These men were not to be deported, they were through marriage exempt from this and lived privileged status as spouses of Germans. It was reported that they were being held so new officials of the Jewish organizations within the city could be chosen to replace those being deported. The reason for their being held was not conveyed to their wives, and rumours spread that these men were to be removed to camps outside of Germany along with those other Jews recently arrested.

The wives and other relatives arrived on the street where their husbands were being held and demanded the return of their husbands. At first the protest was just by one or two women, the numbers grew and an estimated 6,000 had participated at some point or other during the period of nonviolent protest.

Once the selection of the new Jewish officials had been completed the men were released, this gave rise to the impression that they had been released by the pressure imposed by the women’s protests, the exact reason will not be known. Upon their release it was found that 25 of the men due for release had been sent to Auschwitz, these men due to having a privileged status were kept separate from the general population of the prison camp and all were eventually sent back to their families in Berlin, almost all of these privileged status Jewish men survived the war.

The building that housed the men during the period of the protest was destroyed  near to the end of the war during an allied bombing raid. The location of the building is commemorated by a column 2-3 metres high with information about the event posted on the column.

            Although both films were originally created in Europe (and UK, to some degree), they were nevertheless ones of best well-known films (although American audience may be limited or ignorant of foreign films). Set in the timeline of seventy-three years apart, the films do show some parallel lines in reference to framework of landscape, and how wars were conducted in both World Wars. Still, there are intertwined and contradictory visual messages (and phenotypes) in film process makings, which can be said or referred to as ‘mixed economy’ or ‘integral economy’ in both directions simultaneously. Therefore, the films can be said to be limited to European perspective, and not American one, which could be interpreted as entirely stupid erroneous-termed ‘anti-American’, or the likes, in its own American domestic-based Internet media. Scholars of history, naturally, beg to differ, and, most likely, affirm to the majority and its contemporary American society without noisy left-wing agenda of peoples that seem to be presented in California in early 1930s (when All Quiet on the Western Front was subsequently shown within a degree of disapproval, until nearly three decades later that it was finally accepted and scarred twenty-years later in 1958 thereafter) and today.

             The protagonist of All Quiet on the Western Front is unusual in a sense that he is romantic war veteran. Unlike most war films, the film depicted World War I as adventure on the German side, which in turned a growing disillusionment as well as growing process. Stalingrad, on the other hand, is a vicious disillusionment under the banner of depressive and brutal endurances. It should be interesting to note that the protagonist-actor of Stalingrad (1993) participated in a remake of All Quiet on the Western Front in 1979, and the same actor was also in The Downfall (2005). It is as if the actor himself has not aged a bit, or otherwise cloned during the coursework of filmmaking. The same can be said of All Quiet on the Western Front (VHS), in which phenotypes of actors were little distorted and scattered at some points. Stalingrad, on the other hand, is little pragmatic and colored in a way that minimal and shadowy filming is shown, instead of “true colors”. This is probably meant to evoke the old days of fog atmosphere and technology.

            Overall, All Quiet on the Western Front is meant to be an emotional and poetical film in a romantic way. It focuses on the centralization of protagonist’s endurance process in a slow way, in which every dimension of traits are explored and matured. Stalingrad, in contrast, is meant to be the ultimate disillusionment in the sacrifice of defense and rational decision for endurance in battles. That said, one can detect this red buffer: All Quiet on the Western Front ran on literary and unexplored adventure, which is semi-realistically derived from Goethe and Schiller’s classical romanticism. Stalingrad ran on the very brink of neo-realism and its collapse, which depict men as ‘no more than instruments that await the pending, eventual doomed deaths’.

            One may wonder when exactly All Quiet on the Western Front was made, and where. Indeed, one source says that it was made in 1930; other source says that it was made in 1931. The same can be said for Stalingrad, which it was vaguely filmed either in 1991 or 1993. However, there is one significant note on 1930 (or 1931) film, unlike its contender: in VHS, its length is 116 minutes, while DVD length is 112 minutes. The distortion of minutes in the distance of seventy years are measured in its electronic signature, inasmuch a difference that World War I has generated for the next stage that awaited a larger war during the Soviet communist infighting (largely between Trotsky and Stalin) and the containment of the Third Reich.

