was ironic that the PPP, erstwhile promoters of Islamic socialism, were responsible for initiating legislation which introduced the Muslim equivalent of Calvinsit Puritanism.”7 This timing and rushed policy stance proves that Bhutto thought he could salvage his political position by instating religious laws and winning the favour of the Islamists.

Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the General who overthrew and succeeded Bhutto, faced a somewhat similar dilemma as Bhutto; a lack of wide-spread support throughout the country. Some speculate he overthrew Bhutto in order to instate “Islamisation, however, according to Hasan-Askari Rizvi, the policy to restructure the polity on Islamic lines did not appear prominently in early days of martial law regime.”8 Rather, Islamisation

was used for politically strategic purposes. Whenever a regime is overthrown, it makes sense for the new regime to appeal to the opponents of the previous regime. However, the secular and liberal adversaries of Bhutto were opposed to him because of his increasingly autocratic rule. They would not suddenly warm up to a military regime. Instead, Zia could appeal to the other major adversaries of Bhutto: the fundamentalists. He considered the secular political community, not the fundamentalists, the biggest threat to his power.9 Zia”s political strategy was the “use of Islam to legitimize a patently unjust order and to bolster a regime demonstrably without a popular base.”10

In order to get legitimacy from the religious fundamentalists and the wider population in Pakistan, Zia had to cultivate an image of a pious leader who would enforce and defend Islam. His devotion to Islam was made in a blatantly clear to Pakistan’s people by his decision to remain living in a Spartan home once in power. This decision was designed so Zia could portray himself as pious and non-materialistic leader.11 The policy did succeed in winning support among the middle and lower classes, which formed a major base for the fundamentalists. 12 His publicized adherence to religious practices generated respect from the population. The religious parties did not smear him, in the way they did Bhutto for his private “un-Islamic” activities. This cultivated image was done so that the population would eventually equate himself as the defender of Islam and initiator of “Islamisation. This strategy was exemplified perfectly during the referendum of 1984. The referendum question was skillfully posed as to whether one was in favor or against the “Islamisation’ program. A yes vote would guarantee Zia another five years in the government. The “yes” column of the ballot was printed in green because these were the colors that represent Pakistan and Islam. Zia cited democratic teachings as being incompatible with Islamic teachings. Instead, he propagated the belief that the population should focus on the principle of Islamic solidarity, a pivotal factor in Islamic thought, and the establishment of a political system reminiscent of the Rule of the Prophet.13 By making creation of an Islamic state as a priority over democracy, Zia provided an excuse for him to stay in power longer. The utopian Islamic state became a sort of light at the end of the tunnel that Zia would constantly refer to, especially when there was increased pressure for elections. Criticism of Zia could then be equated with a rejection of an Islamic state. All these policies had a common factor; Zia had used systematic manipulation of religious symbols and norms in order to get the population and religious groups to rally around the government.

In order to guarantee support from the Islamist community, Zia had to prove his piety and offer more concessions to them. Zia had to do more than just come across as pious; he had to prove he was setting up an Islamic state. In fact, only the creation of a chaste Muslim state governed by Shari’a would satisfy standards of the main Islamist party, Jammat-i-Islami.14 Zia’s changes to Pakistan’s laws drew applause from the Islamist community. Zia called for a renewal of jihad, imposition of the zaka, and the formation of an Islamic judicial system. Crimes such as adultery, drinking alcohol, theft and gambling were all punished by medieval Islamic measures. Zia decreed the Islamic legal code as the supreme law of the land which essentially meant that Islamic judges could strike down laws that conflicted with Islam. Analysts say that this specific policy was done out of the fear that Zia would be under more domestic criticism once the Soviets left Afghanistan.15 All these policies led Pakistan to be governed by Islamic law and judges, which very much appealed to the Islamist groups.

Winning the support of the Islamist groups was essential because it served as a form of mobilization for the state and against the opposition. The Islamists had considerable support among the middle, lower and migrant class. Jamaat-i-Islami’s ability “to recruit followers among the younger members of the population met with considerable success.”16 Thus, Zia’s Islamisation policies appealed to these constituencies and turned them into his supporters. They served as an effective tool in intimidating Zia’s political opposition.

The case of Zia’s rule shows how religion can be used as a political weapon to divide and destroy the opposition. By equating his regime as the guardian of Islam and implementation of an Islamic state, Zia was able to smear the opposition as being “un-Islamic”. Religious leaders used their legitimacy to condemn left-wing and secular parties as secularists and communists. These smears are “two of the most despised political labels in Pakistan currently.”17 Because they came from religious leaders, many in the population came to believe this vilification. The publicized public lashings for “un-Islamic” crimes terrorized the opposition into submission for fear of being labeled “un-Islamic”. Zia skillfully alleged that anyone who called for Bhutto’s return was calling for a return to Bhutto’s alleged religious sins. By publicizing the accused “sins” of Bhutto, such as womanizing, consuming alcohol and blasphemy, it was much easier to smear politicians calling for his return. Much like Zia formulated himself to represent Islamisation, Bhutto was formulated to represent un-Islamic activities. Thus, when ever someone spoke of a return to democracy, they would be accused of calling for a return of blasphemy. By cultivating a political culture where dissent was viewed as sacrilegious, Zia found a way of using religious as a weapon against his opposition.

