One of the main problems facing Trotsky was the fact that, in abolishing the Tsar’s army, they had lost the experienced core of both the officer class – experienced in commanding and training troops and the common soldiers who were used to fighting under orders and direction. His answer to this problem was to recruit officers and sergeants from the old Tsarist army. There was however the small matter of maintaining their loyalty to the Reds, but this was solved by having red commissars deployed within the army and occasionally by keeping the officer’s family imprisoned or under threat of death! Admittedly, the white army also had its own core force of those men experienced in the arts of warfare both in the form of troops – such as the Cossacks, and in the Army’s supreme commanders – generals Alekseev, Kornilov, Denikin and Wrangel.

   Although the white army was definitely smaller, they did have some experienced troops whose martial experience should have made something of a difference towards the outcome of the war. There were, however, several reasons as to why they did not. The White army did not have the same clear focus and aims that the reds enjoyed – instead of the Bolshevik’s aims simply of achieving rule in Russia, they were merely a counter-red force. The army was composed not of many men under one single banner, but many different people united (just) in fighting a common enemy. The extent of the differing ideals was not similar to, for example, the Communist’s marginally differing views of Marxism but completely opposing political beliefs. Indeed, there were those – the Cossacks – who were a remnant of the old tsarist regime and were still loyal to an autocratic ideology fighting alongside those who merely wished for a slightly different and slower approach to a Marxist endpoint! As a result of this diversity, and the vastly differing political agendas within the force, when coupled with the overall undisciplined nature of the army, led later on to in-fighting between the troops and much switching of allegiance throughout the conflict (i.e. flitting between the Red and White armies.)

   Another advantage the reds held over the whites was the disciplined environment and character of the army. The reds were extremely fortunate in having a political police force – the Cheka – with which they could, and did, terrorise both opponents and ‘comrades’ alike. As any large body of people is wont to do, there was some measure of dissention in the troops over various issues: unavoidable trivial complaints over poor and cruel conditions, bad food – the usual military gripes and larger more potentially damaging facts. A large portion of the main body of the army was composed of conscripted peasants who had no real commitment to the Bolshevik ideal and so they naturally became rather unhappy when they were given orders to burn peasant villages and to kill innocent people. Unlike the white army, who were able to do very little to oppose their parallel dissentions (largely due to the disunity of the forces,) the reds used their Cheka to great effect. Special ‘punitive brigades’ were formed and they undertook the task of maintaining discipline within the ranks at all costs. In addition to the regular court martials (and ensuing executions) of deserters, slackers and such there are many documented accounts of extreme acts of violence being carried out by the Bolshevik secret police to ensure loyalty in the troops and to prevent uprisings in the peasants. These were known as the ‘Terrors.’

   There were both red and white terror campaigns in force during the war and both were horrifically vicious and cruel. The white army for example tortured and shot people suspected of being associated with the soviets, destroyed villages, and tortured Red Army prisoners – whenever a town was captured they would enforce a mass killing of all suspected political opponents. The white general Kornilov at one point said: “the greater the terror, the greater our victories.” and continued that even if it was necessary to “set fire to half the country and shed the blood of three-fourths of all Russians,” the goals of his forces would be fulfilled. Another order issued was to “Hang all arrested workers in the street. The bodies are to be exhibited for three days.” Unlike in the red leadership there was a pronouncedly anti-Semite view circulating in the white supreme command. As a result, the white terror encompassed pogroms (attacks on followers of Judaism) which caused the deaths of hundreds upon thousands of death. The downside of this (from the white perspective) was that the Jews were now more willing to give support to the Bolshevik ideal. The Bolshevik red terror was on much of a similar theme as the white – they too carried out massed executions and attacks upon peasant settlements in hopes of similar goals (putting down of peasant uprisings) but unlike the whites (who were unable due to the fracticious nature of the army’s membership and the resultant loose allegiances,) they also practiced terrorism within their own army which vastly helped, perhaps not the morale, but the continued loyalty, obedience and unity of the troops. The Bolshevik’s stated need for the terror was to deal with counter-revolutionary enemies of the people. The Bolshevik leader Zinoviev said in 1918: “To overcome of our enemies we must have our own socialist militarism. We must carry along with us 90 million out of the 100 million of Soviet Russia’s population. As for the rest, we have nothing to say to them. They must be annihilated.” This, like the quotation of Kornilov above, shows the extreme lengths to which the organizers of the terrors were prepared to go.