Marina Raskova, already an ace pilot and member of the ‘People’s Defence Committee’, was allowed to organised three female aviation groups authorised by the Soviet high command.  They were the 586 IAP (Fighter Aviation Regiment), the 587 BAP (Bomber Aviation Regiment) and the 588 NBAP (Night Bomber Aviation Regiment).

Marina Raskova.  Source

After being accepted to the training program, the young women underwent a rigorous six month flying and navigation course, fitting in to that time an amount of training that would normally take around a year and a half.  In September 1942, Valerya Khomyakova of the 586 IAP’s or ‘Fighter Aviation Regiment’ became the first female Soviet pilot to shoot down an enemy aircraft at night when she downed a Ju 99. 

A month later, the 586 IAP assisted in Operation Saturn and Uranus, which was successful in eliminating the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, after which, they were given the task of defending some important military logistical facilities and strategic locations.  In 1944, the unit took part in the Soviet offensive in Hungry fighting with Yak-9 fighters and they finished the war on one of the captured airfields in Austria.

The 588 NBAP unit or ‘Night Bomber Aviation Regiment’ arrived combat ready in the Ukraine on the 23rd May 1942.  They quickly earned the respect and fear of their enemies being given the nick name ‘night witches’.  The decorated German Commander of II. /JG 52, Hauptmann Johannes Steinhoff, wrote of the 588 NBAP’s;

“We simply couldn’t grasp that the Soviet airmen that caused us the greatest trouble were in fact WOMEN. These women feared nothing. They came night after night in their very slow biplanes, and for some periods they wouldn’t give us any sleep at all.”

On 25th October 1942, a bomb strike by the 588 NBAP set alight a fuel depot at Armavir airfield.  The fire spread and destroyed all but one of the planes on the airfield, leading to the quick withdrawal of the German fighters situated there.  In January the following year, the regiments achievements were acknowledged and it was given the new title of 46th Taman’ Guards Night Bomber Aviation Regiment. 

Pilots of the Guards Night Bomber Aviation Regiment, from left: Lt Irina Sebrova, Capt Natal’ya Meklin, Capt Yevgeniya Zhigulenko and Capt Mariya Smirnova (950).  Source

It was the most highly decorated regiment in the whole Soviet Air Force, with twenty-three of its pilots being awarded with the Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union, with a former navigator of the regiment becoming the twenty-forth to receive the award in 1995.

Marina Raskova took command of the third regiment herself, the 587th BAP or (Bomber Aviation Regiment).  The regiment finished its training on 22nd November 1942 and was moved to the Stalingrad front line.  After helping to liberate the town of Borisov, the unit became known as the 125th “M. M. Raskova” Borisov Guards Dive Bomber Aviation Regiment. 

In one celebrated incident involving a pilot from the unit, Mariya Dolina flying a Pe-2 bomber, managed to shoot down two enemy plains at the same time.  The regiment finished war operations in May 1943 after flying a total of 1134 combat missions dropping 980 tons of bombs in the process.  A tribute made to the women of the unit by the Free-French pilots of the “Normandie-Niemen” Fighter Regiment who often fought along side them stated;

“Even if it were possible to gather and place at your feet all the flowers on earth, this would not constitute sufficient tribute to your valour.”

The 587 BAP and the 588 NBAP were involved in the fighting in the Kuban area of Southern Russia where they came up against some of the best fighter pilots the German air force had to offer including Erich Harmann of the famous JG 54 fighter group, who was the highest ranked fighter ace in the world with 352 confirmed combat kills.

Soviet female fighter pilots in front of a Yak-1 plane.  Source

Throughout the war, the Soviet female fighter pilots were involved in some of the heaviest aerial combat operations in history.  They earned the fear and respect of enemy combatants and were often highly decorated for their efforts by their country.   

Despite this in December 1941 the Red Army repelled the strongest blow of the Wehrmacht, Germany had made a lot of grounds and important sieges, most notably the oil fields in the Ukraine, but were pushed back by a weak Russian army from Moscow and were unable to mount a counter attack. The main reason for this failure of Operation Barbarossa was the weather, but this only happened due to Hitler’s underestimation of Russia and the delay at the start of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler felt that his army was much stronger than that of Russia and Hitler had expected that his “battles of encirclement” strategy would cut off and trap most of the Russian army. But Hitler miscalculated the size of the Soviet army. This meant that Hitler could not circle the Russian army, and also meant that the Soviet Union could launch a counter attack. Since Hitler thought he would be able to gain a quick victory over the Russians he did not to expect to end up fighting in the harsh Russian winter. Tanks and planes froze up, and German soldiers were fatigued quickly, Russians since they were used to the conditions were well prepared and were able to repel the German invasion even after losing 20 million soldiers and civilians. Another contributing factor to why Germany ended up fighting in the winter of 1941/1942 was the five week delay at the start of Operation Barbarossa, which meant that instead of the Operation starting in mid may it ended up beginning in June, even closer to the start of winter.