The strategic use of incorporating religious agents into the government also served as an effective regime maintenance tool. By incorporating the ulama and fundamentalist actors into the state machinery, the state’s policies were seen as more legitimate and could be masked as true religious decisions. The fundamentalist clerics of the Council of Islamic Ideology did not permit books that were “repugnant to Islam”. These would include books that were of secular nature or that promoted innovation. This would typically include literature and material that promoted democratic ideologies or reform that posed a threat to the regime. Thus, Zia found another way to prevent threats to his regime by using the cloak of religion and religious actors.

Perhaps the most effective way Zia manipulated the use of Islam to consolidate power was by turning Pakistan into a totalitarian state. Islam is a moral code that permeates social, political and economic life. By incorporating Islam into the state, it essentially allowed for the state to control all forms all life.18 Much of the population actually supported the draconian measures since it seemed in accordance with Islam. Religious revivalism and state control was so deeply engrained in the population that, ““the more secular intelligentsia were sidetracked by events, their collective voice reduced to a whisper among those appealing to the spiritual dimensions of the larger society.”19 Physical monitoring of the population was done under the rubric of enforcing religion. To enforce his campaign of widespread adoption of the practice of five daily prayers and general compliance to Islamic codes of behavior, Zia appointed 100,000 prayer wardens for village and urban localities to monitor the population The enforcement of the religion’s seventh-century penal codes for “un-Islamic” behavior included lashes for drinking, stoning to death for adultery, and amputations of wrists for thefts. These measures allowed the state to physically monitor the population and encroach into areas that were previously private.20 Because of the use of religion as a justification for the measures, many sectors of the population actually supported or were passive to this whole process. The incorporation of religious themes into the media proved to be another tool of Zia’s. In 1997, television became an enthusiastic promoter of religious themes and the oppressive religious policies of the regime. Because it was masked as religious programming, that state could use the religious preachers to dissipate state propaganda. They extensively spoke of the “acceptance, on religious grounds, of a dictator whose piety is sufficient to command obedience”21. In such a religious country, this message resonated in the population. All these policies, under the pretext of promoting the Islamic religion, allowed Zia to further consolidate his political grip on the population.

AMERICA

Religion has always been a major force in the Untied States’ politics, policy, identity, and culture. Religion has shaped the nation’s character and has formed Americans’ ideas about the world, and influences the ways Americans respond to events beyond their borders. The predominant religion in America today is Christianity.22 In particular, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants and white Catholics, form George W Bush’s largest support base.23 The Christian beliefs these groups carry have been major influences in the forming of Bush’s America. The Bible has been the guiding book of most American leaders, however, the amount of biblical references and maxims used by George W. Bush, especially when describing the war on Terror, have been unprecedented in modern American history.

It was the first year of George W. Bush’s presidency when the notorious tragedy of the September 11th attacks took place. In the aftermath of the attacks, many Americans turned to religion for comfort and answers. Many Americans also turned to the government seeking similar guidance. This marked the occasion where Bush began vigorously using the religious sentiment of the Nation to propel colonial agendas in the Middle East. This is evidenced in Bush’s September 20th, 2001 address to the nation:

“I will not forget the wound to our country and those who inflicted it. I will not yield, I will not rest, I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people. The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.”24 It is clear by his speech that he is setting the stage for an immense conflict and is clearly delineating a common enemy or evil force. He then, arrogantly describes how God is on the side of what he describes as justice and freedom.

Fundamentalist Christianity teaches its believers to be “in the world but not of the world”25; that is, to live among secular people but to reject their way of thinking. One can see how this leads to problems internationally if American foreign politics are built on these ideals. Pair this with pretext of human rights for invading nations, and you find yourself within the current global situation.

The term religious fundamentalism has been exclusively associated in the media with Islamic leaders who are allegedly hell-bent on the destruction of other faiths. This term, however, can be equally applied to American leadership. For example: The persecution of the Ahmediyya community by both Bhutto and Zia draws a relation to the persecution of many Muslims in America. The leaders prohibited this community from attending Islamic rituals, public events and removed them from all positions of public service or office in the armed forces, simply because they were not devout Muslims. Conversely, since 9/11 and the Patriot Act, the discrimination of Muslims in America by means of no-fly lists, extra-judicial imprisonment, (Guantanamo Bay) and unwarranted scrutiny by authorities have been common practice.