   In a civil war, the geography of the country does not really have too large an effect on the outcome of the war – perhaps controlling a few key cities or a strategically superior hill on a battlefield will help a bit, but in this case, due to the sheer size of Russia, the locations of the two armies had major effects. The Bolsheviks were, in general, located in the larger cities of the empire – Petrograd, Moscow, Archangel etc, whereas the whites were  situated in the more remote and rural areas of the country. As a result, the reds were in control of the train network (it being linked between the large cities) and so they were able to both move not only troops quickly and effectively, but also large amounts of supplies. Being in the cities had given the Bolsheviks an advantage from the start in that they had control of the factories and were thus able to manufacture large amounts of new weapons and armaments whereas the whites had to make do mostly with old caches and stores left over from the tsarist era.  The better equipping of the red army did make a difference – not only to their military effectiveness, but also positively affecting the red soldier’s morale whilst adversely affecting the white’s. The white morale which was often rather low in any case led to increased desertions and side switching – often in the middle of conflicts! Another effect of the red control of the cities and rail networks was that they, in addition to being better able to move troops and supplies, could communicate more quickly and effectively – meaning that coordinated attacks became more easily possible. The whites, in comparison, were unable to contact each other as quickly. Often, there would be multiple white offensives happening at the same time but, due to their lack of organization and communication, they would occur a few days apart during which time the reds could defeat one force and then quickly mobilize to fight the other. If the whites had had better communication and coordination between its forces and leaders, perhaps it would have had better military prospects.

   Trotsky was undoubtedly a great leader and quite indispensable for the Bolsheviks continued victories in the civil war – his masterful organization and command of the red army was definitely an important factor in the defeat of the whites. However, the mistakes of the whites were definitely as strong a factor as the successes of the reds – their poor leadership and organization for example. The Bolsheviks were ‘lucky’ to have started of with control of the rail networks and major cities but it is probable that even if the whites had started on equal ground they would still have been defeated because their disunity when compared to the organization, discipline and effectiveness of the red army – which was mostly down to Trotsky – won the war. Without the discipline of the red army enforced by the Cheka and the putting down of peasant insurrection, the reds would not have come out of the conflict nearly so well. Therefore, I conclude that the Bolshevik success in the civil war was in great part down to Trotsky’s leadership – just not completely!

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Therefore, I will try to approach the issue from another perspective. I will first present brief sketches of the major participant political organizations. Then, I will identify and explain some of the important issues relating to inter-party relations during the period under discussion. Finally, I will try to draw some conclusions, which might bare educational value for current Armenian endeavors towards democracy and national unity.

During its two and one half years of existence, The Republic of Armenia was a fledgling country proudly taking great strides towards building permanent democratic institutions. The Western orientation of the government had its profound effect on the internal political atmosphere.

It was in an effort to emulate the West and be considered its worthy ally that the ruling Armenian political organization, the ARF (Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutiun, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, ARF hereafter), committed itself to moderate, republican principles, which, had it not been for the abrupt Sovietization of the Republic, would have undoubtedly paved the way for the realization of democratic governmental institutions.

On the other hand, the short lived experience of some two and a half years was not enough to quite the bickering between the various political organizations with their contradicting ideologies and political agendas.

At the core of the disagreements were some fundamental socio- political beliefs related to the shaping of the future democratic state. Add to this the strong atmosphere of mistrust and uncertainty that existed between the various political parties that had not yet worked within a single governmental entity and you would have a perfect example of a political quagmire in the making.