Using sources A-C, it is obvious that Hitler underestimated but also it shows what the war was like from the perspective of a German soldier and for a Russian. Source A gives a good impression of how the Germans thought that the Russians were weak and easy to defeat. This can be seen in several places for example “The Führer thinks that the action will only take 4 months; I think-even less” This shows directly that Hitler felt that he could defeat Russia quickly but also that this notion had been passed down to other Germans. Another way in which the Germans felt that they could win is how they felt that Bolshevism was very weak “Bolshevism will collapse as a house of cards.” Source A gives an accurate depiction of the foolishness of the Axis powers. Source B shows how Russia felt about Hitler. In the poster it shows Hitler bursting through the Nazi-Soviet Pact, holding a gun looking like a rat, from this we can tell that Russia had a big army due to the obvious size of the Red Army soldier (drawn in red). It also shows how Hitler underestimates the enemy thinking that he can surprise them and kill them with just a gun. Another thing that this poster depicts is how fake Hitler was, shown by the mask which has fallen off his face. This poster would have boosted Russian morale by showing that Hitler was a dirty, frail, two-faced rat, but it also has a lot of factual evidence such as Hitler hiding behind the Nazi- Soviet pact to delay war and how the Russians knew that he was coming. The final source, Source C shows how the German soldiers themselves were doubtful of victory “Long before winter came the chances had been diminished owing to the repeated delays in the advance that were caused by bad roads, and mud.” This also shows how bad the conditions were in Russia and how unprepared German troops were for it. Another part of Source C which shows how the Germans underestimated the Russian army and how big it was “Another adverse factor was the way the Russians received continual reinforcements from their back areas, as they fell back. It seemed to us that as soon as one force was wiped out, the path was blocked by the arrival of a fresh force.” This shows how massive the Russian army was and how it was able to replenish its troops easily. Source C gives an accurate idea of how harsh it was to be fighting as a German soldier and how pointless it all seemed.

There were less decisive reasons which made Operation Barbarossa fail but they all contributed. Firstly was the Russians quick action which meant they were able to move over 1500 factories away from the fighting, allowing them to keep producing arms and munitions for their troops to hold of the Axis assault. Secondly Hitler split his forces too much, in order to take over Russia as fast as possible, this meant that since the Russians had a much bigger army they could easily repel German attacks and neutralize sieges because of the German lack of troops. Finally the Russians showed much Bravery trying to defend their country, for example even women workers in Stalingrad attacked the German soldiers. This patriotism was unmatched by the Germans as they were not on their home ground.

Ultimately Operation Barbarossa failed due to the German’s foolishness to underestimate the Russian army. This lead to the Germans being forced to fight in unusual circumstances such as cold, rain, mud and ice which the Russians were used to giving them a massive advantage.

On the 23rd of July, 1942, Hitler ordered the German Sixth Army, lead by Friedrich Paulus to attack Stalingrad. The siege of Stalingrad was part of Operation Barbarossa, which was the German codename for the invasion of Soviet Russia. Stalingrad was an important Russian centre for industry and communications. It was located on the Volga River and could easily be used, once captured, by Germans to help the German invasion of the Caucasus area, which was rich in oil which could be used to fuel German, planes, ships, tanks and other motorised vehicles. Stalingrad represented the end of the German invasion because it was the furthest east which Germany managed to get to. The Germans lost at Stalingrad for several main reasons, the first of which is how the underestimated the fighting strength and patriotism of the Russian Red Army. The second reason was the weather, which may not seem much, but due to previous underestimations of the Russians the Germans ended up fighting in the harsh Russian winter. The third reason is that the Germans were not suited to the type of fighting which occurred in Stalingrad. The final reason was that during Stalingrad the Germans suffered from a severe lack of supplies.

