The city of Misrata has yet again become the epicentre of a desperate battle by Libyan rebels against forces loyal to Col. Muammar Gaddafi.

More than 120 rockets had been fired on opposition-held areas of Misrata by mid-morning and there were “raging battles” in two strategically key streets, according to rebels this morning. The bombings added much un-needed pressure on the city’s already strained hospitals, which are already increasingly overwhelmed with the appalling injuries of casualties and the death toll is rapidly rising. The vast majority of the casualties are civilians, and doctors say “they include many women and children”.

So why are Cluster Bombs Being Dropped? Was’nt Cluster Munitions banned, and outlawed via the Convention of Cluster Munitions in 2008?.

So what exactly are Cluster Bombs/Cluster Munitions?

Cluster munitions, cluster bombs or sub-munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched explosive weapons that eject smaller munitions: a cluster of bomblets so to speak. The most common types are designed to kill enemy personnel and destroy vehicles.

Now because Cluster Bombs disperse many, many small individual bomblets, many are still left intact and unexploded for days, weeks, months, even years after the original rocket was deployed, Making it incredibly dangerous for ground troops, or civilians alike during attacks and afterwards. Reports have been made of people losing limbs and even their lives many years after a war has ended by stumbling across one of these said “bomblets”.

So to prevent Cluster Munitions from being manufactured, and used in warfare, a convention was signed by 94 countries making it illegal to produce, sell, distribute or use Cluster Munitions, the convention was signed in Oslo, Norway in December 2008.

So what is the Convention On Cluster Munitions?

It is simply an international agreement that bans cluster munitions. When they join the Convention on Cluster Munitions, states commit to:

• never use cluster munitions, nor to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer” them;
• destroy cluster munitions in their stockpiles within eight years of the convention becoming binding;
• clear and destroy cluster munitions remnants in their territory, or support efforts to clear cluster munitions remnants in affected countries, within 10 years;
• in affected countries, ensure that survivors, their families and communities receive comprehensive assistance;
• offer financial or technical assistance to other States Parties, for example in providing assistance to survivors or contributing to clearance programmes;
• adopt national implementation measures (such as national legislation) in order to ensure that the terms of the convention are upheld in their territory;
• Reporting regularly on all these activities.

Now the question arises, “Did Libya sign the 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention?”

Well according to the “StopClusterMuntions” Website, “Libya has not yet joined the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Cluster Munition Coalition is further concerned about unsecured weapons stockpiles in Libya and the risk of proliferation in the region”.

So what are the implications of this? Does the fact that Libya did’nt sign the convention hold them exempt from the Cluster Munitions clause? Or will NATO still hold Libya, Mainly Col. Gaddafi responsible for the use of banned weaponry under the Cluster Munitions Convention?.

What are you thoughts on this subject? Should NATO now inforce ground troops, and invade Libya to stop the atrocities?, Or would this turn out to be another “Iraq war Occupation” if ground troops are dispatched?.

A delicate situation indeed.

            In the interim, the text will depart to discuss the possible implications of what continued use of these weapons will mean for the future of the Ottawa Treaty (the 1997 landmines Treaty), after a short discussion of the utility of this landmark legal document. After examining the legal position, the paper will discuss the issues of CB weapons in greater detail, but with the question of international law set against arms control measures always in mind. Firstly, we will introduce the subject of the mine ban as an instrument of arms control, using global consensus underpinned by normative approaches to arms proscription. 

In the beginning …

December, 1997 ushered in what was considered at the time to be a ‘new’ era in conventional arms control. The ICBL had successfully overturned received wisdom about challenging state-centric, top-down security mechanisms, with Nobel co-Laureate Jody Williams proclaiming that civil society (and by inference grass-roots activism) was the ‘world’s new superpower.’ This claim was, unsurprisingly, supported by the fact that Ottawa concluded ‘the most expeditious arms control treaty in history. As a euphoric and landmark event, Ottawa built on its initial successes by its Entry into Force in March, 1999, following the 40^th ratification by Burkina Faso six months earlier.