The political-ideological spectrum in the Republic extended from the far right to the extreme left. The Bourgeoisie, represented by the Eastern Armenian Populists, or Popular Democrats) Zhoghovrtagan, and the Western Armenian Constitutional Democrats (Ramgavar) occupied the right spectrum, while the socialists, ranging from the Social Revolutionaries (SR’s) to Marxist Social Democrat (SD’s) and splinter groups dotted the left spectrum. The ruling party, The ARF, still adhering to a socialist ideology, pragmatically assumed a centrist position.

The Right Spectrum

The Constitutional Democrats

The Armenian Genocide, perpetrated by the government of Ittihadist Turkey, incapacitated the mainly urban, Western Armenian Constitutional Democrats). The party was formed in the wake of the Ittihadist (Young Turks) coup d’etat of 1908. The restoration of the Ottoman Constitution gave impetus to the party’s platform of free enterprise, and the pursuing of Armenian reforms through non-violent, legal means. It should be noted, however, that the absorption of the more militant Armenakans and a faction of the Reformed Henchakian (Veragazmial) into its ranks made the party more susceptible to notions of defensive armed struggle.

With its strength in the Republic diminished by its Eastern Populist counterpart, the Ramkavars tried to overshadow the ruling party, the Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutiun, by extending their activities among diasporan Armenian communities. Leaders such as poet Vahan Tekeyan, and academician Arshag Chobanian, worked closely with Boghos Nubar Pasha and his National Delegation in Paris, in an effort to strengthen the position of the latter within Allied circles vis-à-vis the government of the Republic of Armenia.

In the day to day affairs of the Republic, however, The Ramkavars managed to keep only a bare semblance of party organization. Their presence was due mainly to some Western Armenian refugees from Van (former Armenakans). Although they published the semi-weekly Tsayn Hayastani (Voice of Armenia) in Yerevan, and in mid 1919 reached as far as negotiating with the ruling party for participation in the government (about which more is to be said later), their active political role in the Republic was negligible.

The Populist Democrats

It was with the Eastern Armenian populist democrat party that the Ruling party in Armenia, the ARF entered into a coalition government from November 1918 to June 1919. It was the dictates of its Western orientation and the set aim of attracting Armenian and other capitalist circles towards the newly established Republic, rather than its social ideology, that persuaded the A.R.F. into willingly entering this uneasy partnership with the Eastern Armenian antirevolutionary bourgeoisie.

The Populist Party was a newcomer into Armenian political life. Tsarist imperial-colonial policies didn’t provide fertile grounds for the creation of liberal democratic parties. Only after the demise of the Russian imperial regime in 1917, did Armenian commercial and professional circles in Tiflis, Baku and Elisavetbol provide the grass-root support for such a party to materialize. The main catalyst in this formation was members of the Russian Constitutional Democrat (Cadet) party, who were advocates of Armenian cultural autonomy within a Russian democratic, liberal federation.

The geographical distribution of its grass roots support suggests that the party was more influential in all parts of Trans-Caucasia except in the predominantly agrarian Armenian Republic.

It was during the second Populist party congress– held in Yerevan on the wake of the collapse of the coalition government, and the party’s boycotting of parliamentary elections during the preceding months-that the representatives of the Eastern Armenian Bourgeoisie displayed, for the first time, “an emphatic western orientation by expressing deep admiration for the Allied Powers.” It was during this congress too, that

party delegates put aside their previous advocacy of cultural autonomy, and endorsed national independence. It was in this euphoric mood that the populists called upon all anti-socialist elements to coalesce to oust the ARF from the government and form a new one based on the principles of free, capitalistic enterprise.

The Left Spectrum

The Social Revolutionaries

The adherents of the Russian Social Revolutionary Movement also had a nominal presence in the Republic. Like the populists, their grass root support was based on student and intellectual circles in Tiflis and Baku. Many of its members were former Tashnakists who had abandoned the party in 1907 because of its absorption of and adherence to the movement to liberate “Turkish-Armenia,” which led the party to assume a somewhat shallow position within the Russian opposition movement of the day.