Throughout the German assault on Russia, Germany had frequently underestimated the Russian fighting force. During World War II, at the Russian’s Red Army had a peak strength of twelve and a half million troops. German officers stated that while fighting in Russia, Russian troops would be killed then another wave of them would come to fill their place. This severe underestimation of the Russian Red Army led to major delays in the advance of Operation Barbarossa, leaving the German army caught up in the harsh Russian Winter. This cold fatigued the men and froze up machinery such as planes, tanks and trucks and sometimes even men’s guns froze up when water got caught in them and froze. Paulus (the commander of the German forces heading towards Stalingrad) advanced in 1942 with 250,000 men, 500 tanks, 7,000 guns and mortars and 25,000 tanks,which compared to the Russian’s forces seems small because at the time of the Soviet counter-attack, the Russian’s had 1,103,000 men 15,500 artillery, 1460 tanks and 1110 aircraft. Another problem in the German army was that they were low on fuel so they had to ration it, and another army group had priority over Paulus’s.

This meant that they ran out of fuel twice, once only thirty five miles away from Stalingrad. Once they received supplies again, Stalingrad was bombed by the Luftwaffe. The Fourth Air Fleet aircraft flew a total of 1600 sorties that day dropped 100 tons of bombs and only lost 3 aeroplanes. According to some estimates, there had been nearly 600,000 people in Stalingrad, 40,000 were killed during the first week of bombardment. As the Germans advanced into Stalingrad they had to fight in a different way to that they had fought before. The battle became a battle of attrition, the Soviets would fight for every building and as the Germans got deeper into the city the Soviets fought more and more patriotically. The German tanks were less effective in the urban warfare front due to the fact that the majority of the fighting was in confined spaces inaccessible to tanks with rifles pistols, machine guns and hand grenades. The Soviets, since they knew their way around the city made good use of hidden machine gun nests and sniper spots.

Even though the Germans were winning, having control of the banks of the Volga River and 90 percent of the city they were seriously fatigued, especially after three months of slow and costly warfare. Yet even though the Russians forces were separated into two small forces, civilians and factory workers helped the effort by volunteering to replace the tank crews of those dead and also many workers repaired machinery. A lot of the fighting in Stalingrad was notoriously hand to hand due the close quarters of Stalingrad’s inner city, therefore civilians and even women joined the fighting

As Russia descended into deep winter the Germans began to run low on supplies. The Luftwaffe dropped an average of 70 tons of supplies a day, but the German army needed 300 tons of a day as a minimum. The men who were already fatigued were put onto one third of their rations. The Germans began to kill then eat their horses because they were so hungry. By 7th December the 6th Army were living on one loaf of bread for every five men.

The Soviet generals Aleksandr Vasilyevskiy and Georgy Zhukov made a plan called Operation Uranus which was to concentrate massive forces of Soviet troops around Stalingrad on the Northern and Southern end of it. The Germans were surrounded by a soviet pincer movement. Hitler had realised that he was losing at Stalingrad so he ordered the 4th Panzer Army to rescue the 6th Army, yet when they were heading towards Stalingrad, they met heavy resistance and due to the fear of being encircled like the German 6th Army had been at Stalingrad they did not continue moving. The Germans were in a terrible situation. Due to failed air support, because of heavy Soviet anti air gunning the Germans were unable to get the supplies they needed. Yet a few German transports which managed to land, airlifted some German troops. Finally the Soviet generals began a second offensive, operation Saturn. The aim of this operation was to get rid of the Germans trapped inside Stalingrad and since the Germans were too low on fuel and men to make a mass breakout many of the German soldiers perished.

Stalingrad was a decisive victory for the Russians, which was won due to the Soviet generals thinking and the fact that the Russians were fighting on home soil. Since the Russians were fighting in their own territory they were well prepared for the winter since they had experienced it many times, whereas the Germans who had never fought in a Russian winter were not. Also the fact that the Russians were fighting for their homeland inspired patriotism within all those in Stalingrad. The Germans were winning at Stalingrad until Operation Uranus was put into action, but this would not have been possible if the Germans had not underestimated the Red Army. The Soviet generals cleverly used their superior fighting forces to encircle the Germans, it was the combination of the plan of Operation Uranus and the sheer size of the Russian army put together that made the Russians win at Stalingrad