            Be that as it may, the efficacy of Ottawa as arms control instrument is now almost a decade old, and of course subject to evolutionary scrutiny. As many an expert observer has noted, the binding nature of this event is about withstanding the global forces that exist in an anarchic global polity, and that the myth of legal inviolability has been exploded (sic) by the recidivist attitude of State signatory Angola, that went back to using mines again despite a solemn pledge not to do so. In short, the problem here is about enforcement; and, also, about the amoral and seemingly cynical attitude that gives succour to alleged ‘pariah’ states that have remained outside Ottawa’s orbit from the outset. Moreover, and to firmly contextualise the problems of whether Ottawa is worth the paper it is written on, El Salvador’s Vice Minister of External Affairs, Sr Rene Dominguez proudly stated for the record that his country is ‘totally mine free’ when in fact the International Demining Group (IDG), a humanitarian mine clearance foundation discovered 53 new minefields since the group commenced survey operations in 1998. What this shows is that legality in the international arena may reside only in the mind of those who contemplate such matters; however, this paper will seek to expand on the notion of law as it applies to CB weapon systems.

Cluster Bombs: a legal exploration

If truth is, indeed, the first casualty of war, and that Cicero’s claim that in war the law is silent, then this leaves the paper with a number of obstacles to surmount. As, for example, a precise definition of Terrorism may be elusive and perhaps wholly subjective, the devil is often in the detail. The struggle by human rights campaigners, arms control activists, humanitarian and aid-related Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) amongst others to establish a clear link between cluster/related munitions and APM is an exercise steeped in vitriol and seeming legal sleight-of-hand. Be that as it may, there are some important aspects of the debate that need to be clarified initially, specifically the differences between APM and cluster/area weapons; they are:

• Unlike mines, Area and CB weapons platforms only become a hazard when they fail to operate in field conditions; that is, they do not ‘go off’ in operational circumstances;
• These types of weapon system require a platform capable of delivering the devices to the target, such as fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter-borne dispensers, and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), the prohibitive costs of which effectively denies use to sub-state groups, paramilitaries, and similar organisations.

However, as most commentators would agree, unexploded area/CB weapons display remarkable similarities to landmines. Taking into account the above observations, the primary point to make is a lack of discrimination. Within the milieu of ‘moral yardstick’ proclaimed to great effect by the ICBL, therefore, it is assumed that the case for stigmatising CB weapons is watertight. However, it should be noted at this point that the legal argument falls down because of apparent chicanery by those parties (that is, the US and the UK and others) to influence the wording of the accepted definition of an AP landmine, which is:

            ‘ “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered to be anti-personnel  mines as a result of being so equipped.

This definition, as it stands, appears to suit the requirements of the international community. Certainly, doubters and detractors should have no problem establishing exactly what is subject to ostensibly global opprobrium. In the light of the above observations, the legal or converse status of CB weapons and related area impact munitions remains problematic, however, when considered together with APM. With reference to Ottawa and the legal status of AP mines, cluster and similar weapons platforms escaped proscription because of the widely-held perception that they are a different class of device, despite patently displaying many of the operational characteristics associated with APM.

            The principal and ongoing problem created at the time of the legal definition being formulated related to unease, mostly in the US, regarding this definition and the possible implications for the banning of CB and related devices; had the definition remained as per the direct quote above, another 35 US weapon systems would have attracted a ban, under the Ottawa Treaty. So, the Clinton Administration wanted the word ‘primarily’ inserted into the definition, as in the following: ‘ …A mine [primarily] designed to be exploded by the presence …..’  This one word insertion denotes the fact that the principal function of CB and related munitions is not to detonate via the same medium of contact or proximity as mines; in other words, the ostensible primary function of CB and similar devices is different to that of mines. However, it is quite evident that when these munitions fail to ‘go off,’ they patently assume the primary function of AP landmines, which in any event amounts to an indiscriminate form of warfare. To consider further detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but nonetheless one must persist with greater legal argument.