A decade later, in 1917, Armenian SR’s joined the Georgian Mensheviks and fought hard to exclude the ARF from the revolutionary councils, which were shaped as a result of the political vacuum created by the toppling of the Tsarist regime.

Contrary to their lack of a strong support group within the republic, and in spite of their feeble membership, Armenian SR’s campaigned vigorously in parliamentary elections. Although they attained meager results, they continued to advocate a single Caucasian entity within an all-Russian federative democracy.

Their failure was a direct result of their disbelief in the concept of national independence. Even when the majority of its delegates, perhaps out of expediency, voted in favor of working within separate Caucasian republics during the party’s conference held in Tiflis in August of 1919, the party could not formulate a working strategy out of their demand. The party organ, Sotsial Heghapokhagan (The Socialist Revolutionary), continued to publish contradicting views about issues relating to self determination and national independence, thus furthering the gap between the party and the general populace.

The Social Democrats

The collapse of empire, partition of Trans-Caucasus, end of Baku Commune, disagreement over tactics, and the final schism between Bolshevik and Menshevik factions had weakened the Social Democrats and scattered them into five rival groups.-

1. The Armenian Section of the Georgian SD (Menshevik) Party that had a negligible role in the Republic,
2. Adherents of the International Russian SD (Menshevik) Party,

Adherents to Russian SD (Bolshevik) Party, who were advocates of Trans-Caucasian Soviet Republics, and National Communist Parties as affiliates of the Russian Communist Party. There was some resistance from Armenian and Georgian Bolshevik circles to this separatist agenda, but it was finally agreed upon by all Bolsheviks in the region, especially when Lenin and the Central Committee in Moscow advocated it.

The Bolsheviks had lots of disagreement over tactics. Some, like Arshavir Melikian advocated educating the public through legal means rather than revolutionary agitation, because the Republic was in shambles. Young extremists opposed this view. The Bolshevik boycotting of parliamentary elections in summer of 1919 suggests that extremists were in control of the party.

In the summer of 1919 there were not more than 500 Bolsheviks in Armenia.

Yet they were on the rise because of their agitation and because of other factors such as.-

• Unresolved condition of the Armenian Question.
• Radical Bolshevik “proletar”s from Baku and other parts of the Caucasus
• Were purring into Armenia.
• Bolsheviks expelled from Georgia coming to Armenia.
• Moscow sending agitators and propagandists into Armenia.
• Armenian government inactive at first (Bolsheviks on government payroll in ministries, they were permitted to deliver lectures, engage in political debates, address public rallies, and even criticize government and ruling party. Therefore, Bolsheviks found a haven in Armenia.

The Government started taking severe measures only after Bolshevik led uprisings in May 1920.

September 1919 saw the first underground party conference in Yerevan. Only twelve delegates were present. There was a conflict between Melikian’s mild views and KRIAKOM members Azkanaz Mravian and Sarkis Gasian. Decision taken to start subversive actions against the existing government.

Thus ARMENKOM was created. However, the party remained underground.

The Social Democratic Specifists

Those were intellectuals who adhered to the principle that Armenians had the right to choose their own unique approach to SOCIALISM. They advocated distinct national Marxist parties.

After the formation of the Republic Armenian SD specifists such as Tavit Ananun, Bashki Ishkhanian, and Sdepan Zorian moved to Yerevan to work within governmental institutions and legal structures. in January 1920 they founded The Social Democratic Labor Party of Armenia as a legal organization. They hailed the restoration of national independence and proclaimed that they will participate in

the process of state building. They ridiculed the Ramkavars assertion that Western Armenia should be the nucleus around which the Armenian state is to be formed. They

also criticized other SD factions for their subversive and intrusive agitation and thus attracted the animosity of the Marxists and bourgeoisie alike.