Hitler knew it would be predictable, and foolish to attack the same place again, and he also knew that if he could defeat the Russians at Stalingrad, he would gain a very strategic piece of land to mount his operations from. It was at this time that the Germans began Operation Blau, the operation that would be meant for the attack on Stalingrad. (Yoder, “Barbarossa”)

Yet, for the Russians in Stalingrad, the third largest city in the Soviet Union, the Russian people thought that war was far off. However, in the middle of August 1942, The Stalingrad City Soviet began to consider evacuating civilians of the city, and to prepare for attack. (Yoder, “Death of a City”)

The battle of Stalingrad was a main turning point in World War II, and a major victory for the Russians. While the German’s weak battle tactics and arrogant attitude towards fighting, as well as the intelligent Russian battle plans slowed the German advance battle into Stalingrad, the battle of Stalingrad could not have been won without the Russian’s nationalism, and an important home “field” advantage.

According to Operation Blau, the German army had been split up into two groups, German army group A and German Army group B; the commanding officer over both armies was Field Marshal Fedor Von Bock. Army Group B included the Sixth army, and was the most powerful as it was supposed to be the army that finished Russia once and for all. (Editors, Time Life Books, 261)

The German Army Group B began attacking Stalingrad on August 24, 1942. Even though plans were made to evacuate Stalingrad in mid-August, by the time the battle had started, the majority of Russian civilians were still living in the city. The first attacks made by the Germans were those of the Luftwaffe, which bombed downtown Stalingrad, reducing that part of the city to burning rubble.

Over 40,000 Russians were killed in these first attacks, and soon afterward, an actual evacuation of the great city began; yet Stalin urged citizens to stay in the city saying that it would strike fear into the hearts of the enemy.

Men were ordered into factories, and women were sent to dig trenches, and ready battlements. After this primary German attack, the nationalism of the Russians began to be seen all over the streets and homes of Stalingrad. The editors of Stalingrad’s local paper printed out a one-page edition, with the headline reading “We Will Smash the Enemy at the Gates of Stalingrad!” (Yoder, “Death of a City”)

The Russian’s nationalistic pride, and love for their country drove many to stay and fight against the invading German forces. The first days of the battle, German’s orders were to “shave-off” balconies chimneys and other structures that may be harboring the enemy. Even with doubled efforts to stop civilians from standing against the Russian army, thousands of Russian civilians remained in Stalingrad, wanting to fight for a country, and city that they loved.

While Russian nationalism was a key benefit for the Russian’s moral, and fighting tactics, a real advantage came from the fact that the Russians knew every “nook and cranny” of Stalingrad, and were prepared to fight the Germans on the streets of their home. The Russian troops and remaining civilians barricaded the streets with paving stones, mined alleys, sniped from rooftops and threw Molotov cocktails to gain an advantage over the advancing Germans.

One famous Russian sniper, Vasily Zaitsev struck fear into the hearts of German officers by obtaining over 149 kills during the course of the battle. “Pavlov’s House”, a building that Sergeant Yakov Pavlov held for 59 days before being relieved, became recognized as a miracle of sorts; Pavlov would mount anti-tank guns on the roof tops of buildings, easily destroying the tanks below, who could not raise their guns high enough to hit the turrets.

The soviet propaganda machine used these legends to construct entire stories of Zaitsev taking on famous German snipers, and Pavlov holding off teems of the advancing enemy, making the Russian citizens all the more willing to try to become a Soviet legend and die for their countries. Large German Panzer IV tanks equipped with heavy armor and weaponry were completely useless in the tight streets of Stalingrad; the fact that tank fighting was drawn to a minimum was very damaging to the advancing German Army.

A main technique of the Germans was also lost to the small debris filled streets of Stalingrad; their blitzkrieg maneuvers. The Germans’ style of lightning-fast, devastating attacks was halted by the very small area they had to fight in. It was clear that Paulus’s rapid war movement was over. The Germans began to address the war as Rattenkrieg, or the war of the rats. The Russians were able to position themselves in city buildings which gave them a distinct tactical advantage over the Germans who were advancing into the city on foot, under a constant bombardment of Soviet artillery fire.