            Assuming that legislation formulated to end the use of APM cannot reasonably be extended to include cluster munitions, the paper must then look further afield to establish the legal validity, or otherwise, of these devices. According to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, the ‘Only legitimate object that States should endeavour to during war is to weaken the forces of the enemy’ and that the employment of arms that uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable is contrary to the laws of humanity. Whilst the above refers primarily to military personnel rendered hors de combat, it precedes other formal, legal instruments designed to at least manage warfare, and further recalls that there should be a distinction between combatants and innocent civilians, a tenet that forms the bedrock of every major international convention of the 20^th century, and indeed of all new humanitarian arms control treaties. From this perspective, Ottawa has been a significant, if not universal success, at least on paper. Be that as it may, legal matters usually reside in august establishments far removed from the blood and misery of battlefields; so, in order to open up the debate and discuss implications arising, this paper will now look at the realities of CB deployment.

Bombs away: making matters worse

In the modern lexicon of a presumed just, democratic ‘New World Order,’ the protection of freedom and of saving the world from evil necessarily entails making hard choices and eradicating ‘terror’ where we find it. Using CB deployment as an example, it is possible to envisage the devastating consequences of persistent and unpredictable patters of indiscriminate injury and death both during, and after, armed conflicts around the world, and that the ‘wide area’ nature of these weapons invariably impacts on civilians to a greater degree than landmines do. Whilst the use and subsequent effects of these weapons has received a great deal of exposure resulting from events in Iraq and Afghanistan relatively recently, the history of CB use has a longer history. Laos, a country that found itself ‘in the way’ during the escalating war in Vietnam, suffered about 580,000 USAF sorties, delivering 2.3 million tonnes of bombs. On average, a plane-load of ordnance was dropped every eight minutes, around the clock, for nine years. The end result is that Laos, and indeed Indo-China geographically, were left ‘Destroyed, impoverished, and littered with [millions of] unexploded bomblets.’ In the same manner in which APM continue to blight the lives of populations infested with these weapons, Life in Laos labours under the yoke of unexploded cluster bombs with disturbing regularity; in the heavily-bombed Plain of Jars, the failure rates of these weapons reached 20-30% that directly impacts on apparent annual casualty rates of 20,000, more than half of which prove to be fatal, although in mitigation these figures from the Laotian government should be treated with a healthy degree of scepticism. However, what is not in doubt is the fact that Laos is still bedevilled by munitions dropped over a generation ago.

            Kuwait, more recently, has had to contemplate and deal with a similar problem. Given the technological imperative of newer weapons, which are better designed and have more effective killing ratios, it should be evident that the incidences of so-called ‘collateral damage’ would rise dramatically; in any event,

            ‘Hundreds of civilians were also killed by these [cluster type] bomblets. With the inordinate number of bomblets dropped in Iraq, thousands will become victims in future years. Since the end of the [1991] war, more than 2,000 Kuwaitis have been injured from bombs and munitions, and most of the casualties have been children.’ 

Moreover, 10% of US casualties were incurred by unexploded bomblets, so-called ‘friendly fire,’ during that conflict. The total quantities of bomblets released from CB pods exceeded 24,000,000 units for the duration of that war, and assuming that the failure rate did not pass 5%, then this still leaves a huge number of devices to make safe and dispose of. That said, clearance must be understood in the context of neutralisation capacity; oil-rich Kuwait is much better placed to withstand the cost of eradicating the debris of war than, say, impoverished Laos or Cambodia.

It would doubtless add to the impact of this paper to list situations in other, similarly-afflicted regions like the Balkans that have CB weapons strewn around the countryside; however, this is part of a greater whole that imagines an expanding and perhaps interminable war on terror that will feature continued deployment of these weapons platforms, which this paper will now discuss.

Cluster weapons: future imperfect?

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) will doubtless unfold, as events dictate. If current analysis is to be believed, this may well include further military incursions in the Philippines, Iran, North Korea, Columbia, or anywhere perceived to be in the bombsights of aircraft bent on finding and destroying terrorism.