The Social Democratic Henchakian Party

Last but not least Social Democratic Henchakian Party. This was the oldest established Armenian SD group and the only one which had Eastern and Western Armenian members. The party reached its peak in 1894-96 during the emancipatory movement in Western Armenia. Then came a period of fragmentation. In 1919 many Henchakists left the party to join Mensheviks or Bolsheviks. Traditional strongholds in Cilicia and Balkans. Publication The Proletar in Tiflis, through which they.-

• Criticized A.R.F. for pseudo socialism, honeymoon with bourgeoisie,
• pretension of leadership.
• Criticized all parties that boycotted parliamentary elections.
• Criticized Populists for opportunism (first working with ARF, then coming out of coalition)
• Criticize intellectuals (SD’s specially) because they could not differentiate between state and government, while the first is permanent and the other transitory. So, if government is now held y incompetents that should not mean abandoning the state or undermining it, but rather aid it by providing new leadership.
• Opposed the presence of two delegations in Paris because that was

contrary to the notion of one nation-one struggle.

The Center

The ARF

Although crippled by the Armenian Genocide which shattered its network

in the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Civil war, which battered its organizational machine in the Tsarist Empire, The Armenian Revolutionary Federation was, in 1918, still considered to be the dominant Armenian political organization upon whose shoulders the task of ruling the fledgling Republic rested.

For three decades since its formation, the ARF had acted as a catharsis through which conservative Western and progressive Eastern Armenian ideological fermentations and political aspirations could be funneled into a cohesive working agenda for the realization of the ultimate goal of Free and independent Armenia. Now that the nucleus of that state was accomplished, the old party program with its

revolutionary zeal was inadequate to meet the challenges of a governmental apparatus. Add to this the almost inevitable popular discontent towards the ruling party of a newly established state, and the internal differences within the rank-and-file, and it was obvious that the A.R.F. had to undergo some radical changes in order to meet the challenges of the new situation.

There were three distinct groupings within the party. The largest was that of Western Armenian members who advocated an evolutionary social reform program. On the other extreme stood Internationalist socialist intellectuals, mostly Eastern Armenian, who pushed for radical social and political change. In the middle stood the old leadership, the members of the party’s highest executive body, the A.R.F. Bureau which,

out of pragmatic considerations, put aside its revolutionary character, and tilted towards moderation, thus weakening the position of the party’s Left. The adoption of a moderate stance by the party’s leadership was also evident in the Bureau’s organ “Heartache”, which stressed gradualism instead of radical social and political reform.

The clash between the first two groups was inevitable during the sessions of the party’s 9th congress in September 1919 (the only one held in Armenia’s capital Yerevan). Issues ranging from the ideological framework of the party to the relationship between party and government were hotly debated under the watchful eyes of Allied intelligence services which followed the sessions with keen interest. After several weeks of deliberations, the Congress formulated its decisions. It was

evident that the moderates had been successful. The Congress upheld the principles of moderate, democratic government and also instructed the newly elected Bureau that it should have an indirect control of government, that it should not interfere in the affairs of the government, but would rather stay in its shadow and extend a supportive hand to it.

Later events, however, such as the Bolshevik agitated uprisings in May

1920 terminated the principle of indirect control of government, when the ARF Bureau came out of the shadows and assumed the government itself. These were, it seems, tiring and critical days where raison d’etat became the raison d’etre of the ruling party’s leadership.

Partisan Politics

After reviewing the participants, let us now ponder on some of the processes of inter-party politics. Because of time limitations, I will present each very briefly.

Perhaps one of the most important processes of partisan politics in the Republic was that of the coalition government between the ruling party and the populist Democrats, the Populist Party which lasted from November 1918 to June 1919. Headed first by Hovannes Kachaznuni and then by Alexander Khatisian, The coalition was not a complete semblance of national unity, since the left wing parties (i.e. SR’s,

SD’s) were against participation in a government where right wing parties were represented. The coalition government provided the opportunity for the Eastern Armenian Bourgeoisie to participate in the state-building process, Many of their Tiflis based cadres relocated themselves to Yerevan or alternated between the two cities, in an effort to plan and implement projects in the spheres of economy, social welfare, education, the judiciary, etc… The coalition government came to an abrupt end because of the act of United Armenia in May 1919. Even though all populist ministers in the government had signed the act and participated in its official declaration, the Populist Central Committee in Tiflis, at the time, it seems, in cohort with Boghos Nubar’s camp in