Even with the tremendous losses, the Germans kept advancing through Stalingrad, leveling blocks with decisive attacks and Stuka dive-bombers. The bulk of the Russian civilians surged forward to attempt to hold the city against the Germans; the Krasny Oktyaber plant continued producing Russian T-42 tanks and sending them straight into battle, sometimes driven by the same civilians that built them. Russian women even defended certain positions along the Soviet line, and all of Stalingrad began to lash back at the harsh German attacks. (Yoder, “Death of a City”)

Despite all the men and women fighting against Hitler and his legions, the German army would still surge forward; that is not to say, however, that the Russian civilian’s movements and decisions were useless during the first days of the fight. The intense nationalism felt by the Russians allowed them to fight with enough gusto to hold off the Germans from taking over important tactical areas such as the ferry landing in central Stalingrad.

The time that the Germans lost to the tightly packed and guarded streets was priceless, and it allowed the Russian armies to mount counter attacks with Yak 1 airplanes, and well calculated strikes against the Germans. While the Russian civilians and troops had made a large dent in the German offensive, it would not be an army that would damage the Germans next, but nature; the Russian winter had arrived, and it was to be the coldest ever to hit Russia in 140 years.

The Russian winters were known for their bitterness, and the one that hit Stalingrad in 1942 was no exception to this reputation; by the end of the war, over 100,000 cases of frostbite were recorded. However, the harsh Russian winter meant more to the clashing armies than losing fingers and toes; each army relied on supply chains vital to their survival that could be jeopardized by the freezing conditions. Not only that, but troops and their duties were greatly hindered by the conditions. Troops went mad with the cold, and abandoned vehicles and weapons in search of warmth, or some relief from the driving winds.

The winter did not favor sides however, and even the Russians who were used to this type of biting cold suffered greatly. Chuikov knew that he had to wait for the great Volga River to freeze before he could re-supply his army. Chuikov had to wait for three weeks before the Volga froze; until that time all he could do was stock pile ammunition, husband his reserves and save his rations of chocolate. Until the Volga froze, a Russian soldier’s life was brutal.

At one point, half of a chocolate bar was the total daily ration for a Russian soldier. Paulus knew he had to act quickly if he was to overtake Stalingrad; if he was able to mount a large attack against the weakened, starving Russian soldiers, it would mean victory for his troops. However, Paulus had problems of his own. He had taken on staggering amounts of casualties due to the harsh fighting on the streets of Stalingrad, and the winter was beginning to take a toll on his own men as well.

Paulus was still confident that he could take Stalingrad, as he now controlled up to 90% of the city. Paulus was in control of the great hill Mamaev Kurgan, the southern residential suburbs, and had broken through to the Volga in downtown Stalingrad. Chuikov now only held downtown Stalingrad, the ferry landing, and Barrikady metal works, and feared that the harsh conditions would end him and his command. (Yoder, “Rattenkrieg”)

The weather would have great consequences for both great armies; Paulus knew that he could not maintain his army in the bombed out deserted city through the entire winter, and he would soon find that supplying his army would become very difficult as he tried to attack Stalingrad with haste. Before mounting an attack, Paulus had some troops of his army “written out” of the battle. (Maule, 61) This meant that many troops were still stationed in Stalingrad with civilian status, and therefore not allowed the soldiers’ rations. After cutting his losses, Paulus requested several battalions of elite combat engineers known as Pioneers.

Before Paulus’ attack had even begun, an entire unit of Pioneers was wiped out by a Russian booby-trap; slowly the awesome might of the German army began to be humbled. It was in the coldest part of the winter that Paulus and his Pioneers spear-headed a final attempt against Stalingrad; the Pioneers threw explosives, ignited the sewers, and detonated satchel charges driving a gap in the Russian line, and splitting Chuikov’s command into three parts. Paulus may have had a small victory, but his armies were exhausted and his forces were now in the center of Stalingrad without supplies, or reinforcements.

On the Russian front, since the Volga was impassible by ship, supplies were air dropped, but because the Russians held such a small amount of land, supplies usually ended up in German forces hands. (Yoder, “Rattenkrieg”). Chuikov mounted multiple small winter offensives, but with Stalin and his commissars breathing down his neck, the attacks ended up being clumsy, and unorganized.(Beckhusen, 258)

The problems with the freezing conditions were becoming more and more apparent in Paulus’ men, and he asked Hitler for advice. In the dispatch that was returned to Paulus, Adolf Hitler assured Paulus that while the Axis forces were in a tight space, the Russians were in much deeper trouble. Paulus readied his men to mount a final attack, but they never got the chance; Chuikov had begun a well-planned counter-attack, and Russian artillery began to destroy Paulus’ lines. It is clear that the weather had a large affect on the battle. The conditions greatly damaged both armies, but the Germans were not prepared to take on the impact of the cold. The winter made Paulus lose men, supplies, and sanity, during the time when the army needed it most.