            Having said that, current thinking on the military utility of CB weapons tends to bifurcate, dependent upon the approach one takes. Anti-landmine campaigners remain adamant that these devices belong firmly in the same legal category as APM, and referring specifically to the Ottawa Treaty. Thus far, the majority of states have signed up to this Convention, with the notable exception of some major arms-producing and selling nations. It is perhaps no coincidence that many of these countries have exhibited a willingness to use CB weapons, notably the US, with pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Vic Warzinsky stating that ‘Cluster bombs are a useful munition that serve a useful and valuable military purpose … I wouldn’t anticipate that we would unilaterally forego using this munition.’

            Perhaps inevitably, serious collateral damage will, as in Iraq and Afghanistan recently, result from the unconstrained use of CB weapons as the GWOT proliferates against so-called ‘states of concern.’ As this paper implies, there will be a concomitant impact on social cohesion and a haemorrhaging of populations from war zones to places of relative safety. Mass migrations through areas polluted by the lethal detritus of war will exact casualties on civilians, unless the political will can be found to formulate and effectively enforce durable arms control initiatives.

Conclusions

The apparently dispiriting tone of this paper is a reflection of 21^st Century zeitgeist, and the mood of unshackled militarism that prevails, in what is apparently an ‘ …[I]nternational and European scene [that] is as complex and uncertain as it has been since the end of the cold war.’ The paraphernalia of war is operational, active and functioning in the fragmented wastes of Afghanistan, in Iraq, and further abroad, as the last remaining superpower practises realpolitik on a truly global scale. Quite where this adventure takes us may be unclear at this time; the outcomes remain opaque, but it is almost certain that innocent non-combatants will become enmeshed in a conflagration not of their specific making, and over which they exercise little, if any, control.

            Similarly, the NGO community, apparently the ‘world’s new superpower’ and putative caller for restraint (if not outright proscription) in arms control matters, appears now to have little or no voice in the august corridors of Washington or London. However, the impetus for meaningful change is as relevant and imperative as ever. The seemingly critical issue is that of powers calling for ‘freedom and democracy’ in a new war in which they exercise their own rules of engagement, including the instruments they use to this end.

            As the case studies briefly discussed here illustrate, the dangers of using indiscriminate weapons in pursuit of objectives breaches at the very least the universal notion of morality and a normative polity that seeks civilised (in the non-value sense) management of conflict, the opposite of which should not be hidden behind the hobbling obscurantism of so-called ‘embedded’ journalism. The point is: a farmer cannot practise sustainable agriculture in a field infested with unstable, highly volatile CB and related weaponry; a child cannot play in an area littered with bright yellow canisters for fear of a premature demise; women and children (who usually perform these tasks in many parts of the world) cannot fetch water from a well that is seen as a ‘militarily-efficacious’ target that may be useful to terrorists.

            What is certain at this juncture remains the question of ends and means; whilst morality remains a ‘difficult’ concept when applied to national security, then the defence of ‘freedom’ becomes meaningless when ring-fenced for the benefit of the world’s relatively wealthy minorities. In the final analysis, the types of weapon under discussion display similar, if not exact, properties to APM when live and yet unexploded on impact with the ground. From this perspective, the weapons are of dubious legality. The law, however, as Cicero again would have it, remains conspicuous by its absence in war, and that the exercise of overwhelming force provides the justification for a sledgehammer approach to diplomacy and peacemaking. It is difficult to imagine just how peace can be constructed and maintained when cluster weapons effectively inhibit post-conflict development, and the institution of a viable civil society amidst the ruins of a dismembered and cluster-bomb infested country. 

However, with the Dublin Accords of 2007, the issue of cluster bomb/sub-munitions proscription seems to be settled. But, as is the case with APMs, there are still a number of countries that refuse, for ‘strategic’ reasons, to inclusively join the majority of countries that want to ban these weapons. This list of non-participants includes Israel, that is currently engaged in military operations in the crowded enclave of Gaza, and which has littered Lebanon with hundreds of thousands of sub-munitions, and which are killing civilians to this day. Moreover as the situation with landmines shows, having a ban does not equal enforcement; Angola, a signatory state to the Ottawa Treaty, returned to laying landmines during an upsurge in civil conflict due to ‘operational necessity’; so, in the final analysis, much depends on the political will of the international community to not only bring about a ban on indiscriminate weapons platforms, but to ensure absolute and enduring compliance.