Paris, which insisted that such an act was the prerogative of a constitutional congress where all segments of Armenians must be represented, protested the act and called upon its ministers to withdraw from the government and boycotted the parliamentary elections to be held in the coming weeks. The Populist Center’s unexplainable position spread confusion within the party’s rank and file. many cadres questioned the validity of the center’s decision. Although the populist center’s erroneous decisions were rectified during the party conference held several months later, the collapse of the coalition government just before the general parliamentary elections did damage the efforts of a unity between the two most influential political segments. The experiment was never repeated.

In explaining the populist center’s stance one should take into consideration the negotiations conducted at the time between the Zhoghovrtagan (populist democrats) and the Ramkavars (Constitutional Democrats) regarding the merger of the two. It might be deduced that the Zhoghovertagan’s center’s position regarding the Act of United Armenia was a result of Ramgavar influences on its leadership.

The Act of United Armenia also created confusion within circles adhering to the newly established Hay Azkayin Azadagan Miyutiun (Armenian National Liberal Union) whose aim was the creation of a joint Constitutional Democrats- Populist Democrats-Reformed Henchakian coalition as a counterforce against the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. Stressed by the prospect that the Act of united Armenia would rally Armenians worldwide around the Ararat Republic — the term with which Ramkavars and other Western Armenian circles used to undermine and ridicule the Armenian Republic and its ruling party — and also worried about The recognition that

the said republic was gaining in Allied circles, architects of the above mentioned Union poet Vahan Tekeyan and Dr. Nshan Der Sdepanian traveled first to Tiflis, where they were joined by Populist Central Committee chairman Samson Harutiunian, and from there to Yerevan to negotiate the Union’s participation in the government. The

plenary sessions of the negotiations coincided with the convening of the 9th ARF Congress. Simon Vratsian represented the ruling party. Proposals and counter proposals led to compromises on both sides, but the end result was that the negotiations created more confusion and distrust.

On the other hand, the single event which solicited unanimous Armenian unity was the Armeno-Georgian border conflict during the period of coalition government. Armenian parties represented in the Azkayin Khorhurt (National Council; Parliament), unconditionally protested the Georgian militant stance and backed the government in its efforts to resist the aggressor. Due to time limitations I am unable to speak about the 1919 parliamentary elections and their results. What is to be underlined here, however, is the fact that the election process was yet another indication of the democratic character of the fledgling republic.

Conclusion

Burdened with numerous external and internal hardships, The Armenian Republic in between 1918-1920 was a country in shambles. War, famine, and thousands upon thousands of bewildered refugees threatened the very fabric of Armenian existence and, in the words of Armenia’s first prime minister, Hovannes Kachaznuni, rendered the country into a “Chaos without Form” (Antsev Kaos). Yet despite these painful birth bangs, the Armenian quest for freedom and independence was on the march. In this chaotic situation internal partisan divisions were inevitable. Yet the high politicization level of the parties and the populace at large was a promising factor for the future democracy. It was on the principles and the broader issues — and not secondary or tertiary details — that Armenian political organizations had differences of opinion. The Republic was not the monopoly of a single party. Even though the ruling party influenced the shaping of government, an outspoken opposition did materialize and a multi-party pluralistic system was working.

If one thing should be stressed here, it would be the fact that the national interest was clearly defined and all of the major participant political organizations were in agreement regarding the elements of the national interest. Governmental decisions were tailored according to national interest, rather than predicated by external influences and pressures.

It is said that History repeats itself. We are bound to repeat the mistakes of the past if we do not learn from our experiences. The period of the Republic did not lack those mistakes. On the contrary, mistakes were numerous and lots of efforts were made to rectify them. It is precisely because of this that the 1918-1920 experience must be of importance to us today.