Also, the way in which Zia implemented social surveillance of his population by appointing 100,000 prayer wardens to monitor his citizens, is almost a perfect mirror of surveillance techniques imposed on Americas by means of the Patriot Act. Zia implemented the intrusion of privacy with the pretense of religion just as Bush implemented the intrusive monitoring as a necessary evil to ensure national security. As seen in Pakistan, much of the population actually supported or was passive to this whole process. Similarly, many Americans have expressed their willingness to forfeit their privacy rights in the name of national security.

It was demonstrated how in Pakistan, criticisms of Bhutto and Zia’s leadership were equated with a rejection of the Islamic state. Similarly, domestic criticism of the Bush administration was considered to be unpatriotic, while criticism abroad was seen as undemocratic. These coercive strategies increase public and global compliance while minimizing dissent due to their multifaceted approach.

While these attempts minimized dissent, they did not eliminate it. There still existed an overwhelmingly anti-invasion sentiment with regards to the Iraq, especially from leftist groups. A need to reconcile both bodies of political thought presented itself. Thus, enter the veil of modern Human Rights. Reports of alleged human rights violations such as tortures, rape and mass murders of Iraqis at the hands of Sadam Hussein were at the forefront of global media. This provided moral grounds for many who were otherwise against the invasion, to show support in the name of humanitarianism.

The problem with this humanitarian campaign was that while some forms of aid were provided, it was coupled with the military agenda. Costas Douzinas does well to elaborate on this notion: “Despite differences in content, colonialism and the human rights movement form a continuum, episodes in the same drama, which started with the great discoveries of the new world and is now carried out in the street of Iraq: bringing civilization to the barbarians.”26

This exploitation of human rights has been taking place long before the Iraqi invasion. Unfortunately, as voiced by Slavoj Zizek, the aid provided by western powers has invariably come with the catch of embracing western democracy and economic values.27 This is especially true when looking at war-torn and 3rd World countries. These nations are, due to their instability, the most vulnerable to covert manipulation through the various coalitions and agencies in place to help them. Douzinas explains, “If the colonial prototypes were the missionary and the colonial administrator, the post-colonial are the human rights campaigner and the NGO operative.”28

Through the examination of the notoriously corrupt regimes in Pakistan, one cannot help but notice the similarities to American and other Western regimes. While Bhutto and Zia’s manipulative use of Islam furthered their grip on political power in Pakistan, Western Power’s dual manipulation of religion has been implemented to assert control over much of the world, especially those nations considered 3rd world.

The hard-line political right in America is appeased by the proliferation of Christian ideals while the leftist groups believe that that their nation’s transgression of foreign borders is in the name of human-rights protection. It is, in essence, the perfect way in which to advance covert economic and colonial agendas such as the securing of oil resources and increasing military presence.

Perhaps it is easier for a people to look outside their own borders to find faulty leadership and corruption instead of looking at their own nation. Or, Perhaps the American people are aware of the awful similarities and choose, themselves, to be ignorant of such wrong-doings so as to ensure the status-quo.

1 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 )

,144

2 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ), 144

3 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ), 158

4 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2004), 169

5 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ), 150

6 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ),169

7 Omar Norman, Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947 ( London: Kegan Paul International, 1988 ),109

8 Hasan-Askari ,Rizvi, “The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan.” Asian Survey, Vol.24,No.5,534-555, May 1984 ,545

9 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ),165

10 Mohammed, Ayoob, “Two Faces of Political Islam.” Asian Survey, Vol.19, No.6, 535-546 June 1979, 540

11 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ),168

12 Shahid, Burki, “Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988” Asian Survey, Vol.28, No.10,1082-110. October 1988, 1091

13 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ), 165

14 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ), 167

15 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ),202

16 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 ), p167

17 Hasan-Askari, Rizvi, “The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan.” Asian Survey, Vol.24,No.5,534-555. May 1984

18 Omar Norman, Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947 ( London: Kegan Paul International, 1988 ),145

19 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History ( Oxford: Oneworld, 2003 )176

20 Omar Norman, Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947 ( London: Kegan Paul International, 1988 ), 147

21 Omar Norman, Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947 ( London: Kegan Paul International, 1988 ), 125

22 CIA World Factbook – United States

23 John C. Green, Corwin E. Smidt, James L. Guth, and Lyman A. Kellstedt, The American Religious Landscape and the 2004 Presidential Vote: Increased Polarization

24 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, – (Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 2001)

25 JS Landres, M Berenbaum, After the Passion Is Gone: American Religious Consequences, (2004)

26 Douzinas, Costas. 2006. “Humanitarianism and Politics.” http://www.re-public.gr/en/wp-print.php?p=30

27 Slavoj Zizek, Against Human Rights, (2005) p. 126

28 Douzinas, Costas. 2006. “Humanitarianism and Politics.” http://www.re-public.gr/en/wp-print.php?p=30