Take for instance a report from United Press International that states 46% of all arms sales in the world are from U.S. companies. That’s a significant figure. The report also suggests that due to the flooding of the developing countries with weapons, the U.S. is also fueling the violence instead of providing an option for defense. It concludes by delicately mentioning the reason why an over-saturated market continues to be fed is simple: corporate greed.

One curious note in the report also pointed to Russia being the next most competitive arms market, with 15% of sales in the developing countries market. I wouldn’t think much of this, except there was another story pointing to who Russia’s client list included: "The principal purchasers of Russian arms were: Iran [$1.7 billion], Syria [$800 million],Yemen [$500 million], Libya, and Israel [$300 million each]."

The story as reported on the worldtribune.com site, made mention of a congressional report called the “ Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005 ”, so I searched for it online. There was a unique difference between the Russian and the American arms numbers; they differentiated between arms sales deliveries (US) and arms sales agreements (Russia). This accounts for the difference between the reported figures in the worldtribune.com article and the congressional report. It’s one thing to make an agreement to sell a weapon, and it’s another thing to actually ship the product. Russia seems to have trouble finalizing the deals, and I suspect that may be a cash flow problem on the part of the customer.

These two still wouldn’t be much of a story on their own, except how they connect to the bigger picture. In the case of Russia, it sold arms to Iran, who in turn funneled them to Hezbollah during the Israeli-Lebanese war. To prove their case further, Israel sent pictures to Moscow, showing the weapons in question. "Some of the missiles were still in their original packaging, which identified them as having been manufactured in Russia," a military source said.

Many screamed “foul!” over this, and to some degree they are correct, but it’s a hypocritical platform. Israel, as most know, also have Russian weapons; they purchased $300 million worth of hardware. As far as I can tell, Israel did not use Russian weapons in Lebanon, however, they did use a substantial amount of American made hardware, which is no secret. In one case, that hardware landed them in hot water with the US State Department . It has been reported there was a type of “gentleman’s agreement” between the US and Israel in the use of specific hardware that could and could not be used in civilian areas. Israel originally denied using American made cluster bombs , however, the results of an Israeli investigation confirms they did in fact employ American made cluster munitions, which could be against the law . Now Israel has confirmed the use of American made weapons in Lebanon, it remains to be seen if the State Department will do anything besides turn a blind eye.

Of course the biggest cache of weapons the United States has in the Middle East is inside Iraq. A recent audit has concluded one out of every 25 weapons is unaccounted for; there are other weapons that are not functional and it doesn’t specify if this is included in the one out of twenty-five, or is a separate figure not disclosed. The official number of missing weapons totals to 14,030, which is considered to be only four percent . If you do a little math, there should be approximately 1,403,000 assorted weapons brought into Iraq by the United States.

I could be wrong, but the United States seems to be supplying the bulk of the weapons in a very volatile region, and the CIA loves to arm and fund any guerrilla group that comes along (we won’t talk about Afghanistan). It’s somewhat hypocritical and disingenuous to point the finger at the Middle East when we train them to kill, give them the weapons to do so, let loose the Proactive Preemptive Operations Group to bring terrorists out in the open by our own terrorist methods , and then say, “if you guys would just come into the twenty-first century, you wouldn’t be fighting all the time.”

Could the Middle East be right when they point to the United States and call us “the great Satan”? From a purely Christian point of view, we export massive amounts of weaponry for greed, pornography, try to install democracy (when we’re being denied it at home through voting irregularities and rights stripping by the congress), and don’t respect their value and culture systems (alcohol, sex, drugs, dating, divorce, dietary restrictions, fraud, bribery). Even from God’s point of view, we export everything He abhors.

So who’s selling the violence? I’m reminded of the old saying, “we have seen the enemy, and he is us.”

quazen.com articles by this writer can be found here

socyberty.com articles can be located here

relijournal.com articles are here

picable.com photographic images are here