Major attacks mounted by the Germans were blunted, or halted due to the lack of supplies, and the difficult if not deadly conditions. Finally, the weather brought out the greatest weaknesses in both armies, and almost slowed that battle to a halt. But even with the harsh winter, the Germans would not have been defeated, had it not been for their foolish arrogance, and the Russian’s ingenious tactics.

During the battle, both sides had great tactical blunders; the Germans when they were mounting final offensives, and the Russians when they were defending against the primary German onslaught. However, had it not been for the weakness of the German’s battle plan on November 19th, 1942, and the strength of Russian ones, the Germans may never have fallen.

The Germans had come into the battle sure that they would win, thinking that the Russians were too weak to fight against their might. However, on the morning of November 19th, the Germans realized that their left flank was extremely weak, and that they had many fewer resources than they required. Paulus and his men had taken a series of rash moves that were very costly to them; requesting Pioneers as reinforcements, and then losing most of them in the fighting was very damaging to German forces as well as moral.

It was at this depression that Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky had time to mount a counter-attack that would end up finishing the Germans, once and for all. Zhukov and Vasilevsky both knew that they should attack the Germans where they were weakest; the broader sections of both flanks contained Italians, Romanians and Hungarians, all who were very poorly trained, and not loyal to the Nazi party or the German powers.

Zhukov finally assembled over 1 million fresh troops, 1500 tanks and 2500 heavy guns as well as hundreds of planes for his final assault, in complete secrecy. Operation Uranus was underway, and after the initial bombardment, the Russian soldiers began their attack. Troops and armor easily punched holes in the German forces, and soon, Paulus’ army was completely enveloped with no hope of escape, and no way to get supplies to his men.

While trapped, the German troops only had enough food to survive for six days; Paulus tried to work quickly to evade the strong barricade, but the German’s commanding officers were repeatedly confused by conflicting orders. A German General, Von Monstein was told to help the German’s escape from the encasing ring of Russians, while Paulus was told to hold the city at all costs.

Hitler also gave German troops false hope to boost their morale; multiple times, Hitler said that he would airdrop supplies onto the troops, or that Von Monstein would punch his way through the Russians to deliver supplies, but both of these tactics failed leaving the Germans more weakened and defeated than ever.(Yoder, “Uranus and Saturn”)

On January 30th, 1943, Hitler made Paulus a field marshal; it was a last ditch effort to convince Paulus not to surrender, as no German field marshal had ever been taken prisoner. (“Stalingrad, 1942-1943”, History)

Even with his newly appointed position, Paulus knew that if he and his army continued to fight, they would be annihilated. The day after being promoted, Paulus surrendered. It is clear that there were many flaws in the German’s formations and plans when the Russians launched the double-envelopment counter attack. The German’s left flank was incredibly weak, and after the Russians were able to penetrate the German forces, there was little Paulus could do to halt the onslaught.

Even after Paulus was trapped, continued miscommunication, and false information from the German command weakened and hurt Paulus’ army. Yet, had the Russians not planned an ingenious counter-attack in the first place, nothing would have happened.

The Soviet commanding officers made crucially beneficial decisions that allowed them to target the weakest part in the German army. Also, the sheer fact that the Soviets ordered over 1 million units for the counter-attack in complete secrecy is a miracle. After the loss at Stalingrad, the Germans slowly began to wither in size and strength.

Following the battle, the German’s Sixth Army was completely annihilated. Of the 350,000 troops that Paulus led into battle only 90,000 survived. Afterwards the 90,000 prisoners were worked in Soviet camps, until only 5,000 came home to their families. (Yoder, Annihilation) The Germans would retain a scar that would never be lifted, and the power of the Germans as a fighting force was greatly reduced after the loss at Stalingrad. Stalingrad itself was awarded the title “Hero City” for the bravery of it’s occupants during the attack.

A colossal statue of “Mother Russia” was erected on Mamayev Kurgan, a central hill of the battle. One of the greatest battles of all time was fought and won by an army and people that were never believed to win. It is clear that the battle of Stalingrad could not have been won without the Russian’s great nationalism, and an important home “field” advantage.